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University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1971
Political Science, general

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BRAZIL'S INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY

by

Gary Page Sibeck

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

(Latin American Studies)

August 1971

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The period 1961-1964 in Brazil, from the inauguration of Jânio Quadros as President until the revolution that overthrew President João Goulart, was a time of considerable experimentation and innovation in Brazilian foreign relations. During this period Quadros rebuffed the traditional allies and friends of Brazil and sought new diplomatic and commercial agreements with the Communist countries in Eastern Europe and the Far East. In addition, Quadros attempted to achieve new leadership for Brazil among the underdeveloped countries of the world. This drive for Brazilian pre-eminence and international influence was particularly directed toward the sub-Saharan countries of Africa, and to a lesser extent toward the other countries of Latin America. After Quadros resigned, and João Goulart became President, the latter attempted to continue these new directions in foreign relations for Brazil, but he was so beset with

domestic problems that he was never able to accomplish any real international gains in the implementation of the new foreign policy begun by Quadros. The Brazilian diplomatic and external economic relations conducted by Quadros and Goulart became popularly known by journalists and historians as Brazil's independent foreign policy. This study is a review of those foreign relations implemented by Quadros and Goulart to determine whether or not they constituted an independent foreign policy and the motive or reason for their actions, which seemingly were such an abrupt change of traditional Brazilian foreign policy.

Until the presidential administration of Quadros, Brazil had rather consistently followed the lead of the United States in her foreign relations with other countries. There had been a few attempts to assert some independent Brazilian influence in world affairs such as Brazil's activities in the League of Nations and Getúlio Vargas' position in the Korean War. While these actions were mostly negative in nature, they were never directly against United States policy, as they were to become during the Quadros and Goulart administrations. When Quadros became President, he initiated activities in foreign relations that appeared to be deliberate attempts at antagonizing the United States in

every conceivable way. Such an attitude of independence in Brazilian foreign policy came as a surprise to many government officials in Washington because the extent of such independence had not been predicted. The rhetoric of Quadros' election campaign speeches had alluded to the possibility of Brazil's pursuing greater independence in her foreign relations when he became President, but campaign oratory is easily disregarded as idle promises.

Jânio Quadros' presidential administration was orthodox and conservative in Brazilian domestic economic policies. He had the problems familiar to all Brazilian presidents attempting to balance the economy and deal with the balance of payments in international trade. He initiated such standard steps to stop inflation as decreasing government expenditures by discharging many government employees and by decreasing the salaries of some of those who remained. Quadros also had the perennial Brazilian problem of solving the problem of the surplus of coffee that entered the market each year. Brazilians had traditionally destroyed part of the crop and tried to sell more coffee to the North American and Western European markets. Quadros was expected to follow the usual pattern for handling the surplus coffee problem, so there was nothing distinctively

unique or unusual in his domestic program for improving the Brazilian economy.

In the area of Brazilian foreign relations, however, the situation was entirely different. Quadros planned and implemented dramatic changes in the direction of Brazilian diplomacy. Each new step was taken with a combination of ambiguity and flamboyant moves. No sooner would he and his foreign minister deny that they were considering a particular course of action with respect to foreign policy than the new policy would be an accomplished act. Even more interesting was the fact that Brazilian government officials themselves never seemed to know what Quadros had in mind for the next move in Brazilian diplomacy.

In 1961, during Quadros' seven months in office, there was a culmination of an international consciousness which had been emerging in Brazil especially since World War II. Conscious of the lack of an independent voice in world affairs in the past and of their growing industrial power, ambitious Brazilians sought a larger voice in international affairs and status as a world power. Under the leadership of Quadros, diplomatic and international commercial actions were taken which constituted an independent foreign policy, and at the same time preserved many of the

country's traditional goals. This independent foreign policy had the threefold direction of rebuffing Brazil's traditional friends such as the United States and Great Britain, stressing solidarity with Latin America and the emerging nations of Africa, and seeking to develop relations with the Sino-Soviet world.

Historically, Brazil's basic foreign policy goals have always been the preservation of the nation's sovereignty and the furtherance of its international trade position. As a result of the Luso-Brazilian heritage, Brazil has supported the pacific settlement of disputes, stressing the use of negotiation and international law. The Brazilians have been very vocal in their defense of the principles of the equality of states and nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other states; and the country has consistently supported international organizations, evidenced by its participation in the work of the League of Nations and the United Nations.

Brazil is potentially the greatest power in Latin America, in terms of size, population, and resources. The people of Brazil, aware of these potentialities, wanted to know why their country could not play a much more important

role in international affairs.¹ To them, geopolitical strength in world affairs was predicated only upon geographical size and demographic numbers, and Brazil had both. Matters of financial and technological capacity were not seriously considered. Throughout much of Brazilian history, the country had been a stabilizing factor on the Latin American scene, and it had engaged in only one war of aggression--the War of the Triple Alliance. As in domestic politics, the people's aversion to violence has been coupled with a hard bargaining sense.

After World War II, Brazil aspired to a more important and prominent role in world affairs. Brazilian diplomats had played their part in the creation of the United Nations in San Francisco. Brazilian officials furthered the principle of collective security within the inter-American system and consistently supported the United States and the West against the Soviet bloc, especially when Cold War issues were involved, such as the Berlin blockade.

Brazilian historians such as José Honório Rodrigues have attempted to trace what they call an independent

¹Raymundo Pimental Gomes, Por Que Não Somos Uma Grande Potência? (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, S.A., 1965).

foreign policy for Brazil back through the nineteenth century. The actions Brazil took to resist the encroachments of European nations, especially Great Britain, were the essence of that independent foreign policy. No one besides Brazilians, however, has considered such actions or reactions to the European powers' advances as being an independent foreign policy. There was an effort, however, to follow an independent course in foreign matters during the last Getúlio Vargas administration (1950-1954). At that time, Brazil refused to commit troops under the United Nations for action in Korea, for example. The Brazilian Congress refused to grant the United States exclusive access to strategic resources and balked at United States insistence on limiting trade in strategic materials with the Soviet bloc.² In addition, hostility to "domination" by foreign capital increased, with clear anti-United States overtones. Vargas himself encouraged this sentiment.

President Juscelino Kubitschek's proposal for an Operation Pan-America to attack the social, political, and economic ills of Latin America was also an indication of

² John W. F. Dulles, Vargas of Brazil (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962), p. 309; Raul Fernandes, A Política Exterior do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Jornal do Comercio, Rodrigues & co., 1951), pp. 60-70.

Brazil's determination to play a larger role in hemispheric affairs. The decision of the United States to proceed independently in this area dismayed Kubitschek, and Brazilians decried the indifference of the Western allies to Latin America. In 1958, Brazil refused to participate in any United Nations policing action in Lebanon, and in 1959, a trade agreement was signed with the Soviet Union.

It was Jânio Quadros who gave full expression to an independent foreign policy. While orally reaffirming traditional ties to the United States, he sought to free Brazil from its economic dependence on American trade and loans. I was interested in the reasons why Jânio Quadros wanted to change Brazilian foreign relations, why he made these changes in the flamboyant manner that he did, and what he hoped to accomplish by them. This study, then, is a review of Quadros' foreign relations as they were applied to the United States, Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America, including the Communist countries. An examination will be made of the cultural, economic, and diplomatic relations since all three were used in different ways in the different geographic areas of the world. The relations will be studied in connection with the diplomatic overtures made by the various countries to Brazil, and the overtures Brazil

initiated and extended to other countries. Chapter II and Chapter III deal with the application of Brazilian foreign policy to the United States. Chapter IV treats of the application of the foreign policy to Western and Eastern Europe. Chapter V discusses the special efforts by Quadros to achieve leadership in Africa, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter VI is a description of the interplay in international relations between Brazil and Communist China. Chapter VII is concerned with the efforts of Brazil to exercise leadership in Latin America. Chapter VIII tells of the resignation of Jânio Quadros. Quadros initiated an independent foreign policy for Brazil, but it did not come to a complete end with his sudden resignation. There was an attempt by the succeeding President, João Goulart, to continue the same policy. This study, therefore, includes a chapter (Chapter IX) on Goulart's foreign policy because it was his fate to reap the aftermath of the international diplomatic and economic moves begun by Quadros. Chapter X is the conclusion.

Before considering the foreign policy of Jânio Quadros in depth, it is necessary to describe the Brazilian governmental organization through which Brazilian foreign policy is conducted. To understand the organization we must

turn to the Brazilian Constitution of 1946, because that was the constitution in effect in 1961. After discussion of the constitution, there will be a summarization of the responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Foreign Service. These are the constitutional source and governmental agencies from which and through which Brazilian foreign policy had been traditionally conducted until the advent of Jânio Quadros; therefore, an appreciation of their position in Brazilian diplomacy aids in comprehending Quadros' unique methods in implementing an independent foreign policy.

The powers relating to foreign relations were vested by the Brazilian Constitution in the Union, which by definition included the States, the Federal District and the Territories.³ The primary responsibility for the direction of foreign policy lay with the Union, but as a practical matter this meant the President. The Constitution granted him exclusive power to maintain relations with foreign states. He negotiated international treaties and conventions and had the power to declare war, make peace and

³Brazil, Constitution (1946), Title I, Chap. I, Art. 1.

permit the transit or stationing of foreign troops, and he was the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.⁴

Certain of these powers, however, required action by the Congress. It had to authorize the President to declare war (except in the event of invasion when it was not in session), make peace and permit the passage or stationing of foreign troops. Senate approval was required for the appointment of permanent heads of diplomatic missions. In addition, Congress was empowered to pass laws concerning the establishment of the armed forces and the settlement of boundary disputes. Either house or its committees could summon the Minister of Foreign Relations to give information and could conduct inquiries into foreign policy. Congressional support and appropriations were often required for the implementation of foreign policy.⁵

The principal agent of the President in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy is the Minister of Foreign Relations, appointed by and responsible to the President. Brazil has been distinguished for the high quality of many of its foreign ministers, the line of which includes

⁴Brazil, Constitution (1946), Title I, Chap. I, Art. 5.

⁵Ibid., Chap. II, Art. 65.

many illustrious names, such as the Baron of Rio Branco and Osvaldo Aranha. Some foreign ministers have remained in office for relatively long periods, notably the Baron of Rio Branco (1902-1912), who in ten years was able to raise the standards of the Ministry and give a new direction to Brazil's foreign policy. For the most part, however, there has been a rapid turnover; between January, 1961 and the first of April, 1964, for example, there were no fewer than six foreign ministers. With all respect to Quadros, however, it must be stated that these changes occurred during the Goulart administration. Quadros had one foreign minister during his administration, Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco. The changes in the Goulart administration reflect the turbulence of the period in which he was President. This lack of continuity was especially serious after Brazil's foreign policy entered a more assertive phase.

The Ministry of Foreign Relations, commonly referred to as Itamaraty (named for the building in which it is housed),⁶ became under Quadros one of the most efficient and effective in Latin America. This fact is attested to by the

⁶Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Palácio Itamaraty (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1937), p. 3. The building was constructed by the second Baron of Itamaraty in 1851.

manner in which the officials in the Ministry of Foreign Relations implemented the foreign policies of Quadros, especially with regard to the Far East and Eastern Europe. The Minister is assisted by a Cabinet, a range of specialized commissions, and a high career diplomat called the Secretary General who heads a Secretariat.⁷

The Secretariat was formerly divided into the departments of administrative affairs, economic and consular affairs, and political and cultural affairs. The lack of coordination between the departments made for serious problems, and the excessive demands of day-to-day administration left officials with little time for long-term policy formulation.⁸

A reorganization of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, which had been under study since 1953, was finally carried out under Quadros in 1961. The principal innovation was the creation of geographical divisions to parallel the old functional divisions. The geographical principle

⁷Lygia de Oliveira Azevedo and José Saldanha da Gama e Silva, Evolução do Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Publicação da Divisão de Pesquisas do Instituto Brasileiro de Administração, Fundação Getúlio Vargas), p. 172. (Mimeographed.)

⁸Ibid., pp. 173-183.

predominated, with political, economic, and cultural affairs being coordinated within each region. The office of the Secretary General was strengthened and a policy planning committee created to coordinate policy and undertake long-term policy formulation. The Secretary General was assisted by Assistant Secretaries General for American Affairs; Western European, Near Eastern and African Affairs; East European and Asian Affairs; Internal Organizations; Economic Affairs; and Policy Planning. A special liaison service with Congress was set up. Machinery to strengthen and coordinate overseas information and trade services was also created. To increase public understanding of foreign policy, so very important during the Quadros administration, the Ministry's press and publications services were expanded and radio and television increasingly used.⁹

The Foreign Service was increased to fill the new diplomatic posts created by Quadros and was made up of over five hundred foreign service officers. The corps was one of the best trained and most efficient in Latin American. The

⁹Bela C. Maday, U.S. Army Area Handbook for Brazil (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 398.

tradition of a career service dated back about forty years, and its roots could be traced to the Empire.¹⁰

Career diplomats were selected by a centralized examination system and were trained in the famed Rio Branco Institute, established in 1945. Candidates for the Institute had to be Brazilian born, be between the ages of twenty and thirty-three, and have completed their secondary education and their military service. Entrance examinations included qualifying examinations in several languages, history, geography, political economy, law and general culture. Physical examinations and psychological and aptitude tests were administered, and the character and morality of the individual investigated. The two-year preparatory course in the Institute included Portuguese, English, geography, Brazilian diplomatic history, political economy, international public and private law, and constitutional, administrative, civil, and commercial law. After successful completion of the course, candidates served a two-year apprenticeship in the Ministry of Foreign Relations, during which they were enrolled in advanced courses, including diplomatic

¹⁰Azevedo and da Gama e Silva, Evolução do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, pp. 1 and 100.

and consular practice, treaties, Brazilian studies and political economy. They then received an overseas assignment. A few candidates were admitted without passing through the preparatory course. Ambassadors were generally chosen from the career service.¹¹

In the past, the Foreign Service was a rather closed circle. Familial and political influence and seniority were often more important than merit in determining eligibility and promotion. A reorganization of the Foreign Service under Kubitschek made it somewhat more open to new geographical and social influence, however. Whereas all recruiting had been done in Rio de Janeiro, preliminary examinations began to be administered in a number of cities throughout the country, and the successful candidates were brought to Rio de Janeiro for further examinations with expenses paid. A number of scholarships were also created. Also, in the past, the members of the Foreign Service were always predominantly of Caucasian descent. The theory behind this was the belief that lighter faces would receive better reception in diplomatic circles abroad. Quadros changed this established tradition and ordered that there should be diplomats

¹¹Maday, U.S. Army Handbook for Brazil, p. 399.

selected from among the Negro population of Brazil.¹² Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos added to Quadros' order and recommended to the director of the Rio Branco Institute that they should obey the principles of President Jânio Quadros regarding racial prejudice, open and disguised, and that any remaining prejudice should be abolished within the service of the Foreign Ministry.¹³ Thus under Quadros further efforts were made to professionalize the Foreign Service and to make it generally more democratic in its selection and promotion, while still respecting the traditions of the service.

Complementing this democratization of the Foreign Service there was also the prevailing theory that the foreign policies of Jânio Quadros represented the will and influence of the people of Brazil in determining an independent foreign policy. No longer were the international relations of Brazil dictated by foreign powers or even strictly controlled in the governmental hierarchy without any consideration of what Brazilian people wanted. This theme was included in the writings of Brazilian liberal authors of the

¹² Diário de Notícias, February 2, 1961, p. 1.

¹³ O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, March 21, 1961, p. 2.

Quadros period such as José Honório Rodrigues and Hélio Jaguaribe. Probably nothing was really farther from the truth, however, than this idea of the Brazilian people influencing Brazilian foreign policy. If anything, Brazilian foreign policy was strictly under the control of Jânio Quadros himself. He, and seemingly he alone, determined the directions of Brazilian diplomatic relations. He became famous for his written and published memos to his Minister of Foreign Relations in which he would direct him to study or to pursue a certain objective in international affairs.¹⁴ These memos apparently were sent at times without any prior consultation with his Foreign Minister, and the first knowledge that the Foreign Minister would obtain of the memos came through press releases. The Foreign Minister thus became little more than an errand boy of Quadros in the pursuit of an independent foreign policy. The relationship must have been satisfactory to the Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco because he remained loyal to Quadros throughout his administration, and even afterwards.

This study is not an attempt to present a history of the Jânio Quadros administration in Brazil. It is, rather,

¹⁴"Jânio New Look," O Cruzeiro, April 1, 1961, p. 6.

a review of the diplomatic and external economic relations of Brazil initiated by Quadros with foreign countries and implemented by his Ministry of Foreign Relations and his diplomatic service. As a result of this review, an effort will be made to ascertain the reasoning behind the new directions taken by Quadros on behalf of Brazil in her foreign relations, and to attempt an explanation of Quadros' negative reaction to overtures extended to him by the United States, his warm reaction to advances made by the Communist countries, and his desire to establish closer relations with the underdeveloped nations of the world. These innovations of Quadros in the field of Brazilian foreign relations became known, popularly, as Brazil's independent foreign policy. This study will attempt to determine to what extent this departure from traditional policy actually constituted a Brazilian independent foreign policy.

CHAPTER II

THE ORIGIN OF BRAZIL'S INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY

President Quadros' Meeting with Ambassador Adolf A. Berle, Jr.

Adolf A. Berle, Jr., President Kennedy's personal representative to Brazil, waited in the anteroom of the Brazilian presidential office for the green lights to come on. The system of red and green lights had been introduced into the governmental offices by the Brazilian President Jânio Quadros for the purpose of administrative efficiency. Finally, the red light changed to green, and Ambassador Berle obtained the long-awaited interview with President Quadros. Berle, accompanied on his mission by the United States Ambassador to Brazil, John Moors Cabot, conferred with the President for approximately two hours.¹ Details of

¹New York Times, March 3, 1961, p. 7; Washington Post, March 6, 1961, p. A9; Christian Science Monitor, March 7, 1961, p. 5.

the conversational exchange which took place at this meeting on March 2, 1961, in Brasília are not available, but as subsequent events were to prove, there is no question that it was a controversial encounter and that the President of Brazil and the special representative of President Kennedy did not leave the meeting in complete agreement.

Upon departing from the conference, neither Ambassador Berle nor Ambassador Cabot would comment on the meeting, since they believed that any statement should come from the Brazilian chief executive. In the usual diplomatic language Berle said that his meeting had been very cordial and interesting. As a result of this news vacuum, reporters and commentators were soon giving rather thorough coverage--some of it based on rumors and speculation and some of a more responsible nature. The reports in the press seemed to indicate that the United States and Brazil had agreed to disagree regarding their differences in foreign policy pertaining to various areas of the world, and Latin American in particular. More specifically, the assumption was made that the two countries differed in their opinion regarding the correct manner in which the Cuban problem should be handled. Such a divergent viewpoint at this time, combined with the Brazilian moves in the direction of the world neutralist

bloc which Quadros had recently undertaken, was considered as posing a threat to the cordiality of Brazilian relations with the Kennedy administration. The United States considered the Cuban problem a continental issue that could not be mediated by any individual western hemisphere nation.²

President Kennedy thus desired the support and assistance of the other Latin American countries in resolving the Cuban problem.

As if to exacerbate the situation, the reporters were soon filing more colorful accounts of the meeting. Time magazine injected a personal note and reported that, as the futile talks ended, Berle extended his hand to say goodbye, but that Quadros had refused to shake it.³ Then, Quadros pointedly turned his back on the special envoy of the President of the United States. All of this occurred to the apparent dismay of Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco.

Coupled with this alleged intransigent attitude of President Quadros in aggravating the matter were his acts

²New York Times, March 3, 1961, p. 7; Washington Post, March 6, 1961, p. A9; Christian Science Monitor, March 7, 1961, p. 5.

³"Brazil: Insult to Injury," Time, LXXVII (March 17, 1961), 32.

subsequent to the meeting. Only a few hours after talking with Berle, an announcement was made that President Josip Tito of Yugoslavia had accepted an invitation to visit Brazil.⁴ The announcement was accompanied by instructions for the establishment of a special task force to prepare an agenda for cultural and economic negotiations with the Yugoslavs, although no date at the time had been set for Marshal Tito's arrival. While, normally, such an announcement would be rather routine, under the peculiar circumstances, it could easily be considered an affront to the United States.

For example when Berle had first tried to see Quadros in Brasília, the President postponed the meeting because he had to make an unexpected trip to Rio de Janeiro for a state governor's funeral. The funeral trip, however, did not prevent Quadros from receiving the chief of the Cuban agency, who brought him gifts from Cuba's economic leader, Ernesto Guevara.⁵ On this occasion Quadros expressed his "great admiration for Guevara." Until this time Quadros had refused to see any United States or Western

⁴New York Times, March 4, 1961, p. 1; Washington Post, March 6, 1961, p. A9; Christian Science Monitor, March 7, 1961, p. 5.

⁵New York Times, March 5, 1961, Pt. IV, p. 6.

European reporters. Perhaps this refusal to cooperate with the press was the reason they sought their revenge on him by reporting all that was unfavorable to Quadros as though it were headline news. For example, they reported that President Quadros had let Berle fly to Brasília aboard a 6:00 a.m. commercial flight rather than invite him to come along in his nearly empty presidential aircraft in which he was simultaneously returning from Rio de Janeiro.

As a result of the press reports, there ensued an unfavorable reaction to the Brazilian treatment of Ambassador Berle specifically and of the United States generally.⁶ To calm matters down, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry offered assurances that United States and Brazilian cordiality had not been affected. Later, after Berle had returned to the United States, the Brazilian representative to the United Nations called on Berle in New York to apologize for what might have been an unintentional slight in the failure of high-ranking officials to see him off at the airport in Rio de Janeiro.⁷ The reason given was a confusion of schedules. Still later, on March 21, 1961, the Brazilian Foreign

⁶ O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, March 5, 1961, p. 1; Washington Post, March 9, 1961, p. A23.

⁷ New York Times, March 7, 1961, p. 13.

Ministry made public an exchange of letters between Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco which made light of reports that the American had been snubbed during his visit to Brazil. In a letter dated March 14, 1961, Berle said that he greatly appreciated the cordiality, frankness, and clarity with which Janio Quadros expressed the presidential views during the interview with him.⁸

Yet, despite all this belated expression of cordiality, Berle had still been unable to get Brazilian backing for a united Latin American front against Castro's Cuba. The idea seemed to be that Jânio Quadros was determined to achieve a totally independent position halfway between the United States and the Communist bloc and that he would brook no argument.⁹

The press reports of Quadros' treatment of Berle also brought a reaction in Washington, D.C., and aroused members of the United States Appropriations Subcommittee. The United States Congress was particularly interested in Brazil's foreign policy at this time because Brazilian

⁸New York Times, March 22, 1961, p. 4.

⁹Washington Post, March 6, 1961, p. A9; Christian Science Monitor, March 7, 1961, p. 5.

officials had handed to Berle a memorandum stipulating the extremely large amount of aid that they would require. Berle was invited to appear before the Subcommittee. At the hearing, Berle stated that there had been a great deal of false reporting about his meeting with President Quadros. This reporting had convinced him that someone in Brazil or in the United States was anxious to create a false impression and create difficulties between the two governments. A month later he was more specific in enumerating his charges against the news reporters and their papers. He said that he had regrettably learned to discount the press comments from Rio de Janeiro, as well as those of other people, on what the government would or would not do. He further added that he thought that there were twenty-seven different papers in Rio de Janeiro. Some of them were quite pro-American. One or two, he thought, were probably under Communist domination, and he believed that the United States should not accept their views as those of the government of Brazil.¹⁰ In these hearings, Berle at all times said that the meeting had been frank and cordial.

¹⁰ John Hickey, "The Day Mr. Berle Talked with Mr. Quadros," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XV (Summer, 1961), 58-60.

On April 7, 1961, the United States Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, John M. Cabot, responded to Time with a letter which said:

I have noted your account of President Quadros' meeting with Ambassador Berle. In view of the great respect and wide circulation enjoyed by your review, I feel that as one of four persons present I should inform you that story is entirely incorrect. No incident or affront of any nature occurred during the interview. Foreign Minister Arinos was not even present.¹¹

Unless a tape recording could be produced of the conversation held at the Berle-Quadros meeting, or some other more persuasive physical evidence brought to light, no newsman could claim to have presented a more accurate view of the meeting than that which Berle himself offered to the House Appropriations Subcommittee. However, due to the prestigious position held by the newspapers and magazines which printed the account describing the interview, one is reluctant to accept Berle's allegation that someone was anxious to create a false impression with the intention of causing a misunderstanding between the two governments. Scholars and diplomats generally agree that one purpose of the Berle mission was to obtain support for a collective

¹¹Hickey, "The Day Mr. Berle Talked with Mr. Quadros," p. 67.

quarantine of Cuba by all the other American republics.¹²
In Brazil, Berle appears to have encountered an unwillingness on the part of President Quadros to take a position against Castro in a collective venture. Probably the cause of Brazilian-American relations would have been benefited had there been a frank statement of the purpose of the mission, the areas of discussion, and the specific areas of disagreement.

Regardless of the success or failure of the Berle mission, there was a much more significant aspect of it for the citizens of the United States. As a result of the journalists' reports to their news media of this meeting, the people and government of the United States became suddenly and painfully aware of the extent and degree of the "independent foreign policy" that Jânio Quadros desired to pursue for Brazil. It became patently manifest that this policy was going to be a radical change from the one pursued by Brazil in the past. Americans had previously thought that Brazil would support the international positions taken by the United States, especially in Latin American. Some may regard this meeting as the beginning of Brazil's

¹²Hickey, "The Day Mr. Berle Talked with Mr. Quadros," p. 69.

"independent foreign policy." Certainly it seemed to be so as far as the United States was concerned. A review of Brazilian diplomatic history will reveal, however, that the desire for an independent foreign policy may have been slowly developing over the years. It is possible that President Quadros' promulgation of that foreign policy was only the culmination of the years of Brazilian frustration in never being able to develop their own policy. An independent foreign policy, to Brazilians, meant that they could act in their own best interests without regard to the opinions and aims of other nations of the Western world.

After President Quadros took office, no one except he himself, perhaps, was sure where Brazil's foreign policy was heading. His apparently ambivalent attitude created confusion among Brazilians as well as foreigners. As a result of some of his actions, certain of his countrymen accused him of planning to deliver Brazil into the neutralist camp. In March, 1961, in his first State of the Nation address to Brazil's Congress, Jânio Quadros sought to clarify his position.¹³

¹³Christian Science Monitor, March 16, 1961, p. 14.

Jânio Quadros denied that he was a neutralist. He gave assurance that Brazil would not forsake the ideals of democracy, because Brazil's ideological position was Western and would not change. What he favored, Quadros emphasized, was an independent Brazilian voice in world affairs and increased friendship with Communist nations. "The East-West conflict," he said, "tends increasingly to restrict itself to ideological attitudes. We have faith in ours, and we wish no ill to people who differ."¹⁴

Coexistence, as Quadros saw it, meant that "Brazil cannot ignore the reality, vitality and dynamism of the Soviet state." Again he proclaimed his desire for diplomatic and trade relations with the Communist bloc and his intention of voting in the United Nations to debate Red

¹⁴"A posição ideológica do Brasil é ocidental e não variará. O reconhecimento dessa verdade, porém não exaure o conteúdo da nossa política exterior. O Brasil só pode ver sua causa ideológica condicionada por seu carácter nacional e seus interesses legítimos . . . O conflito Leste-Oeste tende a restringir-se cada vez mais, ao campo das atitudes ideológicas. Temos confiança nas nossas, mas não desejamos mal aos povos que as têm diferentes. Não existem, a nosso ver, quaisquer que sejam as expectativas subjetivas de cada facção, conflitos ou antagonismos de índole doutrinária, ou social, que sejam incompatíveis com a política de convivência sincera, de coexistência leal." "Presidência," Visão, XVIII (March 24, 1961), 13.

China's admission. But Quadros was also careful to add that "we hope to place our relations with our traditional friend of the north on a fertile and realistic bilateral basis. We hope for United States understanding and support."¹⁵

Quadros' hope of winning the United States' support rested chiefly on his domestic policies. He inherited from his extravagant predecessor, Juscelino Kubitschek, a cumulative two billion dollar foreign debt, the prospects of a balance-of-payment deficit of over six hundred million dollars, and rampant inflation. As a countermeasure, Quadros abolished highly preferential exchange rates and in effect subsidized imports of oil, wheat, newsprint, fertilizers, and machinery.¹⁶

Quadros was aware that his economic austerity program was likely to jeopardize his political popularity. The reforms he promised, however, such as antitrust legislation, land reform and a general tax overhaul, would stand Brazil in good stead abroad as well as at home. When President Kennedy declared such reforms to be one of the conditions of United States aid to Latin American nations, Quadros sent

¹⁵ Washington Post, March 6, 1961, p. A9; Christian Science Monitor, March 7, 1961, p. 5.

¹⁶ Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 194-195.

special envoys to both the United States and Europe to arrange extensions of time to settle old debts and to investigate the chances of new loans.

Quadros' position with respect to the United States was somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, he tried to satisfy the demands of the United States by correcting deficiencies in the Brazilian economy in order to acquire the needed credits which he so desperately needed. On the other hand, he initiated an "independent foreign policy" which in itself may not have appeared to antagonize the United States, but certainly his manner and the methods he employed could hardly have been designed to do otherwise. His actions in pursuit of that foreign policy left little doubt about the direction in which he was leading Brazil. The soothing words of his State of the Nation address did little to dispel the concern of the United States over the new trend.¹⁷

Later, Quadros again tried to answer the question regarding the direction of Brazilian foreign policy and to give the specifics of his "independent foreign policy" in an article in the periodical Foreign Affairs in October, 1961. The article was written before he resigned from his office

¹⁷Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964, p. 199.

but did not appear in print until after he had left Brazil. It is probably one of the most succinct, precise statements of foreign policy issued by Quadros. In this article, Quadros emphasizes two objectives of his "independent foreign policy" and how he was trying to accomplish them. The first was an attempt to be truly independent of the influence of the United States, Great Britain, and other Western powers in Brazilian foreign matters and relations, and the second was an attempt not to be tied to any particular foreign bloc or group of countries.¹⁸ While he recognized the historical and cultural ties to the Western world, he was willing to go no further than admit that they existed. Quadros did not want any alliance with the Western powers. The second objective represented a logical first step in his foreign trade with countries which historically had not been Brazil's trading partners and markets.¹⁹ Quadros hoped to raise the standard of living of all Brazilians by the greater income that would result from such trade. Furthermore, Quadros realized that the Brazilian exports to the West were not expanding rapidly enough to provide the

¹⁸ Jânio Quadros, "Brazil's New Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, XL (October, 1961), 26.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 27.

foreign exchange necessary for the accelerated rate of industrialization Brazil required to cope with its burgeoning population. There was no alternative, he believed, but to go behind the Iron Curtain countries to find new markets.²⁰ The expression of a desire to trade with them at that time appears strange inasmuch as Brazil had not accorded diplomatic recognition to those countries.

These two thrusts, then, constituted the foundation of his foreign policy. They were to lead Brazil through an exciting seven months during his administration. To understand the reasoning behind the two thrusts and to put them in proper perspective, it is necessary to review the historical development of Brazilian attempts to achieve an independent foreign policy.

The Historical Concept of an Independent Foreign Policy in Brazil

A review of Brazilian diplomatic history reveals that Brazil attempted to achieve an independent foreign policy at least four times since 1822. These attempts represent (1) the effort by Brazil to formulate its own policies independent of British political and economic influence,

²⁰ John J. Johnson, "Politics and Economics in Brazil," Current History, XLII (February, 1962), 91.

which was exerted by Great Britain from the arrival of the royal family of Braganza in Brazil until approximately 1888; (2) the era of Foreign Minister José Maria da Silva Paranhos, Baron of Rio Branco, whose policies initiated a long-lasting influence on Brazilian foreign policy; (3) an initiation into extracontinental combat in the First World War and subsequent participation in the League of Nations, from 1917 until 1926; and (4) the independent foreign policy of the Jânio Quadros administration, for the seven months of Quadros' presidency in 1961 and continuing to a lesser extent until 1964 during the administration of João Goulart.

Before Brazil emerged as an independent nation, the mother country, Portugal, had fallen almost completely under the political and economic domination of Great Britain. The British were able to extend this domination to Brazil. The Brazilians were forced to accept an arrangement whereby England would direct its foreign policy and economics. British ships had escorted the royal family of Braganza and a sizeable retinue to Brazil. They had aided the mentally ill Portuguese Queen Maria and her son, Prince Regent D. João, to escape the invading French forces. The ships sailed from Lisbon in November, 1807, and sighted Bahia in

January, 1808.²¹ Soon after arriving in Brazil, the Prince Regent took steps to open the ports of Brazil to the trade of the world. No longer was Brazil's commerce to be channeled exclusively through Portugal. The English were quick to take advantage of the situation and benefited considerably from the new commercial opportunities. In reality, this meant that the ports were open to the English only as long as Napoleon dominated Europe. The British realized that they had to make some provision for the time when the blockade of Europe would cease and the war would end, when other nations would again be in a position to compete with Great Britain in Brazil.

Great Britain sent Percy Clinton Sydney Smythe Viscount Strangford to Brazil in 1808 to negotiate a treaty of alliance, friendship, and commerce between the two countries.²² The final treaties were signed in 1810.²³ These

²¹ Alan K. Manchester, British Preeminence in Brazil: Its Rise and Decline (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1933), p. 69.

²² João Pandiá Calogeras, A Política Exterior do Império (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1927), II, 336-338.

²³ Leslie Bethell, "The Independence of Brazil and the Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Anglo-Brazilian Relations, 1822-1826," Journal of Latin American Studies, I, Pt. 2 (November, 1969), 120.

treaties gave almost all the economic and trade advantages to the English. The treaty conditions were so unfavorable to Brazil that Brazil became economically dependent on England. The treaties gave English merchants in Brazil immunity from visit and search in their homes and warehouses, allowed them extraterritorial rights in legal disputes, and lowered the import duties on their merchandise to 15 percent, while the Portuguese were paying 16 percent and the merchants of other countries 25 percent. In this matter Great Britain had preempted Portugal. Brazil actually gained little from the treaty. Her tropical exports were not even permitted a favorable entry into British ports, because these products would compete with similar produce from colonial possessions in the Empire. Brazilian historians have been almost unanimous in condemning the treaties, especially the stipulations granting the British a lower tariff than the Portuguese on imports into Brazil. They have particularly abhorred the right of British subjects to be tried by special judges, an instance of the kind of special right secured by the extraterritorial laws of the Orient.²⁴

²⁴ João P. Calógeras, A History of Brazil, trans. and ed. by Percy A. Martin (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1939), p. 60.

In addition to the economic advantages it had gained, Great Britain sought to exert its influence in diplomacy. The British intervened in Brazilian foreign policy with regard to territorial matters in the region of the La Plata. While the La Plata region was involved in serious political problems following independence, Portuguese troops invaded the area known as the Banda Oriental in 1816, under the pretext of protecting Brazilian boundaries from anarchy. After four years of intermittent fighting, the Portuguese obtained control in 1820. The Banda Oriental became the Cisplatine Province and was annexed to Brazil.²⁵ The province remained quiet for a few years under the Portuguese and then later the Brazilian Empire. Many of the inhabitants, however, were unhappy with Brazilian domination. As a result of their displeasure, they began a revolt, and Buenos Aires extended them aid. The intervention of Buenos Aires led Brazil to declare war on the area under the nominal control of the province and city of Buenos Aires.²⁶ The British were extremely displeased with the war since it interfered with their commerce; Great Britain felt obliged to

²⁵ Calógeras, History of Brazil, p. 67.

²⁶ Andrew Marshall, Brazil (London: Thames and Hudson, 1966), p. 56.

stop the squabbling of youthful nations. England decided that its economic interests would be served to better advantage if the Banda Oriental became the independent country of Uruguay. The British exerted the necessary pressure and Brazil and Buenos Aires were forced to acquiesce. A treaty, signed by the belligerent parties in 1828 made Uruguay an independent country.²⁷

Probably the most serious difficulty to arise between Britain and Portuguese America stemmed from the attempts of the British to suppress the slave trade. In the matter of slavery, the British had become intent upon abolition, and their obsession blinded them to almost all other matters. From 1808 until 1888, when slavery was finally abolished in Brazil, the British persistently brought pressure to bear on the Portuguese and the Brazilians to stop the traffic.²⁸ England imposed on the Empire of Brazil the agreements previously concluded with Portugal in regard to the suppression of the slave trade. In fact, the English were so adamant about the problem of the slave trade that it permeated almost all their other relationships with Brazil.

²⁷ Marshall, Brazil, p. 56.

²⁸ Manchester, British Preeminence in Brazil, p. 159.

In few other matters have the British stood so firm and so right. Great Britain used the leverage of offering diplomatic recognition to an independent Brazil in demanding that the new country initiate action to end the trade in human cargo. Brazil was forced to acquiesce, and began a limited action to end slavery which was sufficient at the time to obtain British recognition in 1825-1826.²⁹ The British continued to apply pressure on Brazil to implement a program of emancipation. The British persisted in their efforts, even at the risk of having diplomatic and commercial relations severed. Brazil eventually reacted and the break became a reality.³⁰ Diplomatic relations were not resumed until 1865.³¹

After Great Britain had recognized Brazilian independence and had pressured a reluctant Portugal to grant recognition to Brazil, the British diplomat, Sir Charles Stuart, presented England's bill for the services rendered.

²⁹ Manchester, British Preeminence in Brazil, pp. 200-203.

³⁰ Richard Graham, Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil, 1850-1914 (Cambridge: University Press, 1968), p. 169.

³¹ C. H. Haring, Empire in Brazil (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 93.

Sir Charles asked for the immediate conclusion of a permanent agreement containing the special privileges of the 1810 Treaty--all those commercial privileges Viscount Strangford had successfully obtained for his country. The independence of Brazil necessitated a renegotiation of the earlier treaties. Stuart failed in his effort to conclude a treaty. Charles Gordon, however, who had taken over the work, won Brazilian approval of a treaty in 1827, exactly as the British Foreign Office desired.³² It was known as the Anglo-Brazilian Treaty of 1827. This document was essentially an adaptation of the 1810 treaty between Great Britain and the Portuguese monarch in Brazil with all the old privileges pertaining to English trade and extraterritorial rights of the earlier agreements retained by England.

As Brazil gained experience in foreign dealings, it began to resent this excessive domination by the British. The extraterritorial privileges, consular concessions, and restrictions placed on the sovereignty of Brazil by the Anglo-Brazilian Treaty of 1827 were to last until 1844.³³ When the agreement expired the Brazilians were determined

³² Calogeras, A Política Exterior do Império, II,

³³ Haring, Empire in Brazil, p. 65.

not to renew it. This time, in spite of the various pressures which were brought to bear on them, they refused.³⁴

The British were unable to get the Brazilians to sign a new treaty giving them the usual special privileges. They were now in a position equal to that of other foreigners trading with Brazil. Brazil's refusal to sign a new treaty signaled the end of the economic and commercial advantage the British had gained through their one-sided trade pact. The British nonetheless continued to exercise some political and economic influence for years to come.³⁵ But never again would Brazil allow England to dominate its economy. Brazil was approaching maturity and no longer appreciated the strong arm of Great Britain. The country had succeeded in this first attempt to achieve an independent foreign policy.

A second attempt to achieve some independence in foreign policy occurred during the time that the Baron of Rio Branco was Foreign Minister of Brazil. The Baron of Rio Branco assumed the portfolio of Brazilian Foreign Minister in 1902 and held the post for ten years under four different

³⁴ Graham, Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil, 1850-1914, p. 107.

³⁵ Jaime Pinsky, "O Brasil nas Relações Internacionais 1930/1945," Estudos Históricos, No. 5 (December, 1966), p. 200.

presidents, until his death in 1912 at the age of sixty-seven. During this time he was to establish the foundations for a foreign policy that was to endure for many years. Brazilian foreign policy as he envisaged it had four related goals. He was unrelenting in his attempt to attain these goals.

First, he sought to increase national prestige abroad. The newly renovated and augmented Navy called at more foreign ports to show the flag. The number of foreign diplomats in Rio de Janeiro and the number of Brazilian diplomats abroad was increased. Brazilians began to participate in world congresses. A good example of Brazil's changing attitude in international affairs is illustrated by events connected with the two Hague Peace Conferences. Brazil declined an invitation to attend the first conference, claiming that no questions of national interest would be discussed. Eight years later, clearly under the influence of Rio Branco, Brazil not only eagerly accepted an invitation to the second conference, but sent one of the largest delegations. Ruy Barbosa, leader of the delegation and an outstanding journalist, played an active role in the

discussion and held the position of president d'honneur of the commission responsible for arbitration.³⁶

Secondly, Rio Branco emphasized Brazil's role of leadership in Latin American affairs, especially in South America. Diplomatic missions were established in those capitals which hitherto had lacked Brazilian representation. Rio Branco coordinated the Argentine, Brazilian and Mexican recognition of Panama. Ruy Barbosa spoke with the support of all of Latin America when he demanded the equality of all nations which were to sit on the arbitration court at the Hague. The foreign office helped to mediate a conflict between Peru and Ecuador and urged the United States to send a permanent diplomatic representative to Paraguay.³⁷

Thirdly, he stressed the importance of Pan-Americanism. Brazil, set apart from the rest of the hemisphere for nearly a century because of its unique monarchical institutions, joined the fraternity of republics in 1889, the same year in which the modern Pan-American movement got under way. He organized the highly successful

³⁶ E. Bradford Burns, "Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy," Journal of Inter-American Studies, IX (April, 1967), 197.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 198.

third Pan-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1906 that consolidated and gave permanence to the Pan-American movement.³⁸

Fourthly, he closely aligned his country with the United States, thereby shifting Brazil's diplomatic axis from London to Washington. During the earlier part of the nineteenth century, Britain enjoyed a virtual commercial and political monopoly over Brazil, and the English government served as the unofficial model for the Second Empire under Dom Pedro II. Since a good part of the Brazilian constitution of 1891 was patterned after the American constitution, the Baron of Rio Branco viewed the United States as the new political mentor and a friend.³⁹ Perhaps of even greater importance was the fact that in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the North American market was by far the prime purchaser of Brazil's exports. The Baron of Rio Branco foresaw that the newly emergent world power to the north, if properly cultivated, could serve Brazilian foreign interests well. In 1905, the two nations paid each

³⁸ Burns, "Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy," p. 198.

³⁹ Ernest Hambloch, His Majesty, the President of Brazil (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1936), p. 43.

other a compliment by raising their respective legations to the rank of embassies.⁴⁰

The third attempt to achieve an independent foreign policy came to Brazil as a result of World War I. When the war began in Europe, Brazil was divided in her loyalties. The cultured upper classes and intellectuals sided with France; the Italian immigrants also supported the Allied cause; and there were others who believed Brazil's best interests would be served by seeking solidarity with the United States. Other Brazilians openly supported the German position. Usually they were German immigrants and their descendants, but these groups were augmented by military men who were very nationalistic.⁴¹

During that time Brazil had one of the largest merchant fleets in Latin America. Brazil's entry into World War I was attributed to Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in January, 1917. When the Brazilian ship Paraná was sunk off the coast of France in April, Brazil

⁴⁰ Lawrence F. Hill, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Brazil (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1932), p. 292.

⁴¹ José Maria Bello, A History of Modern Brazil, 1889-1964, trans. by James L. Taylor (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 233.

severed diplomatic relations with Germany.⁴² Then the sinking of another Brazilian vessel in May prompted the President to announce that Brazil was linked with the United States and to seize German shipping in Brazilian waters. Later, when the ship Macau was torpedoed by a German submarine off the coast of Spain in October, 1917, Brazil declared war on Germany.⁴³

Having entered the war only a year before its termination, Brazilians believed that their country did not have time for adequate preparation of its land and sea forces to send them to Europe. Brazil's participation was limited, therefore, to the patrolling of the Atlantic by naval units and the sending of a medical mission to France. Many Brazilian Army units were used on the home front to control the unrest among the German inhabitants of southern Brazil.⁴⁴

After the victory of the Allies, Brazil was invited to take part in the peace negotiations at Paris. Soon

⁴² Andrew Boyle, The Brazilian Green Book (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918), pp. 27-30.

⁴³ Donald M. Dozer, Latin America: An Interpretive History (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962), p. 475.

⁴⁴ José Carlos de Macedo Soares, Brazil and the League of Nations (Paris: [n.n.], 1928), p. 3.

thereafter, in company with the other Allied and associated powers, Brazil signed the Versailles Treaty. Brazil also collaborated in drawing up a pact for the establishment of the League of Nations as well as the statutes of the Court of International Justice. The other countries honored Brazil by granting it temporary membership in the Council of the League, and a Brazilian was chosen a judge of the International Court.

Until 1926 Brazil worked closely with the great powers of Europe in the restoration of peace and order. With the refusal of the United States to take part in the League of Nations, Brazil became the principal American nation with a seat on the Council.⁴⁵ It could not function responsibly in the midst of intrigues and struggles for power among the larger nations. The body that had been set up to restore tranquillity and well-being to the world, and especially to Europe, became a source of general uneasiness.⁴⁶

Brazil was associated with this world body only until the application of the Locarno Agreements in 1926.

⁴⁵ Macedo Soares, Brazil and the League of Nations, p. 3.

⁴⁶ Dudley Heathcote, "Brazil and the League of Nations," Fortnightly Review, LXXV (May, 1926), 636-637.

This last attempt to restore peace and security to the Old World was more ambitious but not more sincere or effectual than former attempts. It led, in fact, to disagreement and finally to a break between Brazil and the League of Nations. Brazil officially withdrew June 12, 1928.⁴⁷ Brazil had sought a permanent place on the Council of the League of Nations not for the sake of prestige alone, or to satisfy its pretensions to the status of a great power, but because Brazil considered it indispensable that the League give to the Americas a share in the economic and political restoration of the world proportional to that of European nations. Otherwise, the League would never attain the ideal of universality set up in its charter, but would become an instrument used exclusively for the interests of two or three European powers and their satellites.⁴⁸

The crux of the matter was that the Signatory Powers of the Treaties of Locarno had agreed to give Germany a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations. Brazil decided to veto the admission of Germany into the League

⁴⁷ Denys P. Myers, Handbook of the League of Nations (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1935), p. 9.

⁴⁸ F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 324-325.

unless Brazil were granted a permanent seat on the Council. This action was taken not because of any ill will or resentment on Brazil's part toward a former enemy, but because the membership of the League would be increased by another permanent European member. There were already three, France, England, and Italy, and the admission of the Soviet Union would make four, or five, counting Germany. Yet, the Americas were represented by only two nonpermanent members, one of which was Brazil. This was not right, or so the Brazilians believed.⁴⁹

The European League members could not understand Brazil's attitude. Instead, they preferred to expose the new organization to the first serious contretemps of its existence rather than alter their preconceived ideas of regional politics. Brazil thus chose to withdraw, and it may be said without exaggeration that the withdrawal of Brazil from the League of Nations in 1926 was the first grave symptom of the weakness of that body. "A crisis in evolution," Aristide Briand had called it. It was rather "the beginning of the end," since the gradual disintegration of the League began in 1926. It was proof that the peace

⁴⁹ "The League 'Disaster,'" Literary Digest, LXXIX (April 10, 1926), 17-18.

organization was not living up to the ideals envisioned by its authors and the high hopes of all who did not intend to use it for their own political ends.⁵⁰

After the reversal at Geneva, Brazil maintained only economic and commercial ties with the continent of Europe and the normal diplomatic representation. The country continued intellectual and cultural ties with France and Portugal. Brazil seemed to show no remorse for its action and never considered that it might have made a greater contribution to the solution of world problems by remaining in the League. Instead, Brazil turned its attention again to the American continent, to cooperation with neighboring countries and to the development of closer relations with the United States. This third attempt to achieve an independent foreign policy was relatively unsuccessful.

The fourth and most recent attempt by Brazil to achieve an independent foreign policy was initiated by President Jânio Quadros in 1961; after his resignation, the new President, João Goulart, made some effort to continue the policy. This independent foreign policy of Quadros pursued two basic goals: the first was to encourage the economic

⁵⁰ "Brazil Bolts the League," Literary Digest, LXXXIX (June 26, 1926), 10.

and political development of Brazil, and the second was to display greater diplomatic independence.⁵¹ There was nothing inherently wrong in these goals, but the methods and procedures used to bring them about were the subject of a great deal of controversy.

⁵¹E. Bradford Burns, Nationalism in Brazil (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 95.

CHAPTER III

THE APPLICATION OF THE INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY TO THE UNITED STATES

Part of the reason for Jânio Quadros' desire to pursue a new and independent course in his relations with other countries may be explained by his tendencies to be similarly independent in his domestic political activities. He treated his Brazilian political supporters with the same disdain and intolerance with which he treated the international friends of Brazil. For a comparison of his independence in domestic political maneuvers with the independence he manifested in his foreign policy, it is necessary to understand the Brazilian political scene during the time of Quadros' political ascendancy in Brazil.

Brazil's national political parties were established by government decree (Decree Law No. 7586) on May 28, 1945. They continued to exist for twenty years before being abolished again by decree. The major parties were created

around the presidential candidates in the 1945 election. Getúlio Vargas and a group of trusted friends formed two government parties, the Partido Social Democrático (PSD) and the Partido do Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), to support their candidate, Eurico Gaspar Dutra, while an opposition party, the União Democrática Nacional (UDN), was formed around another candidate, Eduardo Gomes.¹ These remained the major political parties throughout the years.

In 1959, these three political parties of Brazil were faced with a problem. This problem was to choose a candidate for the presidential elections of 1960 who would attempt to attain certain economic, political and social reforms, and thereby fulfill the supposed desires of the populace. For the PTB and the PSD, the selection of such a candidate was not easy since these two parties had already participated in the government and had borne some of the responsibility for past administrative acts.²

While the PSD and the PTB were facing their dilemma, in April, 1959, another less important party in terms of

¹Vladimir R. De Dubnic, Political Trends in Brazil (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968), p. 42.

²Mário Victor, Cinco Anos Que Abalaram O Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965), p. 34.

political strength, the Partido Trabalhista Nacional (PTN), put forth the name of Jânio Quadros as their candidate for President. In Brazilian politics, a candidate may be the nominee of several political parties. Since Quadros was the nominee of one party and his name was now known by the selection committees of other parties, it was easier for him to obtain additional nominations. Quadros, however, did not seek such nominations; rather the parties sought Jânio Quadros. Following Quadros' nomination, the PTN chose Leandro Maciel, the former governor of Sergipe, to run as the vice-presidential candidate with him.³

At a convention in November, 1959, the UDN also nominated Jânio Quadros as its candidate for the presidency. Quadros accepted, with the proviso that he would consider his independence uncompromised by party endorsement. Milton Campos was nominated as his vice-presidential running mate on the UDN ticket. Meanwhile, the Partido Democrático Cristão (PDC) also nominated Quadros as their presidential candidate and Fernando Ferrari as the PDC vice-presidential nominee.⁴ Quadros thus had the support of several political

³Victor, Cinco Anos Que Abalaram O Brasil, p. 48.

⁴Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 190.

parties and a multiplicity of running mates, and as well may be expected, difficulty arose about the matter.

To the surprise of everyone, Quadros displayed his propensity for political independence by resigning the UDN nomination. The resignation apparently resulted from an argument between the UDN and the PDC over which vice-presidential nominee would appear at the first campaign rally. This technique of using a resignation to force a political issue was indeed a harbinger of the future actions of Quadros. The endorsing parties, realizing how desperately they needed Quadros, reassured him he would not be bound by their support. Quadros then consented to re-accept the presidential candidacy of the UDN.⁵

Finally, the PSD (the government party at the time) nominated Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott to be their presidential candidate. Although he was not popular and no advocate of broad economic and social reform, he obtained the support of the PTB and several minor leftist parties. João Goulart became his vice-presidential running mate. The Marshal waged a rather mediocre campaign based upon his impeccable honesty. An interesting development in the

⁵Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964, p. 190.

campaign was the appearance of the "Jan-Jan" committees, which were local organizations urging the electorate to vote for Jânio Quadros for president and João Goulart for vice-president, thus splitting their votes, which is possible in Brazil.⁶ The symbols of the campaign became the sword for Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott in keeping with his military background, and the broom for Jânio Quadros, which indicated that there would be a clean sweep if he were elected. On October 3, 1960, the PSD lost the election when Quadros garnered some 5,600,000 votes, nearly 45 percent of the total, as opposed to some 3,800,000 votes for the Marshal, representing about 31 percent of the electorate. Apparently the "Jan-Jan" committees were effective because João Goulart won with a plurality of 36 percent.⁷

Soon after Quadros was elected president, he began extensive travels abroad. He flew to Europe for an operation to correct damaged muscles in his left eye.⁸ After the operation, which was successful, Quadros remained somewhere

⁶ José Maria Bello, A History of Modern Brazil, 1889-1964, trans by James L. Taylor (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 340.

⁷ Ibid., p. 341.

⁸ Diário de Notícias (Rio de Janeiro), November 23, 1960, p. 1.

in Europe playing a game of hide-and-seek. The game began in London when he registered in three hotels at one time after his operation. He next stood up Prime Minister Harold Macmillan for lunch and supposedly moved on to the Continent. Even Brazilian reporters who tried to follow him lost the trail. Early in December, 1960, his diplomatic passport was checked through a customs line at Madrid's airport, but no one saw him there. In January, 1961, he was traveling in Italy.⁹

Jânio Quadros did manage to keep in contact with his country. A few Brazilians went to Europe and returned to Brazil periodically bearing such unofficial statements as "Quadros will follow an independent policy in international relations," or "He will try to maintain good relations with all countries that want to do business with Brazil." Other Brazilians reported that Quadros was anxious to trade with Red China, that he wanted to meet with Nasser and Nehru, that he was studying administration in Europe, that he was studying Brazilian problems, and that he was in Portugal and would return in January, 1961.¹⁰ As future events were to

⁹"Brazil: Wherefore Art Thou Janio?" Time, LXXVII (January 6, 1961), 32; Diário de Notícias, January 3, 1961, p. 1.

¹⁰Diário de Notícias, January 3, 1961, p. 1.

demonstrate, the United States should have paid closer attention to the statements coming from Quadros in Europe.

During his campaign, Quadros' speeches to the public had varied considerably in content and appeal depending on the audience, but few doubted that in the last analysis he would refuse to follow outgoing Juscelino Kubitschek's pro-United States foreign policy. As soon as the United States election returns were in and John F. Kennedy was elected president, a top Quadros supporter, the Diário de Notícias publisher, João Ribeiro Dantas, flew off to Florida to congratulate the President-Elect, and to suggest a Kennedy-Quadros meeting as soon as convenient.¹¹ Meanwhile, Quadros, vacationing in London, clarified his position regarding a meeting of the Presidents. He indicated that he was not only cool towards a meeting with Kennedy but acted very much like a man about to take his nation down the road to neutralism.¹² He declined an invitation from President Eisenhower to visit the United States, and shunned a meeting with France's President Charles de Gaulle. Instead, he put

¹¹"Brazil: Journey to the East," Time, LXXVI (December 5, 1960), 34; Diário de Notícias, November 12, 1960, p. 1.

¹²Diário de Notícias, November 22, 1960, p. 1.

out feelers to India's Jawaharlal Nehru, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Tunisia's Habib Bourguiba about the possibility of a visit, and sent an aide to see the rebel leader of Algeria, Fershat Abbas.¹³ Quadros also began unofficial talks with British economists about British loans to liquidate Brazil's United States debts, and hinted at reorienting Brazil on a new European "axis."¹⁴ In Brazil, the Quadros moves had everyone in a dither. "It's a bomb," roared Rio de Janeiro's pro-United States newspaper, Diário Carioca, "Jânio has now evidenced his enchantment with the idea of neutralism. Does he have in mind selling our cotton to Nasser, our tea to Nehru, and our sugar to Fidel Castro?"¹⁵

After returning to Brazil, on January 31, 1961, Jânio Quadros took office as President of Brazil, replacing Juscelino Kubitschek. That night, Quadros spoke over the radio to the People of Brazil. In his address, he told them that there was a need for Brazil to have commerce with all the nations of the world and that there was a need for Brazil to have a sovereign policy. He further added that

¹³ Diário de Notícias, November 19, 1960, p. 1.

¹⁴ Diário de Notícias, November 5, 1960, p. 1.

¹⁵ "Brazil: Journey to the East," p. 34.

Brazil would be friendly with the Western powers, but would never cooperate with them in maintaining economic and political domination over colonial peoples.¹⁶

Brazilian problems at that time were primarily economic. The country was in a "terrible financial situation," Quadros said in his inaugural address. Most critical of all was the inflation which was almost out of hand. When Juscelino Kubitschek took office in 1956, the cruzeiro was quoted at 80 to the United States dollar. By January 31, 1961, the cruzeiro had dropped to 230 to the dollar on the free market. In 1960, prices in Brazil had increased considerably.¹⁷ In the wake of such inflation, there occurred a wave of strikes and discontent was high among the hard-pressed workers. On January 1, 1961, Brazilian debts at the Export-Import Bank totalled \$509,000,000, and undisbursed balances available to Brazil were only \$92,000,000.¹⁸

At the same time, Jânio Quadros inherited a budget deficit of almost \$430,000,000 and a foreign debt amounting

¹⁶Victor, Cinco Anos Que Abalaram O Brasil, p. 83.

¹⁷Brazil, Government Trade Bureau, Brazilian Bulletin, XVI (February 1, 1960), 4-7.

¹⁸Hanson's Latin American Letters (Washington, D.C.), No. 832 (February 25, 1961).

to \$3.8 billion, \$338,000,000 of which was to be paid in 1961. "We will make sacrifices and squeeze every penny to pay off our debts," Quadros declared, "but, we must find the solution in a democratic way, because in those countries where they try to find solutions through revolution, the people lose more than they gain."¹⁹

Also, there was the problem of Brazil's most important product--coffee. Immediately after World War II, the world demand for coffee was strong and prices were high. Coffee growers expanded their plantings. Then the demand decreased to an amount less than the supply. To maintain the price level, the Brazilian government bought and stored the surplus, which in 1961 exceeded fifty million bags.²⁰ How to dispose of this surplus and subsequent surpluses constituted another problem facing Jânio Quadros.

At this point, an examination of the background of this man who won the Brazilian election with a large plurality (for Brazil) and who, upon taking office, led off with an announcement that portended difficulty for the Western powers, would seem enlightening. Jânio da Silva Quadros

¹⁹ Washington Post, January 30, 1961, p. A9.

²⁰ Ibid.

was the son of Doctor Gabriel Quadros and Leonor da Silva Quadros. He was born January 25, 1917, in Campo Grande, Mato Grosso. His mother was also born in Mato Grosso, but was the daughter of an Argentine rancher from Santa Fe.²¹ In 1930, Quadros moved his family to São Paulo where he established a medical clinic and a pharmacy. Jânio Quadros was educated in the schools in São Paulo except for a short time while his family lived in the town of Lorena. In 1933, Jânio Quadros graduated from the Archdiocesan College where he had majored in humanities.²² He enrolled in the School of Law at the University of São Paulo in 1935 and graduated in January, 1940.²³ (In Brazil the length of a law course is frequently five years.) After completing his education he taught at a number of secondary schools in Brazil.

The forty-three year old President was a "lone wolf" ever since he gave up a career as a high school teacher to enter politics. He was elected to a number of posts including councilman, national deputy, mayor of São Paulo, and governor of São Paulo state. At no time did he find it necessary to associate himself with a major organized party.

²¹ José Viriato de Castro, O Fenômeno Jânio Quadros (São Paulo: Palácio Do Livro, 1959), p. 33.

²² Ibid., p. 34.

²³ Ibid., p. 36.

His enigmatic personality and charisma were assets in the building of a career. His flamboyant manner and directness appealed to the voters of all classes. His approach to politics otherwise was traditional. During the 1960 campaign he traveled some 150,000 miles, gave over a thousand speeches, and shook the hands of thousands of voters.²⁴

Indicative of the typical Jânio Quadros approach to politics was his action after being elected a deputy in the Congress as a PTB candidate from the neighboring state of Paraná in 1958. Quadros asked immediately for six months' leave and set out on a trip to the Far East, the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. Since he was even at that time considered to be a leading candidate for the presidency, he received a very cordial reception in many of the countries he visited, as well as excellent publicity in the Brazilian press.²⁵ Others thought that his leaving Brazil at such a time indicated great unconcern for the possibility that he might become a presidential nominee. After he returned to Brazil, however, Quadros demonstrated that his

²⁴ John J. Johnson, "Brazil: New President, Old Problems," Current History, XL (April 7, 1961), 205.

²⁵ "The Atlantic Report: Brazil," Atlantic Monthly, September, 1959, pp. 24-25.

real goal was the presidency, and he never bothered to appear in Congress. Such was the background of the man who became President of Brazil in the 1960 election.

Soon after Quadros assumed the chief office of Brazil, John F. Kennedy sent several emissaries to South America to ascertain the opinions of Latin Americans regarding certain policies planned by the United States in inter-American affairs. Brazil was an important stopover for these men because Quadros' enigmatic ways had begun to create problems for the United States. As early as February, 1961, President Kennedy's Food-for-Peace mission extended an important offer of aid to the financially distressed administration of Quadros by proposing an expanded program of sending surplus food to Brazil. This mission was headed by George McGovern who was in charge of President Kennedy's new Food-for-Peace program. McGovern, accompanied by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., was sent to Brazil by President Kennedy to call on Quadros and set forth the United States offer to meet Brazil's immediate need for wheat and to engage in a new food distribution program in famine stricken northeast Brazil.²⁶ At the same time, Ambassador Cabot

²⁶ Juan de Onis in New York Times, February 19, 1961, p. 26.

communicated to Quadros President Kennedy's decision to make a \$10,000,000 credit available to Brazil to tide the country over any immediate foreign payments problems. Quadros turned the loan down.²⁷ Later, as we have seen, in March of the same year Latin American Task Force Chief, Adolf A. Berle, was received by Quadros with an icy reserve that bordered on hostility.

After the Berle mission in March, 1961, the next United States government official to have an interview with Quadros was Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon. This cabinet member met with Quadros to discuss financial aid totaling nearly one billion dollars. Preliminary negotiations had already been conducted between the United States and Brazil.²⁸ On May 16, 1961, President Kennedy pledged to continue broad financial help to Brazil as part of his far-reaching aid program for Latin America.²⁹ This assurance was given to Brazilian Finance Minister Clemente Mariani during a White House visit.³⁰ Their discussions

²⁷ "Brazil: One Man's Cup of Coffee," Time, LXXVII (June 30, 1961), 23.

²⁸ "Jânio é O Homen Certo Para Kennedy," O Cruzeiro, April 29, 1961, p. 122.

²⁹ Washington Post, May 12, 1961, p. A1.

³⁰ New York Times, May 17, 1961, p. 19.

completed the negotiation of a broad program which at the time was estimated to be in excess of \$1,500,000,000 in new credits and debt postponement.

On May 17, 1961, the United States and the International Monetary Fund announced a major program of financial assistance to rescue Brazil from a balance-of-payments crisis. The United States would make new loans totaling \$338,000,000, the Fund was to provide \$160,000,000 more, and a group of European banks were working on a deal to produce \$150,000,000, making a total of \$648,000,000 in new money. Furthermore, the United States allowed Brazil to postpone the repayment of \$305,000,000 of debt outstanding, and the Fund postponed \$140,000,000.³¹ These actions were a response to Brazil's crushing burden of foreign debt and extreme inflation which had prevented her from bringing her international dealings into balance. The financial aid was to help with the existing debt and assist in paying for continued imports. Apart from all this, United States officials said that Washington and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were prepared to talk about loans for the development of Brazil.

³¹Richard E. Mooney in New York Times, May 18, 1961, p. 6; Christian Science Monitor, May 18, 1961, p. 3; Bernard D. Nossiter in Washington Post, May 18, 1961, p. A14.

Brazil's contribution to the deal was an agreement to take steps to correct her problems--steps to reduce her enormous budget deficit, restrain private credit, and abandon long-standing inflationary practices in support of coffee exports. The magnitude of Brazil's problems can be seen in the following figures. Her existing debt to the United States was \$1,759,000,000 and to other countries and the International Monetary Fund \$1,100,000,000. There was a 33 percent inflation of prices in Brazil in 1960, and only one-half of Brazil's \$1,500,000,000 budget was covered by tax revenues.³²

In the end, the United States found itself supporting Quadros with the greatest outpouring of aid ever lavished on a Latin American nation. Secretary Dillon finally presented the documents personally to Quadros with the United States government's final calculation of its share of a free-world aid package in excess of one billion dollars. Dillon's reception by Quadros on this occasion was somewhat more cordial than the one extended to Berle,

³² New York Times, May 17, 1961, p. 19; Christian Science Monitor, May 18, 1961, p. 3; Bernard D. Nossiter in Washington Post, May 18, 1961, p. A14.

but even so, Dillon was hustled into and out of Brasília's Planalto Palace via the underground garage.³³

In June, 1961, United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, for whom Latin Americans had a great regard, received a warm welcome in Brazil. On a ten-month tour to discuss President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, he found expressions of friendship and enthusiastic talk about development. In São Paulo Quadros went further than he had for any other United States diplomat.³⁴ He talked with his "dear friend" Stevenson for over two hours, and later told the press, "I firmly believe that relations between this democracy and the great democracy of North America will become constantly closer and more intimate."³⁵

Because of the key position occupied by Brazil in the Inter-American family of nations, and because many believed that Quadros was converting Brazil into a major world power, some people assumed that Ambassador Stevenson had achieved his greatest success in Brazil. This interview

³³"The Americas: Hello, but No Help," Time, LXXVII (June 23, 1961), 29; Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 95 (June 5, 1961).

³⁴Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 100 (June 12, 1961).

³⁵Ibid.

of more than two hours (30 minutes had been scheduled) and the cordial statements of both after the event justified the belief that Ambassador Stevenson's guarded optimism about closer Brazil-United States relations was to a large degree justified. There were certain circumstances that helped the Quadros-Stevenson talks. President Quadros had just been criticized mercilessly in Brazil for his foreign policies; the criticism came just as much from his personal and political friends as from his political foes.³⁶ After talking with Quadros, Stevenson had an interview in Rio de Janeiro with Foreign Minister Arinos de Melo Franco.³⁷

During the months of July and August, 1961, President Kennedy's brother, Edward M. Kennedy, toured Brazil.³⁸ Edward Kennedy made a two-day visit to the backward northeast area.³⁹ The purpose of his trip was to present to the peasants a generator with which they were able to create

³⁶ Christian Science Monitor, June 12, 1961, p. 5.

³⁷ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 101 (June 13, 1961).

³⁸ O Estado de São Paulo, July 30, 1961, p. 8.

³⁹ O Estado de São Paulo, August 1, 1961, p. 44.

sufficient electricity to illuminate their huts.⁴⁰ After his tour, he said that he was sure the United States would do all it could to help development in the northeast, where Francisco Julião's peasant leagues had been formed. The peasant leagues were believed to be sympathetic to Fidel Castro.⁴¹

The United States believed that it had cause for concern regarding the Brazilian northeast. Even before Edward Kennedy's visit, the United States thought it saw a growing threat of a Castro-style revolution in this vast remote corner of Brazil. Such fear had led President Kennedy to single the area out for special attention in his developing program for Latin America. Experts from Washington descended on the area. These experts found that northeast Brazil was so underdeveloped a region that it needed just about everything. An ambitious program to meet the problems of the region had been written by the Brazilian economist, Celso Furtado. The United States experts showed

⁴⁰Clodomir Morães, "Peasant Leagues in Brazil," in Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America, ed. by Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970), p. 478.

⁴¹New York Times, August 2, 1961, p. 12.

interest in Furtado's plan as a possible way to extend aid to the area.

In addition to these travels for economic and diplomatic purposes between the United States and Brazil, there was a considerable exchange of diplomatic notes and speeches pertaining to the foreign policies of the respective countries. Soon after Jânio Quadros had assumed the presidency, President Kennedy sent him a congratulatory message, which was the customary thing to do. In February, 1961, President Quadros responded to Kennedy's congratulatory message and told him that he intended to strive for a strengthening of the close ties between the United States and Brazil.⁴²

In March, President Quadros made his State of the Union message to the country. In it Quadros pledged Brazil to a policy of "relations with sincere collaboration with the United States in defense of the democratic and social progress in the Americas." He further stated that "the ideological position of Brazil is occidental and it will not change." In sum, President Quadros in his speech sought to dispel any impression that his "independent" foreign policy meant an inclination toward neutralism in the East-West

⁴²New York Times, February 9, 1961, p. 6.

"cold war." His argument was that while Brazil was unconditionally aligned with the West, an independent policy placed her in a favorable position to help lessen world tensions.⁴³

The United States was thus faced with the dilemma of choosing an appropriate foreign policy with regard to Brazil. Quadros had launched a Brazilian foreign policy which seemed to be in opposition to many things the United States desired in the field of international affairs. As will be elaborated in subsequent chapters, Quadros opposed moves by the United States to isolate Cuba. He sought friendly relations with the Communist countries, especially Communist China and North Korea. He sought to wrest leadership of Latin America from the United States, and in spite of his words, his actions indicated that he desired to align Brazil along the neutralist lines of Yugoslavia, Egypt, India and Indonesia, and in so doing, ignore or deny the agreements Brazil had made previously with the Western powers. Yet he consistently assured the United States Department of State that Brazil remained sympathetic to the causes of the West. Finally, President Kennedy had to make a decision whether to support Brazil or not. He chose to

⁴³Tad Szulc in New York Times, March 16, 1961, p. 8.

support Brazil, and his Ambassador, John M. Cabot, said that American policy in Brazil was geared to keeping their relationship friendly and democratic. The loss of Brazil to Communism would probably "in view of its size and importance mean the loss of all Latin America to Communism." This significant statement was made when Cabot spoke to the graduating class of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Massachusetts.⁴⁴

In July, 1961, President Kennedy invited President Quadros to visit Washington in December. The newspaper O Estado de São Paulo said that President Quadros would accept the invitation.⁴⁵ The visit to Washington was to have followed a thirty-day tour of ten South American countries that Quadros planned to make in November. The decision to invite Quadros was made after President Kennedy had decided he would be unable to attend the Inter-American Economic Conference which was to be in Uruguay. It had been planned at one time that Kennedy would stop in Brasília for a meeting with Quadros on his way to Uruguay.⁴⁶ This

⁴⁴ New York Times, June 10, 1961, p. 6; Christian Science Monitor, June 12, 1961, p. 5.

⁴⁵ O Estado de São Paulo, July 30, 1961, p. 9.

⁴⁶ Juan de Onis in New York Times, July 28, 1961, p. 7; Christian Science Monitor, June 13, 1961, p. 3.

meeting was never to take place, however, because Quadros resigned before the visit could be realized.

Before Quadros resigned, though, he managed to put the United States in an awkward diplomatic position once again. This last time pertained to Ambassador John Moors Cabot. The appointment of this man as United States Ambassador to Brazil in 1959 had been enthusiastically welcomed by the professional diplomats who were at the time best acquainted with the workings of the United States government. His competence and deep understanding of Inter-American affairs based upon a long list of assignments in the area (he was Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs in 1953-1954) assured a firm foundation from which to improve relations between Brazil and the United States.⁴⁷

The story has already been narrated about his diplomatic ability during the Berle visit in not publicly commenting on the Berle meeting with Quadros. Soon he needed to draw upon all his diplomatic acumen to counter Jânio Quadros. On July 11, 1961, a statement by Cabot that Brazil could not be considered an "uncommitted nation" was followed

⁴⁷ "The Atlantic Report: Brazil," p. 25.

by an admonition from President Quadros against "meddling." In his statement, Cabot had recalled that Brazil had signed a number of treaties with the United States and other American nations and thus could not be considered uncommitted. When the statement became publicly known, Quadros resented it, and in a speech declared that Brazil has a "positive independent international position and will not tolerate meddling from anybody, whoever it may be." The President then added, "Brazil does not withdraw from obligations assumed with its brothers' continental family."⁴⁸

The statement by Cabot had been made in response to a question from a reporter during an interview at the United States Embassy. The Brazilian reaction took the Embassy personnel by surprise. The stand taken by Quadros was applauded by the Brazilian nationalist sectors, and the Communists asserted that Ambassador Cabot's remarks constituted interference by the United States in Brazil's affairs. The Brazilian government was just as eager to have the incident closed as evidenced when the Foreign Minister Arinos de Melo Franco said, "The way we fulfill our obligations is a matter

⁴⁸New York Times, July 12, 1961, p. 13; Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 119 (July 10, 1961).

for the discretion and sovereignty of our country. All Brazil's agreements are to strengthen the peace, not weaken it." The matter was thus closed but this episode may have resulted because Quadros sought this internal political reaction and considered the statement an excellent opportunity to reaffirm his "independent foreign policy" with a United States ambassador whose replacement by Lincoln Gordon in October, 1961 had already been announced.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Juan de Onis in New York Times, July 25, 1961, p. 11; Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 121 (July 12, 1961).

CHAPTER IV

THE APPLICATION OF THE INDEPENDENT

FOREIGN POLICY TO EUROPE

Western Europe

Before Jânio Quadros assumed the office of president of Brazil, an international incident occurred which developed into a diplomatic crisis between Brazil and Portugal. The ultimate solution of this international problem was indicative of Quadros' independent foreign policy with regard to Portugal.

On January 9, 1961, the luxury cruise ship, the Santa Maria, with its passengers (including some United States citizens), had set out from Portugal for a pleasure voyage to the Caribbean Sea area and Florida. One of its scheduled stops was La Guaira, Venezuela. At that port a group of conspirators, posing as regular passengers and carrying weapons hidden in their suitcases, boarded the ship. From La Guaira, the ship continued on to its next port which was the Dutch-ruled island of Curaçao.

On Sunday, January 22, 1961, the conspirators, consisting of thirty men led by former Portuguese army captain Henrique M. Galvão, commandeered the Santa Maria in the Caribbean when she was en route from Curaçao to Port Everglades, Florida.¹

At first, the world was confused about the facts regarding the seizure of the ship and the significance of the act. The United States became involved in the matter immediately because this country had available ships and airplanes which could be used in an attempt to locate the Santa Maria. The United States was also interested because of the American tourists aboard the vessel. The commander of the United States Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Robert L. Dennison, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for guidance after an exchange of messages with Galvão aboard the ship. At that time the Santa Maria was heading toward the mid-Atlantic Ocean.²

Galvão had affirmed his willingness to confer with United States Navy officers aboard the liner and his desire

¹ Diário de Notícias (Rio de Janeiro), January 25, 1961, p. 1.

² Foster Hailey in New York Times, January 27, 1961, p. 1; Washington Post, January 29, 1961, p. 1.

to disembark the passengers, but he declined to reveal his destination. Admiral Dennison had urged him to put in at the port of Belém, Brazil, which at this point brought Brazil into the international matter. Brazil further became involved in the affair when Lt. General Humberto da Silva Delgado, the political chief of the Portuguese rebels in exile in São Paulo, Brazil, sent a message to President Kennedy asking him to call off the air and surface forces tracking the Santa Maria.³

All of this raised an extremely interesting question in international maritime law, which was whether the men were pirates and outlaws as the government of Portugal claimed, or rebels who had seized the ship as the first move in a planned uprising against the Portuguese government, as Galvão claimed. If branded pirates, Galvão and his men were "enemies of mankind" in the eyes of international law and subject to seizure by any nation. If called rebels, however, then the ship seizure would presumably be regarded as an internal Portuguese political struggle and other nations could not interfere.⁴

³Foster Hailey in New York Times, January 27, 1961, p. 1; Washington Post, January 29, 1961, p. 1.

⁴Diário de Notícias, January 26, 1961, p. 1.

United States Navy ships and aircraft and ships from other countries had placed the position of the Santa Maria about 1,300 miles east of Trinidad on a course she apparently had set for Angola, Africa. The liner was about 700 miles from the Brazilian port city of Belém. Galvão gave notice to the world that he was not going to dock anywhere until his status as a "belligerent" against the Antonio de Oliveira Salazar government in Lisbon had been recognized. He further stated that he and his men were Portuguese politicians on a Portuguese ship, fighting for the liberty of their homeland, and that they should not be confused with pirates. He represented a national independence movement and he further confirmed the fact that the movement was led by Lt. General Humberto da Silva Delgado who was a former Portuguese military and political leader living in Brazil. Lt. General Delgado had fled from Portugal after his defeat for the presidency in 1958 in an election he claimed was dishonestly conducted.⁵

As the Portuguese liner progressed toward Africa, the Brazilian port of Recife became the closest for the Santa Maria. Brazil, however, at first declared the seizure

⁵Diário de Notícias, January 25, 1961, p. 1.

to be an obvious act of piracy. Such was the position taken by the Juscelino Kubitschek government. Neither the United States nor Brazil gave Galvão any assurance that he and his followers would not be treated as pirates if they landed in Brazil and thus be held liable for all the legal consequences of their acts. The United States continued to be involved since the chase and surveillance of the Santa Maria was almost exclusively a United States Navy affair. Great Britain apparently decided that it was an internal Portuguese matter, and withdrew her two frigates stationed in the West Indies from further action. The Portuguese concentrated their efforts on screening the Cape Verde Islands and West Africa against a possible landing.⁶

The United States and Brazil discussed a formula that would allow the United States Navy to take the passengers off the Santa Maria near the Brazilian coast. Brazil had become recalcitrant to any United States proposals and seemed ready to hinder all United States efforts to solve the Santa Maria impasse by forbidding the use of Brazilian airfields to United States Navy search planes. This action, in part, was out of deference to Portugal and in part

⁶ Foster Hailey in New York Times, January 27, 1961, p. 1; Washington Post, January 29, 1961, p. 1.

represented resistance to United States interference in the matter. While Kubitschek was still president, Ambassador John M. Cabot conferred with the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, and sought Brazil's permission for a resumption of search flights by thirteen United States Navy airplanes that had been grounded in Recife. The United States and Brazil reached an agreement on solving the problem of the passengers aboard the Santa Maria, but the aircraft ban remained permanent. The United States had proposed next that the Santa Maria be allowed to enter a Brazilian port to unload her passengers, and then be permitted to sail wherever Galvão wished to take the ship. Brazil was most reluctant to agree to this formula, which would imply a commitment not to intern the Santa Maria if she sailed into a Brazilian port. Such a commitment would doubtless be interpreted as a hostile act by Portugal, with which Brazil traditionally had close ties. The act would appear as a direct refusal to accept Portugal's contention that Galvão was a pirate.⁷

The United States did not cease in its efforts to find a solution, however, and negotiations between the United States and Brazil then focused on a physically

⁷Tad Szulc in New York Times, January 29, 1961, p. 1; Diário de Notícias, January 30, 1961, p. 1.

feasible way of landing the passengers. The United States had emphasized all along that its interest was confined to the passengers' safety. The United States wished to have the passengers debark just beyond the three-mile limit of Brazilian territorial waters around the island of Fernando de Noronha. The island was equipped with a dock adequate for receiving freighters or destroyers, and with a landing strip that could accommodate transport aircraft. It was further proposed that Henrique Galvão be granted asylum in Brazil inasmuch as Lt. General Humberto da Silva Delgado had earlier received a haven in that country. The Brazilian government of Kubitschek turned all these proposals down and continued to adhere to its position that the men were pirates, according to international law.⁸ The outgoing administration of President Juscelino Kubitschek actually sought to avoid taking action on the Santa Maria issue and leave any decision to the incoming President, Jânio Quadros.⁹

The week-long pursuit of the Santa Maria ended on January 30, 1961, when a United States Naval officer boarded

⁸ Gerhard von Glahn, Law among Nations (London: The Macmillan Co., 1970), pp. 330-331.

⁹ Tad Szulc in New York Times, January 29, 1961, p. 1; Diário de Notícias, January 30, 1961, p. 1.

the liner to negotiate the removal of the passengers. The boarding came about as a result of President-Elect Jânio Quadros' statement that he would give asylum to Galvão and the other men involved in the seizure. Quadros would permit the Santa Maria to put into Recife or the port city of Bahia, following his inauguration January 31, 1961. Quadros promised asylum to Galvão because he was an old friend whom he had met in Venezuela in 1960.¹⁰ This statement by Quadros confirmed an earlier report from Lt. General Delgado, stating President-Elect Quadros had promised Galvão a permit to enter Brazil as a refugee from his exile in Venezuela.¹¹ Lt. General Delgado had further advised Galvão to remain outside Brazilian waters until after Quadros took office as President.

The Santa Maria steamed to the limit of Brazilian territorial waters; it dropped anchor there as Galvão decided that the guarantee offered him by Quadros was not sufficient. While President Quadros' message contained the provision of asylum, it did not assure Galvão, specifically,

¹⁰Tad Szulc in New York Times, January 30, 1961, p. 1; Washington Post, January 29, 1961, p. 1.

¹¹New York Times, January 27, 1961, p. 2; Washington Post, January 30, 1961, p. 1.

of immunity for the ship. The message, in effect, kept in force the order of the previous Brazilian administration that the Santa Maria be seized the moment she entered Brazilian waters and be returned to her Portuguese owners.¹²

Various legal compromises were suggested. Portugal indicated that it would not seek the extradition of Galvão should he find asylum in Brazil. The Lisbon government was interested only in the ship, her passengers, and those crew members who remained loyal.¹³ President Quadros and his cabinet considered recognizing a state of belligerency between Galvão and the Portuguese government. Such recognition under international law would permit Galvão the right to enter and leave Recife with the Santa Maria within a period of seventy-two hours. Such an amount of time would enable them to discharge the passengers and take on supplies.¹⁴

The result of all of these compromises was that the Santa Maria landed in Recife on February 2, 1961. Under the

¹²Tad Szulc in New York Times, February 2, 1961, p. 1; Diário de Notícias, February 1, 1961, p. 1.

¹³New York Times, January 30, 1961, p. 1; "Dia 30: a bordo do Santa Maria," Visão, XVIII (February 24, 1961), 52.

¹⁴New York Times, February 2, 1961, p. 4; "Dia 30: a bordo do Santa Maria," p. 52.

protection of armed marines of the Brazilian government, all the passengers disembarked, followed by the entire crew of the ship. Without a crew, the legal point of remaining seventy-two hours and sailing out of the port became a moot question.

The Portuguese government had formally asked the Brazilian government to seize the Santa Maria. Portugal further advised Brazil that they would consider the incident terminated only when the Santa Maria arrived back in Lisbon. Brazil then officially turned over the Santa Maria to the Portuguese government two hours after the Portuguese rebels surrendered the ship to the Brazilian Navy on February 2, 1961. The Portuguese government agreed to deliver the ship to its owners. Delivery of the Santa Maria to the Lisbon government rather than to the ship's owners was legally important to the rebels. The Salazar regime in this way could not sue them in Brazilian courts on criminal charges; a lawsuit might have caused them problems in their status as political refugees.¹⁵ With this legal problem settled, Henrique M. Galvão and his rebels came ashore and officially

¹⁵Tad Szulc in New York Times, February 4, 1961, p. 1.

received political asylum in Brazil.¹⁶ On February 4, 1961, the Santa Maria was turned over to her rightful owners the Portuguese Line.¹⁷ Her former crew of 350 returned to their duties immediately and sailed within a few days for Lisbon. The ship resumed her regular schedule March 23, 1961.

To this day, it is still unclear exactly what Galvão had hoped to accomplish in seizing the liner except for the world-wide publicity he won for the exiles' struggle against the Portuguese regime. Galvão himself said he had proved that Portugal's strong man Salazar was not invulnerable. A side effect of his action, though, was to bring to the attention of the Portuguese Jânio Quadros' readiness to deviate from the traditional Brazilian line of friendly foreign relations with them if circumstances warranted. The episode also served to show the anti-Salazar tendency of the Quadros government. Portugal was to feel only a mild application of Quadros' "independent foreign policy" at first.¹⁸

¹⁶"En busca do Pôrte da Liberdade," Visão, XVIII (February 3, 1961), 14-15.

¹⁷"Passageiros do Santa Maria en Recife," O Cruzeiro, February 18, 1961, pp. 124-129.

¹⁸"Presidência," Visão, XVIII (February 10, 1961), 13.

Brazil had already altered her relations with the United States by adopting an "independent foreign policy" when she prepared a second diplomatic jolt for her old ally Portugal. The new note of discord with Portugal related to the status of Portugal's African possessions. This subject will be discussed at length in the chapter pertaining to Africa. Brazil at this point adopted a strongly anti-colonial position as part of Quadros' new foreign policy.¹⁹ There had been about six weeks of civil disorder in Angola. As a result, the African-Asian nations in the United Nations General Assembly demanded a debate of the Portuguese Angola question. Under Juscelino Kubitschek, Brazil had maintained a hands-off attitude on the issue of Portugal's overseas possessions. This policy came under review as Brazil opened a drive to strengthen her relations with the emerging African nations. Brazil's traditional ties with Portugal made the policy issue a delicate one.

In typical Quadros fashion, the new President of Brazil rushed in with an order to Brazil's delegation to the United Nations to vote with the African-Asian group, following an investigation by Brazil of the violence in

¹⁹David Nasser, "Portugal Não e Colônia do Brasil," O Cruzeiro, March 1, 1961, p. 9.

Angola.²⁰ Then, just as quickly, on the next day, Quadros backtracked on Brazil's support, ordering the Brazilian delegation to abstain in a General Assembly vote. The decision was announced after Quadros conferred in Brasília with the Portuguese Ambassador to Brazil.²¹ Quadros' reversal of policy concerning Portuguese Angola temporarily calmed the diplomatic waters, but later Quadros pursued an ever more anti-colonial policy in Africa and caused the Portuguese to watch his activities warily.

West and East Germany

Soon after Quadros became President, he sent one of Brazil's top economic negotiators to seek financial assistance in Western Europe. Roberto de Oliveira Campos was sent to Europe to discuss the status of large Brazilian debts there and to seek the directing to Brazil of development credits, especially from West Germany.²²

Partly as a result of Quadros' efforts to open up diplomatic relations with the Eastern European countries, it

²⁰New York Times, March 29, 1961, p. 10.

²¹New York Times, March 30, 1961, p. 5.

²²Tad Szulc in New York Times, March 12, 1961, p. 31; O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, February 26, 1961, p. 1; Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 95 (June 5, 1961).

was rumored that Quadros was preparing to extend diplomatic recognition to East Germany.²³ In July, 1961, the Ambassador to Brazil of the Federal Republic of Germany transmitted to Quadros the irritation of that government at the news that a Brazilian mission would visit East Germany and that Brazil would receive a minister, or ministers, from that government. The Ambassador desired to know if this action implied a revision of the Brazilian position on the question of Berlin and the possible diplomatic recognition of East Germany. Quadros responded to the initial inquiry negatively, but then insisted that Brazil and her people wished only for a peaceful solution to the Berlin question. With regard to East Germany, Quadros told the German Ambassador that the United Nations, as well as individual nations were examining the problem and Brazil reserved a similar right. He further stated that since he was not personally responsible for the fact that Germany was a divided country, he must face reality and would trade with both. In fact, he would trade with ten divisions of Germany if there were ten.²⁴

²³ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 97 (June 7, 1961).

²⁴ Carlos Castilho Cabral, Tempos de Jânio e outros tempos (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, S.A., 1962), p. 304.

The West Germans were not amused and informed Quadros that if he recognized East Germany diplomatically, they would cease the purchase of Brazilian coffee and seek a source of supply elsewhere. Since Brazil had a surplus of coffee and West Germany constituted one of the principal markets for the commodity, Quadros acquiesced and no further steps were taken to recognize East Germany.

Eastern Europe

The idea of reestablishing diplomatic relations between Brazil, the Soviet Union, and Communist East Europe did not originate with Jânio Quadros. In the late 1950's, such eminent Brazilian diplomats as Oswaldo Aranha were writing and talking about the possibility of expanding Brazilian foreign relations with Communist countries.²⁵ The idea was gaining ground in Brazil that the "voice of the people" should be heeded, a voice that was demanding that Brazil undertake a more dominant role in world affairs even if this meant extending diplomatic recognition to Communist East Europe. Jânio Quadros appeared on the scene at just

²⁵ Oswaldo Aranha, "Relações Diplomáticas com a União Soviética," Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, I (June, 1958), 18.

the right time to capitalize on this apparent expression of the popular will.

The reestablishment of Brazilian diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union had for some time been a subject discussed at length in newspaper and legislative circles and caused considerable controversy. Normally, the matter would have been carefully considered by authorities of the appropriate government department and resolved in accordance with the best interests of the nation. Public opinion now, however, was becoming an increasingly important factor in the making of foreign policy. In a certain sense, internal political forces were taking the initiative in diplomatic matters. These forces manifested a displeasure with the orientation that prevailed in the conduct of Brazilian diplomacy because the Brazilian diplomats had not changed Brazilian foreign policy in keeping with the transformations that were occurring in the entire world. The debate was not limited to those who opposed intransigently the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Brazil and the Soviet Union or those who pleaded for the restoration of these relations. There was in addition another solution offered. Its proponents proposed only the exchange of commercial relations, or still more timidly, the development of

Brazilian commerce with the Russians through intermediate nations.²⁶ Also the new foreign policy was expected to create serious problems for the Brazilian left. The Brazilian Communists had not supported Quadros in his domestic policies, but they did want Brazilian diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union. They were thus in the awkward position of having to give their support to the foreign policy of a political rival.²⁷

Brazil had established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1945 and had broken them in 1947. Brazil was thus the only "great" power which did not have diplomatic representation with the Soviet Union. Quadros felt that Brazil therefore could not ignore the Russian presence any longer. Brazil was industrializing, and industrialization and isolationism are incompatible. Some Brazilians believed that a Christian democratic nation should not have relations with Communists, but Aranha offered Switzerland as an example of countries that did. Moreover, Brazil had had relations with dictators like Perón. To counteract any fear that diplomatic recognition would add to the spread of

²⁶ Washington Post, March 6, 1961, p. A9.

²⁷ "Presidência," Visão, XVIII (February 10, 1961), 13.

Communism, he gave this assurance: ". . . the expansion of Communism in no part is owed to the Russian diplomats."²⁸

The true reason Brazil wanted a resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was a desire to be included among other world powers recognizing Moscow. A right to participate in important world decisions, it was thought, would follow automatically.

When Jânio Quadros assumed the presidential office of Brazil in 1961, the nation was approaching a period of change in its diplomacy. As a champion of Christianity and of democracy, Brazil had not maintained commercial or diplomatic relations with the nations of the Iron Curtain, where, it was maintained, atheistic, inhuman, and dictatorial communism prevailed. Jânio Quadros broke a long tradition of supposed submission to North American politics and imprinted his own personality on Brazilian international relations. There were Brazilians who believed that the United States did not want Brazil to have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union even though the United States recognized the Soviet Union.²⁹

²⁸ Aranha, "Relações Diplomáticas," pp. 21-22.

²⁹ João Cândido Maia Neto, Brasil-Guerra Quente na América Latina (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, S.A., 1965), p. 57.

The question was asked as to why Brazilians could not talk with Moscow if the United States, England, and France--leaders of the free world, and former allies of Stalin--discussed diplomatic matters with his successors and traded with the Russians. There were two important reasons why Brazil should not do so. One, historically amusing and interesting, was predicated on the theory that Brazilian national honor had been involved in the João Soares Pina incident. Second, perhaps more serious, was the fear that diplomatic relations would open the doors of the country to Bolshevik propaganda.

The João Soares Pina incident is rather well-known among Brazilian officials. This Brazilian diplomat became quite drunk when he was attached to the Brazilian embassy in Moscow in 1947 and was imprisoned by the Russian police. Because he was a diplomat, Brazil considered it an affront. The issue became more involved when Gazeta Literaria, a Moscow journal, published an article showing General Gaspar Dutra, Brazilian president at the time, in a classic picture of a South American general. The two episodes formed the pretext for a Brazilian rupture of diplomatic relations with the Russians.³⁰

³⁰ Neto, Brasil-Guerra Quente na América Latina, p. 59.

In order to remedy this long diplomatic and commercial hiatus, President Quadros sent a message on February 7, 1961, to Premier Khrushchev saying he believed that closer relations between Brazil and the Soviet Union would contribute to world peace and prosperity. The message was a reply to Premier Khrushchev and the Soviet chief of state, Leonid Brezhnev, who had expressed hope for increased relations between the two countries when President Quadros was inaugurated.³¹

In addition to the Soviet Union, Quadros was ready to establish diplomatic relations with Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, while the government continued a study of possibly setting up ties with the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco announced the completion in February, 1961, of the preparations ordered by President Jânio Quadros for setting up relationships with the three Eastern European states of Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Brazil had had full relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia for many years and maintained a lively trade with them. Based upon the success of commercial trade with Poland and Czechoslovakia, Quadros had instructed Arinos de

³¹New York Times, February 8, 1961, p. 2.

Melo Franco to study potential diplomatic and trade relations with the remaining small East European Communist countries within days after taking office January 31, 1961.³²

To implement further his plan to open up diplomatic contact with East Europe, Quadros appointed a special ambassador to discuss political relations with countries behind the Iron Curtain. As roving ambassador to these Communist states, he chose João Dantas, publisher of the Diário de Notícias in Rio de Janeiro and spokesman for the advocates of neutralism in that city. Dantas' mission originally was to travel to Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary to complete details for the establishment of diplomatic relations with those countries; it later included Poland also.³³

Before Dantas' departure, however, Brazil, in an exchange of notes in Washington, D.C., formally established diplomatic relations March 21, 1961, with the three Communist countries of Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. While the announcement of the renewed diplomatic ties was made in

³² New York Times, February 24, 1961, p. 7; Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 63 (April 14, 1961); Washington Post, March 6, 1961, p. A9; "Presidência," Visão, XVIII (February 24, 1961), 14.

³³ Tad Szulc in New York Times, March 12, 1961, p. 31; Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 91 (May 29, 1961).

Brasília, notes were exchanged in Washington because none of the three states had any representatives in the Brazilian capital. At the time, the United States Department of State officials found no particular cause for alarm in the reestablishment of relations. They simply noted that the action was intended to exemplify the independent line in foreign affairs that President Jânio Quadros had pledged his administration to take during the campaign in the fall. Upon reflection on what had already occurred between the United States and Brazil, it is surprising that this diplomatic act in the capital city of the United States was not considered another diplomatic offense to the United States. The exchange of notes could have taken place in another city where representatives of all the countries involved were located. After all, Brazil had not had diplomatic relations with Hungary and Rumania since she severed ties with the Axis powers upon declaring war against Nazi Germany, and Brazil had never had diplomatic relations with Bulgaria.³⁴ To use the capital city of the country which was the leader in the Cold War against the Communist countries as the locale for extending diplomatic recognition to those same

³⁴New York Times, March 22, 1961, p. 4; Washington Post, March 22, 1961, p. 1.

Communist countries, was not a display of the very best diplomatic tactfulness. Next, the Ministry of Foreign Relations announced in April, 1961 that diplomatic relations had been established with Albania.³⁵

Finally, later in April, 1961, the special ambassador of President Jânio Quadros, João Dantas, left Brazil on a final revised, expanded tour of seven Communist countries with orders now to do as much trade as possible without involving dollars. João Dantas, heading a group of twenty delegates, said the President had instructed him "to change all possible imports from the dollar area, not because there is any prejudice against the dollars, but simply because we have no dollars." Dantas further said he intended to negotiate the purchase of thirty-six ships in Yugoslavia and would seek to order oil in the Soviet Union. In addition to the Soviet Union, the delegation's final itinerary included visits to Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia.³⁶

³⁵ New York Times, April 7, 1961, p. 2; Christian Science Monitor, June 17, 1961, p. 3; Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 92 (May 31, 1961).

³⁶ "A Missão João Dantas," Visão, XVIII (April 14, 1961), 22-23.

Quadros, however, was not really interested in maintaining diplomatic relations with all the countries in Eastern Europe. In further diplomatic maneuvers in that area, the Brazilian government revoked the credentials of the ambassadors of Lithuania and Latvia. These two countries, which were absorbed by the Soviet Union in World War II, are considered by the United States to be sovereign, but occupied. Brazil's action amounted to official recognition of the states as part of the Soviet Union.³⁷

The government announced in March, 1961 that President Tito of Yugoslavia had accepted an invitation to visit Brazil. The invitation had been extended by President Quadros in one of his foreign policy moves and was regarded as another attempt to move Brazil toward a policy of Latin American neutralism. As has been seen, the announcement of Marshal Tito's visit was undiplomatically made a few hours after Quadros had conferred with Adolf A. Berle, Jr., President Kennedy's personal representative, in a review of Brazil's economic problems and her new approach to foreign policy.³⁸

³⁷New York Times, March 15, 1961, p. 6; Washington Post, March 6, 1961, p. A9.

³⁸New York Times, March 3, 1961, p. 7; Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 92 (May 31, 1961). Also see Chapter II.

All these new diplomatic activities of President Jânio Quadros began upsetting his old middle-of-the-road friends in Brazil without making him any new friends among the extreme leftists. His diplomatic maneuvers earned him sharp criticisms from the broad moderate groups that formed the bulk of his followers in the 1960 election. Yet all these activities, even the promise of establishing full-fledged relations with the Soviet Union, failed to sway the Communists and other left-wing elements in their firm opposition to his domestic measures of economic security. The Communist press charged that Quadros, in choosing conservatives and moderate men for his cabinet, was continuing the policies of past governments in remaining basically "submissive" to Washington.³⁹ It was widely believed at the time that Quadros' growing independence in foreign policy was intended to placate the extreme leftists and nationalists in their opposition to the stern and orthodox moves he had already taken to heal Brazil's shattered economy. The Brazilian Communist Party leadership was not fooled by such maneuvers.⁴⁰ Thus, Quadros found himself in a position

³⁹ Tad Szulc in New York Times, March 5, 1961, p. 29.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

where his domestic policy was approved by the majority of public opinion in Brazil and the United States but abhorred by the Communists, and his foreign policy was disapproved by many in Brazil and the United States but praised by the Communists.

One of the major problems that remained for Quadros was diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union, a matter that had to be handled carefully. On May 8, 1961, Quadros announced that Brazil would receive a high-level mission from the Soviet Union in June, seeking to promote improvement of relations. An advance representative had met Quadros earlier to arrange the visit. The mission planned to see several Latin American countries in addition to Brazil.⁴¹ When the Soviet mission arrived in July,⁴² President Jânio Quadros, again demonstrating his independence, postponed talks with them in order to fly to São Paulo to see his first grandchild. The Soviet mission of sixteen officials and six journalists had arrived in Brasília July 17.⁴³ President Quadros went to see his granddaughter,

⁴¹New York Times, May 9, 1961, p. 3; Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 97 (June 7, 1961).

⁴²Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 117 (July 6, 1961).

⁴³O Estado de São Paulo, July 18, 1961, p. 52.

born July 18 to his daughter Dirce Maria, wife of Alaor José Gomes, a journalist.⁴⁴

President Jânio Quadros returned to Brasília and later received the Soviet goodwill mission there. The head of the mission, Mikhail P. Georgadze, extended an invitation from Premier Khrushchev to President Quadros to visit the Soviet Union.⁴⁵

Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco told the Soviet goodwill mission that Brazil hoped to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union very shortly. He decorated members of the delegation, led by Mikhail Georgadze, secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and expressed the hope that ideological and political differences would not impede peaceful coexistence between Brazil and the Soviet Union.⁴⁶ Arinos de Melo Franco also said that Brazil hoped to increase peaceful exchange, both commercial and diplomatic, with Russia. As a vanguard of

⁴⁴New York Times, July 19, 1961, p. 8; O Estado de São Paulo, July 19, 1961, p. 36; Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 126 (July 19, 1961).

⁴⁵New York Times, July 20, 1961, p. 10; O Estado de São Paulo, July 20, 1961, p. 64; Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 128 (July 21, 1961).

⁴⁶O Estado de São Paulo, July 25, 1961, p. 48.

this future expected exchange, a permanent Soviet trade mission arrived in Rio de Janeiro in July, 1961 to open a commercial office. The traveling goodwill mission from the Soviet Union was the first of its kind to visit Latin America. It planned to continue its tour to Uruguay, Argentina, Ecuador and Cuba. The mission was composed of several members who were representatives of official Soviet cultural, trade, and legislative bodies. Six representatives of the Soviet press and television were traveling with the group. The presence of the mission coincided with new actions of President Jânio Quadros that were demonstrative of an "independent" policy toward the United States. These included the official designation of Vice-President João Goulart to head a Brazilian mission to examine trade possibilities with Communist China and a verbal slap on the wrist of the United States Ambassador, John Moors Cabot, for meddling in Brazilian affairs, as has been stated.⁴⁷

Finally it became official; President Jânio Quadros announced in July that he had given orders for a renewal of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The announcement was made at the end of a news conference at which the

⁴⁷ Juan de Onis in New York Times, July 25, 1961, p. 25. Also see Chapter III.

President stated that Brazil and Argentina would go united to the Alliance for Progress meeting in Uruguay in August. Meanwhile, the Soviet goodwill mission, which brought President Quadros a warm letter from Premier Khrushchev hinting at economic benefits from a renewal of relations, flew on to Ecuador. President Quadros, at his news conference in Brasília, said he has given instructions to the Foreign Ministry to reestablish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.⁴⁸ Quadros further said that contracts with the Soviet Union would be advantageous to Brazil. "I do not believe our standard of living can improve except by increasing domestic and foreign trade, which means increasing production," he said.⁴⁹ The decision to reestablish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union met with general approval in the Brazilian press, although with reservations by some major newspapers. The support was based primarily on the supposed prospects for expanded trade with the Communist bloc deriving from closer relations.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 132 (July 27, 1961).

⁴⁹ O Estado de São Paulo, July 25, 1961, p. 9.

⁵⁰ Juan de Onis in New York Times, July 28, 1961, p. 7; O Estado de São Paulo, July 26, 1961, p. 36.

Another Russian visitor who was quite different from the previous diplomatic and commercial representatives was Major Yuri Gagarin who left Havana in July for Rio de Janeiro. The invitation from the Brazilian government came suddenly, and in order to rest up for it, Gagarin had to forego accompanying Dr. Fidel Castro on what had become the Cuban leader's favorite tour for foreigners: a trip to Playa Girón, scene of the April, 1961 unsuccessful invasion attempt by anti-Castro Cubans. The eagerness of Soviet officials to get Major Gagarin to Brazil was an indication both of their desire to make an impression on that country and of their realization that the young major had proved to be a most effective propaganda instrument.⁵¹

When he arrived in Brasília, Brazilians accorded high official honors to the Soviet space pilot. Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, Minister of Education Brigido Rinoco, and Minister of Aviation Brigadier Gabriel Grun Moss were at the airport to greet the Soviet visitor. President Jânio Quadros had declared Major Gagarin an official guest for his four-day visit. The Major arrived in Brasília on a Soviet Ilyushkin jet plane that brought him

⁵¹Richard Eder in New York Times, July 29, 1961, p. 9; O Estado de São Paulo, July 28, 1961, p. 34.

from Cuba. He was honored at a public reception. Major Gagarin continued on to Rio de Janeiro, arriving there in a rainstorm. Because of the heavy downpour, a program and public reception had to be cancelled. Several busloads of Brazilians had turned up at Galeão Military Airport, but the Air Force police turned them away at the entrance to the base. Major Gagarin was whisked by limousine from the airport past a small cheering crowd. He went directly to a private home where he was to stay. The triumphal welcome was timed to underscore the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, ordered by President Quadros. Major Gagarin was scheduled to attend a football game for the opening of the professional season at Maracanã Stadium. Plans also called for a visit to São Paulo, while the Brazilian Coffee Institute announced that it would put out a Gagarin coffee for sale in the Soviet Union. The Brazilian government had placed heavy emphasis on trade possibilities with the Communist bloc in promoting the establishment of diplomatic relations.⁵²

Later, on a tour through the city, Yuri A. Gagarin was cheered by 3,000 students and workers in Rio de Janeiro.

⁵² New York Times, July 30, 1961, p. 14; O Estado de São Paulo, July 29, 1961, p. 38; O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, July 30, 1961, p. 1.

The reception was in sharp contrast with the welcome he received from only about 500 persons when he arrived from Brasília, where rain and the weekend exodus from the city had cut down the crowd.⁵³ Prior to his departure for Canada, the next country on his tour, Gagarin received a medal from President Jânio Quadros. He also delivered another warm letter from Premier Khrushchev to the Brazilian president.⁵⁴

President Jânio Quadros expressed gratification in August, 1961 at Premier Khrushchev's promise that everything would be done to assure peace generally in the world. Quadros, replying to a letter professing peaceful intentions that Major Yuri A. Gagarin brought him from Premier Khrushchev, said:

At a time when dense clouds seem to be gathering on the international horizon, I received with the greatest satisfaction Your Excellency's words, assuring us that the conquest of the Soviet astronautic science will be placed exclusively at the service of humanity's welfare. It was with equal pleasure that I received your declaration that everything would be done to assure peace and end the

⁵³ New York Times, July 31, 1961, p. 2; O Estado de São Paulo, July 29, 1961, p. 38.

⁵⁴ New York Times, August 4, 1961, p. 6; O Estado de São Paulo, August 3, 1961, p. 60.

armament race. Brazil is willing to maintain relations with all countries and offers the hand to all.⁵⁵

President Jânio Quadros further told Premier Khrushchev that Brazil had something to offer and much to receive from the Soviet Union. In the letter to the Soviet Premier, made public in Rio de Janeiro, Quadros had added that while Brazil had received "valuable aid from other sources," this aid had not been "on the scale of our needs." "It is important for Brazil to intensify her interchange with the Soviet Union," President Quadros wrote in his published letter. "The science, technique and resources accumulated in the gigantic race of the U.S.S.R. toward progress can stimulate development of my country at a time of Brazil's decision to break the routine of misery, sickness and ignorance."⁵⁶

As far back as July, 1957, Jânio Quadros had told a newspaper in São Paulo: "In matters of foreign policy, we have been very timid. We ought to be more aggressive." Two years later, but still before his name was presented at the

⁵⁵ New York Times, August 6, 1961, p. 10; O Estado de São Paulo, August 5, 1961, p. 38.

⁵⁶ New York Times, August 20, 1961, p. 29; O Estado de São Paulo, August 19, 1961, p. 38.

Convention of the UDN as the presidential candidate, the ex-Governor of São Paulo visited the Soviet Union. During that visit, accompanied by the journalist João Dantas, Jânio Quadros conferred with the Foreign Minister of Russia, Nikolai Patolichev, about the possibilities that would be offered to Brazil in establishing commercial relations with the Soviet world. Later, João Dantas, in Rio de Janeiro, declared to other journalists that Jânio Quadros, if elected president of the republic, would establish relations with the Soviet area, thus facilitating the possibility of exchanging cacao, coffee, motor cars, and minerals, for Soviet crude petroleum, fertilizer, and machines. In 1960, in his governmental program, the then candidate Jânio Quadros confirmed this statement by saying that he wished "to establish commercial relations with all the countries that are disposed to acquire our products in satisfactory conditions."⁵⁷

These diplomatic moves were not welcomed, however, by the President's critics. Cardinal Jaime de Barros Câmara, Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro, said he had opposed the diplomatic moves to the Communist countries when they

⁵⁷Victor, Cinco Anos Que Abalaram O Brasil, p. 232.

began in February, 1961, and that he felt like a man watching a dangerous and risky game such as a bullfight.⁵⁸ A former police chief of Rio de Janeiro, Col. Danilo Nunes, at that time a state deputy in the Guanabara assembly, said that the presence of Soviet diplomats "opened the frontiers of Brazil to Soviet espionage and subversion of the public order."⁵⁹

Carlos Lacerda, the anti-Communist Governor of the State of Guanabara, had threatened to resign in protest against President Jânio Quadros' policy of closer relations with Communist countries. Lacerda, who had supported Quadros in his campaign for President, also denounced the President's awarding of a medal to Major Ernesto Guevara, Cuba's Minister of Industry. Speaking at the opening of a regional convention of the International Free Trade Unions Organization, the Governor declared that he would rather take to the streets and fight than permit the hopes of the Brazilian people to be frustrated or detoured by a policy of successive capitulations to Communist tyrannies.⁶⁰ The

⁵⁸"Presidência," Visão, XVIII (February 24, 1961), 14, 24.

⁵⁹New York Times, July 30, 1961, p. 14.

⁶⁰New York Times, August 22, 1961, p. 22; O Estado de São Paulo, August 20, 1961, p. 13.

medal was pinned on Guevara as the Cuban made a visit to Brasília on his return from the Alliance for Progress conference in Uruguay. It was Brazil's highest medal. Many Brazilians agreed with Lacerda.

In spite of the fact that many of his former friends and supporters were turning against him with regard to his efforts to establish relations with the Soviet Union, Jânio Quadros manifested that same independence in his actions with regard to Brazilians as he had done with the representatives of the United States. In foreign matters, Quadros was beholden to no man and would not listen to any cautionary advice. He was singularly adamant in his attempt to bring Brazil and the Soviet Union into closer diplomatic relations. The irony of the situation is the fact that Brazil did eventually exchange ambassadors with the Soviet Union, but it did not occur during the presidential administration of Jânio Quadros. He initiated the diplomatic exchange activity, but the final implementation actually took place during the administration of his successor, João Goulart.

At the same time Quadros was negotiating with the Slavic Communist countries, he was also formulating a new role for Brazil to play with the countries of Africa.

CHAPTER V

BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY APPLIED TO AFRICA

The emergence of the newly independent countries of Africa toward the end of the 1950's coincided with the desire of Brazilian government officials and businessmen to expand the market for Brazilian products in that area of the world. Production of exportable goods had increased markedly. While the countries of Africa were obtaining their independence, the advances made in industrialization in their country were causing Brazilians to think in terms of greater self-sufficiency.¹ Nationalist sectors of the left in Brazil, moreover, were seeking to identify the problem of Brazilian underdevelopment with the struggle for emancipation of the countries just emerging from colonialism. Both of these factors were to have an effect on Brazilian foreign policy toward Africa.

¹ Celso Furtado, Diagnosis of the Brazilian Crisis, trans. by Suzette Macedo (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), p. 77.

In the formulation of an African policy Brazil used three approaches, coinciding with specific geographical areas. The first was the Northern region of Arab Africa. In this desert region, the role of Brazilian foreign policy was to be one of passive acceptance of the overtures extended to Brazil by President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic in conjunction with President Josip Tito of Yugoslavia. In a way, the actions of these two men and the countries and regions they represented created a transitional phase in the foreign policy of Brazil from Eastern Europe to Africa.

The second approach was to the sub-Saharan area of Africa, or rather, a part of Black Africa extending from the Sahara Desert in the north to Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa in the south, and from Dakar in the west to Dar-es-Salaam in the east. The Brazilian overtures to Africa in this area were economic, although romantic in their appeal. Brazilian industrialists and businessmen saw in Africa an excellent market for their products. There was discussion about possible competition from African tropical products, but throughout the Quadros administration not one serious economic study was published on the subject. Fears of the European Common Market's being closed to Brazilian tropical products in favor of African products were

restricted to government circles and to some journalists who wrote about the potential danger.²

The fears proved to be groundless during the Quadros administration. Some attempt was made to justify an Afro-Brazilian policy on historical grounds. Various arguments were advanced in support of this idea. One of these held that since Brazil is the most "Africanized" of the Western Hemisphere countries, as a result of contacts maintained during centuries of slavery, it is in a better position than any other to understand Africa and therefore to establish relations with African countries. Another argument maintained that miscegenation is a typically Brazilian phenomenon, and there is nothing Portuguese about it. This preference for an historically based Afro-Brazilian policy was widespread in Brazil among representatives of the more progressive currents of social thought.³

² Maria Y. Leite Linhares, "Brazilian Foreign Policy and Africa," The World Today, XVIII (December, 1962), 536; Theophilo de Andrade, "De Gaulle, A Cultura Latina, o Mercado Comun e o Café," O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, March 5, 1961, p. 4; João Alberto Leite Barbosa, "Namôro com a África," O Cruzeiro, January 28, 1961.

³ This includes such authors as Gilberto Freyre, José Honôrio Rodrigues, A. J. Bezerra de Menezes, Jarbas Maranhão, and Eduardo Portella.

The third approach was to the Union of South Africa. In this country on the extreme southern tip of the African continent, Brazil was again seeking potential markets for Brazilian products. The chief difference in the Brazilian foreign policy with respect to White Africa was the absence of an attempt to champion anti-colonialism.

In May, 1961, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic and President Josip Tito of Yugoslavia opened a drive to attract Latin America into the neutralist bloc of nations, of which they considered themselves to be the leaders. The first step taken in this drive was a preliminary meeting in Cairo in July, 1961 to prepare for a heads-of-state conference to be held at a later date in another city. The projected conference was described as another Bandung with Latin America added. Bandung in Indonesia was the site of a meeting in 1955 of African and Asian countries. At that meeting, President Nasser emerged as one of the leading neutralists in the world. The possibility of a new meeting of "uncommitted" countries on what might develop into a global basis arose during talks between Presidents Tito and Nasser while the Yugoslavian head-of-state was in Cairo on a visit. During their meetings the two leaders wrote a joint letter that was passed through

diplomatic channels to foreign governments on three continents. The letter set forth the mutual problems of uncommitted countries and suggested the advisability of a conference of heads-of-state.⁴

Presidents Nasser and Tito were seeking the development of stronger public opinion to resist pressures of "imperialists" rather than the creation of a new and stronger bloc. Their aim also was to urge a neutralist approach to the social, economic, and political problems of the small countries. The Latin American nations would not be specifically advised to break ties with the United States, but that was viewed as an indirect objective. The conference was to discuss the "evils" of accepting too much aid from and trade with "imperialist" powers.⁵

President Nasser's growing interest in Latin America was also manifested in another way. He announced that he would visit Brazil and Venezuela in September and October, 1961. Such a trip was to follow the preparatory meeting in Cairo in the summer of 1961.

⁴ New York Times, May 5, 1961, p. 1; Washington Post, March 6, 1961, p. A9.

⁵ Ibid.

Brazilian official reaction to the invitation to the conference came rather suddenly when the Brazilian government announced that Brazil had no intention of attending a conference of neutralist nations in Cairo during the summer of 1961. President Quadros had received the ambassadors of the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia who had transmitted an invitation to Brazil to take part in the conference. Quadros took the matter under consideration. When there was an announcement from the Middle East News Agency that Brazil, Cuba, and Mexico had accepted the invitations, the reaction was quick. This was not true as far as Brazil was concerned and prompted the sudden statement by the Brazilian government in the negative.⁶

Apparently Quadros changed his mind about sending a representative to the Cairo conference because in May, 1961, he named Vasco Leitão da Cunha, secretary general of the Foreign Ministry, as an official observer at the meeting.⁷ In this way Brazil was not actually participating in the conference but was only observing. Vasco Leitão da Cunha resigned his position, however, before he departed, and

⁶New York Times, May 13, 1961, p. 2.

⁷New York Times, May 30, 1961, p. 4; Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 92 (May 31, 1961).

President Quadros named a new representative. The new Brazilian official observer at Cairo was João Augusto Araújo Castro, Minister Counselor of the embassy in Japan.⁸ The latter attended the conference, but since he was just an observer, did not actually participate in any of the discussions regarding the location of the official meeting for the heads-of-state. The meeting in Cairo led to a larger meeting of neutral nations scheduled to be held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in September, 1961. Quadros decided to send an official observer to this meeting as well, and appointed Carlos Alfredo Bernardes. This man was ordered only to observe and not to participate in any discussions.⁹ Quadros, however, resigned from the presidency before the meeting in Belgrade and Bernardes did not go as his representative. João Goulart, however, sent an observer to the conference of neutralist states in Yugoslavia in September, 1961.

This was the extent of Brazilian foreign policy with regard to the northern region of Arab Africa, except for Quadros' wish to open embassies in Rabat, Morocco and Tunis,

⁸ New York Times, June 2, 1961, p. 3; Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 106 (June 20, 1961).

⁹ O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, August 20, 1961, p. 1.

Tunisia.¹⁰ It is evident that it was, for the most part, a passive policy, in which the Brazilian government merely reacted to overtures extended to Brazil from President Nasser.

During the administration of Jânio Quadros, the government of Brazil took an active interest in the Negroes in Brazil, on the one hand, and in promoting better diplomatic relations with the newly independent countries of sub-Saharan Africa on the other. No aspect of Brazilian relations with Africa deserved more attention than the study of the Africans in Brazil. Africans had been forcibly imported into Brazil at a steady rate from the 1530's to the 1850's. Early writers had described types, qualities, virtues, and defects in a few sweeping and stereotyped generalizations. Writings on racial matters dealt mostly with the Indians, and the Negroes were ignored. Campaigns for the abolition of the slave trade and of slavery were waged throughout the nineteenth century, attracting members of intellectual and ruling minorities, from José Bonifácio to Joaquim

¹⁰ Diário de Notícias, March 24, 1961, p. 1; Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 110 (June 26, 1961); Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 139 (August 7, 1961).

Nabuco.¹¹ During that period the African element in the population was studied in connection with the attempt to abolish slavery.¹² In the twentieth century, the Brazilian author Gilberto Freyre encouraged still further this Brazilian interest in the Negro element in their society with his sociological-historical works, the most famous of which is entitled The Masters and the Slaves.¹³ Because of Freyre's contribution, Brazilian diplomats became increasingly conscious of the fact that a mixed domestic population gave Brazilian people a feeling of unusual solidarity with African nations.¹⁴

The fact is that approximately 11 percent of the Brazilian population is predominantly Negro.¹⁵ The first

¹¹ "José Bonifácio on Negro Slavery and Civilizing the Indians," in A Documentary History of Brazil, ed. by E. Bradford Burns (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 200.

¹² José Honório Rodrigues, "The Influence of Africa on Brazil and of Brazil on Africa," Journal of African History, III (September, 1962), 49.

¹³ Gilberto Freyre, The Masters and the Slaves (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946).

¹⁴ Gilberto Freyre, Brazil: An Interpretation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), pp. 127-128.

¹⁵ Rodrigues, "The Influence of Africa on Brazil and of Brazil on Africa," p. 52.

Negroes came from the west coast of Africa, from "Guinea," a geographical term which seems to have been very vague and to have included nearly all the territories on the west coast of Africa between the Senegal and the Orange Rivers. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the main slave-producing areas were the regions then known as Congo and Angola.¹⁶

The two most important Negro groups which entered Brazil at the beginning of the sixteenth century were the Bantu and the West African Negroes.¹⁷ The latter were sent principally to Pernambuco, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro.¹⁸ From the seventeenth century onwards, a number of Brazilian products were used for exchange purchases: sugar, brandy, tobacco and cotton, and even powder and firearms. The ships that transported the Negroes were never only slavers, because they also carried goods for barter from Brazil to Africa and Portugal. The journey from Angola to Pernambuco lasted 35 days, to Bahia 40 days and to Rio de Janeiro 50 days.¹⁹ Brazilians increased their commercial contacts

¹⁶ Maria Archer, Brasil, Fronteira da África (São Paulo: Editôra Felman-Rêgo, 1963), p. 21.

¹⁷ Freyre, The Masters and the Slaves, pp. 299-300.

¹⁸ Rodrigues, "The Influence of Africa on Brazil and of Brazil on Africa," p. 53.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 55.

with Negro Africa south of the Sahara, instead of with White Africa, and they saw their society and civilization become "Africanized."

Modern Brazilian linguistic studies do not admit many grammatical influences from African languages on the Portuguese spoken in Brazil. Since many of the Negroes from Africa already spoke a Negro dialectical form of Portuguese and were resigned to the acceptance of Portuguese sovereignty, it follows that the accepted language in Brazil would be Portuguese also.²⁰ There is, therefore, little influence on the structure of the language, but there is much influence on the vocabulary. There are Creole forms of speech which are indicative of a European language roughly learned by peoples of inferior culture and social position. These forms simplify the use of verbs and reduce inflections, so that it is a morphological influence.²¹ There thus was no great modification in the structure (which characterizes a language), but there was an enrichment of the vocabulary and a social differentiation in the simplification of verb forms and of inflections. The fact is that

²⁰Archer, Brasil, Fronteira da África, p. 40.

²¹Rodrigues, "The Influence of Africa on Brazil and of Brazil on Africa," p. 57.

Portuguese became softened in Brazil, losing the hardness of the Portuguese spoken in Portugal. All of this has resulted in a greater freedom of expression with regard to grammatical rules and usages in the Portuguese language as spoken in Brazil.

It thus may be said that the major African contribution is that made to the actual demographic composition of Brazil, which distinguishes it from most of the other Latin American countries, either because the proportion of aborigines in the population is small or because the number of Negroes is large, or finally because miscegenation between Negroes and whites accounts for a high proportion of the population. Brazil is in a position somewhat similar to Cuba's; in Cuba the Negro played an important part in the economic structure and had a cultural influence, while miscegenation was the decisive factor in the ethnic formation of the country. In fact, Brazil is neither aboriginized nor Africanized, but balanced.

In spite of the many Brazilian studies of Africans in that country, Africa itself was forgotten for a long time and the Negro was, to all intents and purposes, the Brazilian Negro. From 1850 until 1950 no significant research had been carried out on the continent of Africa, nor had

Brazil's interest in Africa, past and present, even been recognized.²² Their interests being thus limited, Brazilian scholars had not been able to prepare public or diplomatic opinion, with regard to the importance of Africa to Brazil. Owing to the virtual nonexistence of these studies and to the predominance of European and North American influence in Brazilian foreign policy, the three centuries of intimate relations between Brazil and Africa were forgotten. As a result, Brazil did not keep abreast of the changes taking place in Africa, as it should have done in the interests of possible good economic, political, and cultural relations. All of this indifference was supposedly to come to an end during the administration of Jânio Quadros.

In 1954, Adolpho Justo Bezerra de Menezes wrote a book entitled O Brasil e O mundo Asio-Áfricano, containing a number of interesting ideas. He claims that: (1) with the decline of political colonialism, the Oriental and African people will come to weigh more importantly in the international balance of power; (2) Brazil needs a foreign policy which is more independent and active; and (3) Brazil finds

²² José Honório Rodrigues, "Brasil, Atlântico e África," O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, April 2, 1961, p. 4.

herself in an excellent position to lead the Asian-African bloc of nations.²³ José Honório Rodrigues accepted these ideas and added one more to them by advocating a security agreement between Brazil and the countries of Africa.²⁴

With regard to the first of these ideas, i.e., the growing ascendancy of the Asiatic and African peoples in the international balance of power, events had occurred which gave credence to this thesis. At the meeting in Bandung, Indonesia, there was demonstrated a solidarity among the underdeveloped countries of the world which had previously known colonialism. In addition, the Afro-Asian bloc was beginning to assume increased significance in making decisions in the United Nations.²⁵

As regards the second of these ideas, i.e., that Brazil needed a new foreign policy which would be different from the previous international role she had taken, it could be said that such a policy had been implemented under the previous President Kubitschek. He had accepted, on behalf

²³ Adolpho Justo Bezerra de Menezes, Ásia, África e a Política Independente do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Pongetti Editôres, 1960), p. 69.

²⁴ Rodrigues, "Brasil, Atlântico e África," p. 4.

²⁵ Menezes, Ásia, África, e a Política Independente do Brasil, p. 69.

of Brazil, the military charge of policing the Gaza Strip, and in 1958 had put forth the idea for Operation Pan America, which offered solutions to the economic problems of Latin America.²⁶ In April, 1961, Quadros revoked the military policing charge and ordered the Brazilian battalion in the Gaza Strip to return to Brazil.²⁷ These actions were indicative of the direction Quadros was leading Brazil in foreign matters relating to Africa.

The third idea, that Brazil should be in a position to lead the African and Asian nations, was the idea that appealed most to Quadros. Some Brazilians believed that they were especially fitted to assume this role. Had not their intellectuals been developing this theme in their writings? The Brazilians were thus beginning to believe it was their destiny to play such a role. Since they had not become a nuclear power, they could participate in forming among the weak and oppressed countries a new mentality of disaffection and lack of confidence in the two super powers with nuclear weapons. In addition, Brazil was once a colony, and its independence had never been imperialistic in

²⁶ Menezes, Ásia, África, e a Política Independente do Brasil, p. 70.

²⁷ Diário de Notícias, April 2, 1961, p. 8.

the colonial sense of the word. What people better than the Brazilians, who had already built a major civilization in the tropical zone, could comprehend the problems of other countries located in identical latitudes? One of the main purposes of this attempt to reach out to these underdeveloped nations was the constant allure of potentially new markets for Brazilian products. This policy was generally approved by the Brazilians.²⁸ Brazil had seen herself transformed from an agricultural country into one of industrial significance and wished to take advantage of her new position in the world.²⁹

Although the possibility of competition arose with the African countries which produced similar goods to those in Brazil, that likelihood was rationalized. The assumption was made that when these countries received their independence, they would no longer be subject to exploitation from their former European masters. As a result, their governments would demand a more just remuneration for their labor. The European countries would then have to buy at international market prices what they desired for manufacturing.

²⁸ Diário de Notícias, February 19, 1961, p. 4.

²⁹ Menezes, Ásia, África e a Política Independente do Brasil, p. 71.

Brazilian products would then be just as competitively priced as European-produced goods, and Brazil would be able to sell her products in the market also.³⁰

It was Jânio Quadros who, on one of his long trips in the spring of 1960 to the countries of Africa and Asia, revealed himself as an astute internationalist. He realized not only the political implications with respect to these continents, but also saw the African need for foreign aid and Brazil's opportunity to supply that aid with expectations of future gratitude and prestige in their days of supposed prosperity.³¹

It should also be mentioned that even at that early time just prior to Quadros' presidential inauguration, there was a group of Brazilians who were opposed to Brazilian diplomatic autonomy. The group consisted of those people tied to the United States through financial interests.³² They interpreted any suggestion of more Brazilian independence from the Western countries in international diplomatic

³⁰ Menezes, Ásia, África, e a Política Independente do Brasil, p. 73

³¹ Linhares, "Brazilian Foreign Policy and Africa," p. 534.

³² Menezes, Ásia, África, e a Política Independente do Brasil, p. 71.

and economic relations as being a sell-out to Communism and, ultimately, complete dependence on the Soviet Union.

Brazilian intellectuals believed that this was erroneous thinking and poor policy on the part of the administration since the day would arrive when the Asian and African nations would liberate themselves economically as well as politically. The United States would then be forced to withdraw its investments from those countries and give more emphasis to her transactions with Brazil.³³ Other groups in Brazil believed that the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union for the allegiance of the newly emerging nations should not be the concern of Brazil and that the country should not compete with the international giants in the underdeveloped countries of the world. Their advice was not heeded by Quadros and his advisors.³⁴

From the very beginning of his presidential campaign, Jânio Quadros expressed his intention to reform Brazilian foreign policy by rapprochement with the Afro-Asian countries. As early as May, 1960, after making a trip to the Far East and Africa, he called for a change in

³³ Menezes, Ásia, África, e a Política Independente do Brasil, p. 71.

³⁴ Ibid.

Brazil's relations with Asia and Africa. Expansion of international relations and advantageous shifts in trade would increase Brazilian authority among nations, for Brazil was already a country with a definite future and could not remain simply a member of the South American community. Provided national interest was served in each case, Brazil would maintain diplomatic relations with all countries.³⁵ This opinion expressed by Quadros after his journey in the spring of 1960 seems to have been the presidential candidate's first expression favoring closer Brazilian relations with African peoples.

A short time later, on May 31, 1960, Quadros stated:

The general lines of Brazilian diplomacy are set in Victorian molds. I believe it indispensable to bring the orientation and procedures of our international politics up to date. We must be more objective, more practical, more dynamic. . . . Unfortunately, in this solemn fleeting hour Brazilian diplomacy is wasting opportunities, some through omission. The great states of the future in Africa and Asia should be able to find in Brazil's international maturity the courage they lack to shorten the period until inevitable emancipation.³⁶

In his understanding of international events, candidate Jânio Quadros revealed himself to be much better

³⁵ José Honório Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), p. 311.

³⁶ Ibid.

prepared and shrewder than his opponent Henrique Teixeira Lott. On various occasions he reaffirmed his independent line of rapprochement with all nations and especially solidarity with the African peoples. The victory in October, 1960 gave him his opportunity. Addressing himself to the Brazilian people through the "Voice of Brazil" on January 31, 1961, the new President declared: "We are going through some of the most trying days that humanity has ever known. Colonialism is breathing its last, ashamed of itself, incapable of resolving the dramas and contradictions that it has engendered." In addition, he repeated his commitment, which had been sanctioned by the people, to an independent policy of relations with all countries:

We open our arms to all nations on the continent. We are a communion without political and philosophical prejudices. We are a communion without rancor or fear. We are sufficiently conscious of our power not to be timid about dealing with anyone at all.³⁷

This affirmation of "a sovereign policy, sovereign in a real and full sense, before any and all powers," was a notice of Brazilian maturity that should have surprised no one in Brazil or abroad because it had been repeatedly announced throughout the entire campaign. No time was

³⁷ Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa, p. 311.

wasted in initiating the policy of rapprochement with the various countries, including those in Africa, which Brazilian leaders and intellectuals believed they were bound by destiny to influence. It was a policy that intended to free Brazil from the classification so common in international political literature, the so-called Latin- or South-Americanization--the continent's becoming a satellite of the United States' interests or of European imperialism. It was, above all, the foreign policy that President Quadros wanted and could put into effect in view of his special constitutional powers and the support of a decisive legislative majority. President Jânio Quadros promoted the about-face in Brazilian foreign policy, an about-face not only in the sense of independence, but also in that of broader horizons. He sought in his foreign dealings a freedom of action that had been restricted by external pressures and denied to the president by the political oligarchy and economic interest groups, which were able to control the press and much of Congress. It was the vote of the intellectuals and the working people that elected Quadros and the voices of these same people that later acclaimed the independence of his conduct, his broadening of international relations, his new directions, his anti-colonialism, his solidarity and

cooperation with independent Africa. The customary Brazilian subservience to other countries no longer obtained. Since Brazil's obsequious position had changed in the process, the objectives and methods of Brazilian foreign policy had to change. Because Quadros was the first Brazilian president who knew many of the countries of the world personally, and not just Europe and the United States, it was possible for him to think in broad and universal terms.³⁸

On Quadros' side was his Foreign Minister, Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, who had affirmed and reaffirmed his anti-colonialist position before, as in his speech to the Chamber of Deputies on August 13, 1958, or his approval of rapprochement with Afro-Asian peoples in the Senate on July 30, 1960. When he took office as Foreign Minister on February 1, 1961, Afonso Arinos said:

Brazil is in an especially favorable situation to serve as a link between the Afro-Asian world and the great Western powers. A democratic Christian people whose Latin Culture was enriched by indigenous, African and Asian influences, we are ethnically half-breeds and culturally a mixture of elements originating in immense geographical and demographic areas that are making their appearance in international life in this century. Furthermore, the processes of miscegenation introduced by the

³⁸ Jarbas Maranhão, Brasil África Um Mesmo Caminho (São Paulo: Editôra Fulgor Limitada, 1962), p. 32.

Portuguese Metropolis to mold us have facilitated our racial democracy, which if not as perfect as we should like is nevertheless the most advanced in the world. We have no such prejudices against the colored races as is found in so many white . . . populations.

Therefore the legitimate exercise of our sovereignty in international politics will lead us to attain democracy and liberty.³⁹

To Quadros' Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco feel the task of interpreting and implementing Brazilian foreign policy with respect to Africa. He elaborated on the theme, by now historical, that the Brazilian position was founded on natural ethnic, geographical and cultural facts. It was natural that Brazil would turn toward Africa.⁴⁰ He further contended that with the coming together of the sub-Saharan tropical countries of Brazil and Africa, there was a stronger possibility of creating a north-south dialogue in which the northern developed countries would help the underdeveloped countries of the southern hemisphere.⁴¹

In additional speeches and interviews, Arinos de Melo Franco revealed that the foreign policy toward sub-Saharan Africa had a specious economic foundation. The

³⁹ Diário de Notícias, February 2, 1961, p. 1.

⁴⁰ O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, April 9, 1961, p. 1.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 14.

Brazilians believed that they could not sell more than they already sold to the countries from which they traditionally bought and sold goods. They would therefore have to go out in search of new markets, and African countries were potential buyers of Brazilian products. While it was recognized that the African countries would not be immediate purchasers of Brazilian goods, they constituted a long-term potential market area in which present sowing of seeds would result in a future harvest.⁴² The reasoning was specious because sub-Saharan Africa had not developed into a market for Brazilian goods to the extent that Arinos de Melo Franco believed.

Brazil was thus to be the leader in creating a tropical Atlantic world as a positive contribution to the cause of economic development in the less industrialized nations. Brazilians believed America was fated to integrate itself with Africa and geographically Brazil was to be the natural bridge of this union.⁴³

To begin the practical implementation of Quadros' policy toward Black Africa, Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco was

⁴² Daniel Caetano, "Arinos Fala Sôbre Cuba, etc.," O Cruzeiro, June 10, 1961, p. 21.

⁴³ Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, "O Brasil Tem Vocaçãõ Africana," O Cruzeiro, April 1, 1961, p. 107.

sent to Dakar, Senegal, to be present at the independence celebration in that city.⁴⁴ This was part of the new diplomatic drive to consolidate Brazilian ties across the South Atlantic with Africa. While in Senegal, Arinos de Melo Franco studied the possibilities of promoting foreign trade and closer cultural ties with the new African countries.⁴⁵ After visiting Senegal, the Foreign Minister flew to Lisbon to clarify the situation regarding a number of Portuguese who had sought asylum in the Brazilian Embassy and to examine the possibility of Angola's achieving independence from Portugal. President Quadros had instructed Arinos de Melo Franco to inform Portugal that the Brazilian delegation would abstain from voting in the United Nations when a petition or request for intervention in Angola was presented.⁴⁶ Brazil was thus officially notifying Portugal that Brazil would cease to support that Iberian country in its policy of suppressing any independence moves by her African colonies, as Brazil had done in the past.

⁴⁴ Diário de Notícias, March 13, 1961, p. 1.

⁴⁵ O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, April 2, 1961, p. 3.

⁴⁶ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 63 (April 14, 1961).

President Quadros did not wish to abdicate total direction of foreign policy. Here was a repetition of what had happened in the Kubitschek administration when there were two foreign offices: one in the Itamaraty (Foreign Office Palace), devoted to routine tasks, and another in the Catete (Presidential Palace in Rio de Janeiro) creating the Operation Pan America and other foreign policy. Now, while bureaucratic affairs were the responsibility of the Itamaraty, decisions were made in Alvorada Palace (Brasília). The President directed the Itamaraty without discretion, issuing instructions in little notes previously circulated by the press and radio. One of the first, dated February 24, 1961, had requested that provision be made "(a) to constitute a work group for the purpose of preparing Brazilian diplomatic representation in the new African states; (b) for the Foreign Ministry to review Brazil's African policy, which must be examined in all its aspects, especially political, economic and cultural." On the same day President Quadros decided to create scholarships for Africans through a 20 percent reduction in diplomatic salaries equal to or higher than \$400 per month, half of the savings from the cut to be applied to the scholarships.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa, p. 314.

The plan dictated by Quadros included cultural agreements between Brazil and Morocco, Senegal, Ghana, Tunisia, and Nigeria to be implemented by the Ministry in due time. The cultural agreements included the above-mentioned scholarships. Later on, these provisions for the scholarships were modified several times. Originally, there were to be twenty scholarships in 1961, forty in 1962, sixty in 1963, eighty in 1964, and one hundred in 1965; at first, only for students of medicine, pharmacy, architecture, agronomy and veterinary medicine.⁴⁸ Then they were changed to 300 African scholarships for a duration of five years. The students were to be invited from Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Togoland and Dahomey to Brazilian universities for professional training in medicine, pharmacy, architecture, agronomy, and veterinary medicine. They were to have their travel costs paid by the Brazilian government, and receive 15,000 cruzeiros a month.⁴⁹ The Brazilians soon discovered that they would have a problem with the African students because the African youth selected did not speak Portuguese.

⁴⁸ Juan de Onis in New York Times, March 22, 1961, p. 3.

⁴⁹ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 112 (June 28, 1961).

An intensive course in Portuguese was therefore planned for the students, and while they were studying, work was to be found for them.⁵⁰ This teaching of Portuguese was even to be carried one step farther when Quadros negotiated in July, 1961, with Senegal to teach Portuguese in Senegal and create a department of Brazilian studies in the University of Dakar.⁵¹

The Brazilian Foreign Ministry then undertook the study of establishing diplomatic missions in various sub-Saharan countries and finally opened them in Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal. These were in addition to the existing embassy in Cairo and the legation in Pretoria. Besides creating new embassies, there was some activity on the economic level. In July, 1961, in Brazil, an agreement was signed between Brazil and the delegations that represented African coffee interests. This document, called the "Declaration of Rio de Janeiro," established a new policy for Brazilian and African coffee. It was understood that although Brazil and some of the African countries were competitors in a certain segment of the international coffee market, it was in their common

⁵⁰ Diário de Notícias, February 18, 1961, p. 2.

⁵¹ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 133 (July 28, 1961).

interest to regulate competition, making it possible not only to obtain relative stabilization of prices in the world market, but also to provide a fair wage for their rural workers. The document included provisions for studying ways of better cooperation in defending their common commercial interests and especially methods to maintain the levels of coffee prices in the world market.⁵²

The "Declaration of Rio de Janeiro" was a natural outcome of efforts toward international cooperation. It established the bases also of a consultative system for commercialization of the product, adoption of similar criteria and policies to control production, and strengthening of agriculture in the individual economies. This step, accelerating the process of international understanding and integration, was in a sense a complement to the Accra Conference, which in April, 1961 had established the bases of the Cacao Agreement.⁵³ Cooperation in the economic sphere seemed easier than in the cultural and political.

The decisions concerning circumnavigation of Africa by the Brazilian Coast Guard, the traveling exhibit of

⁵² O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, July 2, 1961, p. 6.

⁵³ Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa, p. 315.

Brazilian products on the ship Custodio de Melo, and the decoration of the Order of the Southern Cross conferred on the President of Ghana and the Heads of the Councils of Ministers of Senegal and Tanganyika were rather insignificant in promoting Brazilian trade with Africa when compared with President Quadros' instruction to the Director of Brazilian Lloyd's to conduct studies for the purpose of creating a shipping service between Brazil and Indonesia with stops in Africa.⁵⁴ It was not until June, 1962 that this last provision finally began to take form after Congressional approval of a resolution establishing a direct line between Brazil and Africa, but not mentioning continuing on to Indonesia.⁵⁵ It was the Jânio Quadros administration, though, that had taken an interest in this trade and initiated the action linking Brazil and Africa. Since then Brazil has slowly and gradually been increasing the exportation of its products to the African countries using Lloyd's ships going directly to Lagos, whereas formerly the trade was conducted through the ports of New Orleans and Durban.⁵⁶ Still, overall, trade

⁵⁴ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 122 (July 13, 1961).

⁵⁵ Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa, p. 316.

⁵⁶ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 124 (July 17, 1961).

between Brazil and Africa were negligible, barely .03 percent of imports and 1.1 percent of exports.⁵⁷

The Angolan struggle for independence remained a problem for Brazil.⁵⁸ When the Angolans revolted against the Portuguese in February, 1961, Brazilian foreign policy was strained by conflicting loyalties to Portugal and support for emerging colonial peoples.⁵⁹ In June, 1961, Ghana informed the United Nations that its government had closed its sea and air ports to Portuguese ships and planes, had adopted other restrictive measures in its relations with Portugal, and condemned the latter's policy in Angola; the British government revealed that it had suspended all licenses for the supply of military equipment to Portuguese overseas territories; and the government of Senegal broke off diplomatic relations with Portugal. The United States sent a protest to Portugal against the use of American military equipment in Angola. And what did Brazil do? Until

⁵⁷ Conselho Nacional de Economia, Exposição Geral da Situação Econômica do Brasil 1961 (Rio de Janeiro, 1962), p. 39.

⁵⁸ Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, Evolução da Crise Brasileira (São Paulo: Companhia Editôra Nacional, 1965), p. 255.

⁵⁹ Diário de Notícias, February 8, 1961, p. 1.

Jânio Quadros' time, that country had backed Portugal with regard to Africa. It was thus hoped that he would change completely the previous policy of support, and at first he seemed to do so when it was originally announced that Brazil would vote for Angola in the United Nations.⁶⁰ Then, in the final roll call in the United Nations, Brazil abstained from voting on the restrictions and condemnations against Portugal.⁶¹ The recoil with respect to Angola sacrificed the possibilities of success by Brazilian foreign policy in Black Africa. At least such a conclusion was reached by certain Brazilian intellectuals in their writings.⁶² The truth of the matter is that the abstention from voting by Brazil really seemed to have little effect on the relations between Brazil and Black Africa. The African countries were apathetic or even indifferent to the opinions of Brazil in the United Nations and considered Brazilian diplomatic activities too insignificant to be important. There is also the possibility that the Black African countries appreciated the efforts on their behalf by Brazil and accepted the fact

⁶⁰ Diário de Notícias, March 28, 1961, p. 1.

⁶¹ Diário de Notícias, March 30, 1961, p. 1.

⁶² Eduardo Portella, Política Externa e Povo Livre (São Paulo: Editora Fulgor Limitada, 1963), p. 21.

that the decision to abstain was a difficult one for Brazil and only done under duress. Whatever the reason, Brazilian diplomatic and economic relations with Black Africa continued to progress.

Because of his great interest in African and Asian affairs, Jânio Quadros caused to be established a government sponsored agency named the Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos Afro-Asiáticos (Brazilian Institute of Afro-Asian Studies) in Rio de Janeiro which undertook an ambitious program of publishing.⁶³ Eduardo Portella was appointed to head the Institute and was charged with the responsibility of searching out, planning, and providing material and information which would permit an objective formulation of Brazilian policy for Africa and Asia.⁶⁴

The last area in Africa of interest to Brazilian foreign policy makers was the southern portion occupied by the Union of South Africa. Brazil stood with most of the other countries of the world in condemning apartheid in the Union of South Africa. This disdain for apartheid, however, was not so strong that it deterred Quadros' main objective,

⁶³ Maranhão, Brasil África Um Mesmo Caminho, p. 11.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 21.

which seemed to be an attempt to increase Brazilian trade with that country. His activities in Black Africa had a thin veneer of cultural and ethnic overtones, but beneath it all was always the attempt to enlarge Brazilian exports. This fact became apparent in March, 1961. Between March 13 and 16, Jânio Quadros received a Union of South Africa mission in Brazil in an attempt to expand South African trade with Brazil.⁶⁵ Quadros was just as eager to reciprocate in a trade agreement with South Africa. He therefore sent the inevitable memo to Arinos de Melo Franco to prepare to send a Brazilian mission to South Africa to continue the negotiations.⁶⁶ Thus, while he was attempting to be anti-colonial and a sincere friend of the Negro, he was dealing diplomatically with South Africa for commercial purposes. The negotiation earned him the criticism of Brazilian intellectuals, but little trade resulted from this effort.⁶⁷

We have thus seen that one goal among many of the Quadros administration's independent foreign policy was

⁶⁵ Diário de Notícias, March 13, 1961, p. 1.

⁶⁶ Diário de Notícias, March 14, 1961, p. 10.

⁶⁷ José Honório Rodrigues, "Brasil, União Sul-Áfricana e África do Sud-oests," O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, April 23, 1961, p. 4.

building a new relationship with Africa. The dramatic appearance of numerous independent states on the other shore of the South Atlantic, as well as Brazil's social and intellectual traditions, made this a particularly appealing ideal.

The proof of Brazil's past intimate connection with Africa is her people, of whom about one-third are of African descent. If Brazil has had a prevailing national self-image, it is that of a land of interracial harmony, toleration, and miscegenation. Accepting this creed, it was only natural for Brazil to feel a claim to particular consideration by the African world.⁶⁸

The case for Brazil as a country without any form of discrimination is usually overstated. It is an untruth; racial toleration, integration and justice have been lacking to such a degree in other countries that by comparison it has not seemed illogical to believe Brazil has practically no racial problem.

Many people agree that Brazil is a hybrid country culturally as well as ethnically. Certainly, the Caucasian and Negroid cultural and ethnic mixture would be sufficient

⁶⁸ Lawrence Nevins, "Brazil and Africa," Journal of Inter-American Studies, VI (1964), 121.

to explain a special interest in Africa. To these two mixtures could be added the record of historical contacts. The negative quality of this heritage has not been emphasized, however. It is that the basis of most interchange between Brazil and Africa before the twentieth century was the African slave trade. Africans came to Brazil as merchandise. That cultural characteristics and agricultural products also passed from one continent to another is very interesting to an anthropologist or historian, but was entirely incidental to the slave trade. There is little in this past over which a modern African can justifiably wax sentimental.

The Africans have not looked to Brazil with gratitude for her example of interracial harmony.⁶⁹ The independent countries of Negro Africa do not have considerable white minorities and do not particularly need--let alone want--lessons in racial tolerance. Moreover, Africans who are fortunate in knowing Brazil firsthand do not take long to observe that despite all the talk of tolerance, Negroes in Brazil are situated socially and economically at the bottom of society.

This does not mean that sentimental bases for a policy of cooperation are wholly lacking, but they are stronger

⁶⁹ Nevins, "Brazil and Africa," p. 121.

on the Brazilian side than on the African. There are, however, practical reasons why a policy of closer contacts between Brazil and Africa might be the basis of a mutually beneficial relationship. Although the two regions produce competing agricultural commodities, it is in their mutual interest jointly to consider means of regulating the markets. By virtue of resources and experience, Brazil is in a convenient position to provide leadership in such enterprises. It is also not unreasonable to suppose that some day Brazil will be able to market certain industrial products in Africa in significant amounts if they become competitively priced in the world market.

CHAPTER VI
BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY APPLIED
TO THE ORIENT

China launched late in the 1950's a cultural, commercial, and diplomatic campaign to win over Latin America. Seeking closer ties with Brazil represented but one part of its broad program. This Chinese offensive had as its goals: to persuade the people of Latin America to increase their trade with Communist China, to exchange diplomatic representatives, and ultimately to convert the Latin American peoples to Communism and to follow Peking in world affairs. With regard to Brazil, Communist China employed a twofold approach in its attempt to influence the people. Overtly, China made cultural and economic overtures to impress the Brazilians, and covertly, it apparently extended aid and encouragement to the most radical and revolutionary element in the Brazilian Communist movement.

During the Quadros and Goulart administrations, Brazil was very susceptible to such overtures, but it did not play a completely passive role. Quadros initiated commercial and diplomatic dealings with China to such an extent that Chinese-Brazilian relations appeared to be on more of a reciprocal basis than Brazil enjoyed with any other region of the world.

Chinese efforts to penetrate Brazil actually began before the Quadros administration and continued until after the Goulart administration. Communist Chinese diplomacy seemed at times to follow a definite program, and at other times to be based on opportunism. Regardless of the Communist Chinese goals, Brazil always appeared responsive. Brazil even initiated new diplomatic moves toward Oriental countries in addition to Communist China.

Historically, the relations between Brazil and the Orient have always been rather tenuous and irregular. Treaties were signed between Brazil and China in the nineteenth century, but they have little bearing on the period of Quadros and Goulart. Brazilian foreign policy during the period of the Chinese Republic, especially from 1913 to 1961, followed the United States line on a global

plane.¹ For example, in 1949 Brazil transferred her diplomatic representation in China to Tokyo, headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and in 1952 to Taipei, Taiwan.²

A few years after the Communists became established in China, Peking engaged in a concerted effort to sway opinion in Latin America away from the Soviet Union's policy of economic competition and limited military action, toward Mao Tse-tung's view that revolution must be pushed immediately and at any cost.³ The Chinese really were attacking Nikita Khrushchev's gradualist revolutionary concept, putting forth an alternative concept based on the conviction that the West could be deflated sooner than Khrushchev thought if the U.S.S.R. and the world Communist movement were to become more aggressive. The Chinese had optimistic estimates of the certainty of success in Latin America.⁴

¹ José Honório Rodrigues, Interêsse Nacional e Política Externa (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, S.A., 1966), p. 133.

² José Honório Rodrigues, "Brazil and China," in Policies Toward China, ed. by A. M. Halpern (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1965), p. 458.

³ Louis J. Wiznitzer, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Latin America," New Republic, CXLVII (December 1, 1962), 17.

⁴ Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1964 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 300.

Their conflict with the Russians was to have repercussions in Latin America.

Since the Communist Chinese did not have diplomatic representation in Latin America, they started their penetration of the region about 1956 with the establishment of friendship societies in several Latin American countries. In 1958, Chinese interest in the underdeveloped areas of the world greatly increased.⁵ The endeavor in the cultural field was later placed under the guidance of the Chinese-Latin American Friendship Association, which was set up in March, 1960 in Peking and was charged with the responsibility of disseminating Chinese views throughout Latin America. Its counterpart, the China-Brazil Friendship Soviet, located in Rio de Janeiro, was managed by Adão Pereira Nunes and Rachel Cossay, quite independently of the local Communist Party.⁶ From this simple friendly beginning, they progressed to a second stage during which the Communist Chinese opened branches of their Hsin Hua News Agency in Rio de Janeiro, Havana, Buenos Aires, and other cities. These news agencies were staffed with Chinese reporters ostensibly

⁵Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 167.

⁶Wiznitzer, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Latin America," p. 17.

doing no more than reporting news stories back to China, but as events were to prove, they were also engaging in underground activity. For example, they later were charged with buying farms in the interior to be used as guerrilla training camps.⁷

This increase was manifested in Latin America by a third stage in the Chinese offensive. This was an exchange of delegations of various kinds between the two countries, which increased in number each year.⁸ Before continuing at this point to expand upon the attempt of the Chinese to influence Brazilians ideologically, the focus of attention on Communist maneuvers must be shifted and consideration given to the activities of the Communist parties in Brazil.

In Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, and Guatemala, many rank-and-file Communists had become impatient with Nikita Khrushchev's gradual methods toward extending Communism, which they called "operación durmiente" (freely translated as a slow progression toward Communism).

⁷Vladimir R. De Dubnic, Political Trends in Brazil (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968), p. 126.

⁸In 1958, thirty-seven Latin American delegations went to Peking. This number increased until in 1960, 168 delegations went. (Wiznitzer, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Latin America," p. 17.)

One of the most dramatic results of the Sino-Soviet rift was the split in the Communist Party in Brazil.⁹ Five senior members left the party in 1961 and founded their own Partido Comunista do Brasil (PC do B). This was the Communist Party of Brazil as opposed to the Brazilian Communist Party and was under the leadership of Mauricio Grabois, João Amazonas, Guido Enes, and Manuel Ferreira.¹⁰ These men angrily rejected the idea of a united Communist front and called instead for revolutionary organization of the peasants. The PC do B remained very small, numbering only a few hundred members, and was burdened by a rigidly dogmatic position.¹¹ The rift with the old-line Party became patently public in March, 1962, when Novos Rumos (the pro-Soviet weekly of the orthodox Communists) and A Classe Operária (the biweekly publication of the pro-Chinese dissidents) engaged in a violent polemic.¹² While the pro-Soviet party fought within

⁹William E. Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), pp. 18-19.

¹⁰Daniel Tretiak, "Latin America: The Chinese Drive," Contemporary Review, CCV (November, 1964), 571.

¹¹Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 279.

¹²Novos Rumos, March 2-8, 1962, p. 2.

the student organization for a "popular front" of progressive, Christian-Socialist and other students, the pro-Chinese denounced all such alliances and urged the students to take to the country and help train the peasants for guerrilla warfare. Novos Rumos called this policy "irresponsible" and Trotskyite."¹³ A Classe Operária answered by calling the pro-Soviets "instruments of the bourgeoisie" and "appeasers." Novos Rumos had persistently backed Brazil's President Goulart, though with reservations. A Classe Operária violently denounced Goulart as a traitor to the workers and peasants. Both publications quoted Marx, Engels, and Lenin as proof to support their respective positions. In all, these two news publications were very interesting for Brazilian readers at that time because of their continuing vitriolic and polemical debate.

Then, in late August, 1962, a third Communist-oriented publication called LIGA appeared. It was under the management of Francisco Julião, founder and leader of the Brazilian "Peasant Leagues" in Northeastern Brazil.¹⁴

¹³ Moises Vinhas, "O Partido e Indestrutível," Novos Rumos, March 23-29, 1962, Suplemento Especial.

¹⁴ "A Terrível Imagem da Revolução," O Cruzeiro, March 25, 1961, pp. 6-15.

Julião was not a member of either of the other Communist parties, but was an outspoken admirer of Mao Tse-tung. He had visited Peking once and enthusiastically supported his personal friend Fidel Castro (who was strongly suspected of helping to finance Julião's movement).¹⁵

While it would be very difficult, of course, to establish that the publications A Classe Operária and LIGA and the organizations they represented received direct support from Communist China, the assumption may be made that they received encouragement and possibly financial backing, too, of a clandestine nature. This assumption is predicated on the evidence presented at the trial of the Chinese in Brazil after the revolt of 1964 and discussed in detail at the end of this chapter. Support by Communist China for a more radical position of the Communist Party in Brazil indicated that Mainland China was following a dual foreign policy toward Brazil. While extending the hand of friendship by sending cultural, economic, and diplomatic missions to Brazil, Communist China was apparently attempting to subvert the country internally through the PC do B. Even more amazing was the fact that the Brazilian government of Quadros

¹⁵Wiznitzer, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry," p. 17; O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, March 12, 1961, p. 4.

and Goulart did not seem to see any connection between these activities. In their endeavor to obtain more foreign trade, top governmental officials of Brazil overlooked the true aims of Red China.

Everywhere in Latin America, it seemed, most of the rank-and-file revolutionaries felt closer to the Chinese revolution than to that of the Russians. They had no patience with "peaceful coexistence" or "thaws." At the conference of the eighty-one Communist parties held in Moscow in November and December, 1960, all of Europe's Communist parties (with the exception of Albania's) endorsed Khrushchev's views, however reluctantly in some instances. But the Asian and Latin American delegates showed open sympathy for the aggressive line of Mao.¹⁶ Perhaps it was because of this sympathy shown at the conference that China assumed responsibility for coordinating Communist activities in Latin America.

The delegates were aware that the Cuban, Egyptian and Algerian revolutions had been made without Communist help and sometimes against the advice of the Communists. They knew that the Chinese revolution succeeded without

¹⁶"China Comanda o Comunismo na AL," Visão, XVIII (January 27, 1961), 17.

Stalin's support. Similarly, they knew that in Latin America, Moscow (and some Latin Americans trained there) often supported strategies designed to bring the Communist Party of Brazil or Colombia or Venezuela, etc., closer to power. In 1960, for example, the Brazilian Communist Party, upon orders from Moscow, reversed itself and backed Jânio Quadros for President. Marshal Teixeira Lott, whom the Brazilian Communists had previously backed for the Presidency, would probably have been more lenient to the Communists in Brazil.¹⁷ But Quadros, while promising to crack down on the Brazilian Communists, had proposed to reestablish diplomatic relations with Moscow, which Teixeira Lott had not done.¹⁸

The main goal of Communist China in Latin America was to establish ideological leadership over the revolutionary movements in that area. To do this it was necessary, first, to identify the revolutionary struggles of the Latin American people with Chinese revolutionary tradition, and, second, to convince the Latin Americans that Chinese revolutionary experience and strategy were applicable to their

¹⁷ Washington Post, January 3, 1961, p. A4.

¹⁸ Diário de Notícias, February 2, 1961, p. 1.

situation. Since the Chinese lacked normal diplomatic channels and had limited economic resources, they chose to use an ideological approach--penetration via cultural contact and exchange.¹⁹

In 1959, the Chinese began a slight shift in their ideological penetration of Latin America away from merely establishing friendship societies to a more active approach. In this new or third stage, individuals of various backgrounds made journeys to China and were welcomed with dinners, speeches and sight-seeing tours by the Chinese, but the Chinese hospitality was especially lavished upon Latin American opinion-makers, intellectuals and journalists. A sign of the approach of the third stage was the Latin American tour undertaken by a group of Chinese journalists in 1959 in Chile, Uruguay, Brazil and Cuba. While in Brazil, the group called on Pedro Calmon, Minister of Education, and discussed an exchange of teachers. They also visited Samuel Waimar and Paulo da Silveira, vice director and director of Última Hora, a leading Brazilian newspaper.²⁰

¹⁹ Joseph J. Lee, "Communist China's Latin American Policy," in Government of Communist China, ed. by George P. Jan (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1966),

²⁰ Ibid., p. 603.

Believing that the effectiveness of a newspaper, a news agency, and a broadcasting network is decided less by their facilities than by their position as the voice of the people, the Chinese spared no effort to win the writers of these media in Latin America to their side. No matter how small and insignificant they might be, journalists representing newspapers, magazines and other media were taken to see China at first hand. The Latin American journalists, for their part, were curious about this new nation, flattered by the special attention given them, and eager to visit and report on the country. A three-man Brazilian delegation, for example, consisting of Paulo da Silveira and Octavio Malta, the director and editor of Última Hora, and Radoico Guimaraes, a reporter for Diários Associados, went in March, 1960. They were followed by two other Brazilian delegations in June and November of the same year.²¹ The latter was headed by Inácio de Alender, vice-president of the Brazilian National Journalists Federation.

By 1960, the Chinese Communists had achieved considerable success in their campaign of ideological penetration. Latin American intellectuals who had visited China had come

²¹Lee, "Communist China's Latin American Policy," p. 604.

to identify their revolutionary movements with the Chinese revolution, convinced of the applicability of China's revolutionary model for them. On their return to Latin America they gave talks, passed resolutions, and wrote articles and books expounding these views.²² In these publications and speeches, they saw striking similarities between Brazil and China. In fact, they equated warlords with dictators, and "foreign devils" with United States business interests. Both countries had their problems with landless peasants. Soon Brazil was referred to by the intellectuals as a "Tropical Communist China." By 1961, twenty books in praise of China's being used as a model for Latin Americans to emulate had been published in Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay and Cuba.²³ Not one was critical in tone and not one presented a dispassionate account of the accomplishments of Communist China. The Chinese, of course, were primarily interested in giving the Latin American peoples an ideology and strategy for the conduct of their "national democratic" or "liberation" movements.

²² An interesting account from a feminine point of view may be found in Os Dias Chineses by Helena Silveira (São Paulo: EdArt, 1961).

²³ Lee, "Communist China's Latin American Policy," p. 604.

Another general approach that the Chinese made to Brazil was economic in nature. Simultaneously the Brazilian government made economic inducements to the Chinese. Quadros looked at the millions of Chinese peoples and believed that they would constitute a market for Brazilian goods in the same way that British and Japanese "old China hands" nostalgically dreamed of their trade with China. Since 90 percent of the total value of Brazilian exports was already made to the traditional markets (United States and Europe), Quadros believed that Brazil needed to open new markets, not only to alleviate the deficit in the balance of payments that had accumulated in that area, but also in order to satisfy, by expanding foreign commerce, the growing capacity of her industrialized output.²⁴

With the coming to office of President Jânio Quadros in 1961, it appeared that the Brazilian government had decided to change the policies followed by previous Brazilian governments of giving almost total support to American policy regarding the continent and the world. For Brazilians, the formulating of this new policy contained two traditional and permanent principles in Brazilian foreign

²⁴Lee, "Communist China's Latin American Policy," p. 604.

policy that dated from the days of the Empire but which had been deemphasized in the early years of the Republic. They were: (1) the repudiation of entangling political and commercial alliances with the great powers that all Brazilian foreign ministers had followed since 1844 when the treaty with Great Britain was terminated; and (2) the maintenance of commercial relations without discrimination which actually dated from 1808, but which was not observed for some time.

In pursuit of this change in foreign policy, President Quadros, in one of his early orders, indicated he was considering recognition of Communist China and a break in relations with Taiwan. The President asked for a report on the amount of trade conducted between Brazil and Taiwan and on the cost of maintaining the Brazilian Embassy in Taiwan.²⁵

Then as if to confuse even more the foreign relations with the two Chinas, Brazil's Foreign Minister Arinos de Melo Franco announced at a press conference in February, 1961, that there were no immediate plans for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and

²⁵New York Times, February 5, 1961, p. 26.

Communist China.²⁶ The Foreign Minister, however, hinted that Brazil might turn to a formula of "two Chinas" in her relations with the governments on Taiwan and on the mainland of China.²⁷ As he had done in his speech when he took office, Arinos declared that Brazil would follow a sovereign foreign policy and that the country planned diplomatic and trade relations with all nations that were ready to respect her juridical and social organization. Expressing his personal opinion, Arinos said that practical reasoning showed that a Communist Chinese situation existed and would have to be dealt with. The Foreign Minister's statement appeared to support speculation in Rio de Janeiro at the time that the government of President Quadros would eventually grant recognition to the Chinese Communist regime on the mainland but without withdrawing recognition from the Nationalists holding Taiwan. However, Minister Arinos said he had no instructions from President Quadros to study the possibility of relations with Peking. He further said that Brazil had decided to support a United Nations General Assembly debate on whether Communist China should be admitted to the United

²⁶ Diário de Notícias, February 23, 1961, p. 1.

²⁷ Ibid.

Nations because he felt this would contribute to lessening East-West tensions. But he went on to add that his government had not decided how it would act if the General Assembly voted on the membership issue.²⁸ In summation, Arinos offered little in his announcement that would clarify speculation at the time on whether the Quadros regime in fact expected to establish formal relations with Communist China. Many of the people in Brazil had been speculating that the administration was using commercial relations as the yardstick for possible diplomatic relations although Brazil had only sporadic commercial exchanges with Communist China.²⁹

Still later in February, 1961, President Jânio Quadros definitely aligned Brazil with those countries in favor of the United Nations debate on the admission of Communist China.³⁰ Thus he squarely placed his nation against the United States position on a major world issue. In instructions to the Foreign Ministry ordering Brazil's delegation to support inclusion of the subject of Peking's

²⁸New York Times, February 25, 1961, p. 2; Christian Science Monitor, March 7, 1961, p. 1.

²⁹New York Times, February 7, 1961, p. 1.

³⁰Diário de Notícias, February 23, 1961, p. 1.

admission on the agenda of the next General Assembly, President Quadros refrained from indicating whether he also favored actual membership of the Chinese Communists in the world organization. But the decision to back debate of the China issue made Brazil the first Latin American country aside from Cuba to take a stand. It raised the possibility that President Quadros' example might be followed by various other republics in the Western Hemisphere, thereby seriously threatening continued United States success in keeping the Chinese membership question from discussion and vote.³¹

The move was the most spectacular made by President Quadros in launching Brazil into what he promised would be an independent foreign policy. It followed an order to the Foreign Ministry to study the state of relations with Nationalist China and the possibility of a relationship with Communist Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. President Quadros took the step on Communist China just a few days after President Kennedy's personal representatives had assured him of the desire of the United States to provide far-reaching economic aid to Brazil, and the day after his Finance Minister, Clemente Mariani, had announced that he was going to

³¹New York Times, February 23, 1961, p. 1.

Washington soon to discuss assistance problems. But it had been President Quadros' thesis all along that friendly relations with the United States should be compatible with the same type of relations with all countries, if Brazil was to have a truly sovereign policy.³²

In March, 1961, the Brazilian government let it be known that Brazil would not act alone ahead of the United Nations on recognition of Communist China. Although President Quadros ordered that Brazil vote in favor of including the admission of Communist China on the agenda of the next session of the United Nations General Assembly, this did not mean Brazil was prepared to recognize the Peking regime prior to a United Nations decision.³³

Not exactly relating to China but closely associated with that area of the world, there were other Brazilian diplomatic developments. In another move toward the establishment of an independent foreign policy, President Jânio Quadros issued a memorandum to his Foreign Minister instructing him to prepare to receive a North Korean goodwill mission that was scheduled to arrive in Brazil in

³² "Presidência," Visão, XVIII (March 10, 1961), 12-13.

³³ New York Times, March 24, 1961, p. 6.

August, 1961.³⁴ More specifically, the Foreign Ministry was to prepare an agreement for increasing Brazilian trade with the North Koreans.³⁵ President Quadros announced that Brazil would receive the mission with the greatest satisfaction.

What made this statement of Quadros so interesting at the time was its obvious lack of diplomatic tact. While he was so busily preparing for the North Korean mission, there was already in Brazil a mission from South Korea which had come to increase trade between Brazil and South Korea.³⁶ Quadros, after saying that the North Koreans were coming, even received personally the members of the South Korean mission.³⁷ One can only speculate on whether the South Koreans brought up the subject of North Korea at that meeting.

Various cultural and commercial missions between Oriental countries and Brazil increased in number. In May,

³⁴ New York Times, July 28, 1961, p. 7.

³⁵ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 133 (July 23, 1961).

³⁶ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 119 (July 10, 1961).

³⁷ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 129 (July 24, 1961).

1961, a commercial mission of Communist China visited Brazil and initiated conversation about the possibilities of exchange between the two countries. In these conversations, the opinions expressed about the feasibility of trade with China were founded purely on demographic criteria, and they did not take economic matters into account. The visit of the commercial mission of Communist China did not conclude with concrete results translated into contracts of purchase or even in a definite understanding for the immediate increase of exchange with Brazil.³⁸

In July, 1961, President Jânio Quadros asked Vice-President João Goulart to head a Brazilian mission to Mainland China and other Asian countries.³⁹ Goulart was given full authority by Quadros to negotiate accords of commerce and payments with Communist China.⁴⁰ The Brazilian mission left August 8, 1961, for China by way of the Soviet Union.⁴¹

³⁸ Rodrigues, Interêsse Nacional e Política Externa, p. 139.

³⁹ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 124 (July 17, 1961).

⁴⁰ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 129 (July 24, 1961).

⁴¹ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 141 (August 9, 1961).

After a stopover in Moscow, Vice-President Goulart and his economic mission arrived in Peking on August 13, 1961.⁴²

His arrival was announced to the world over the radio waves of Radio Peking. Tung Pi-wu, one of Communist China's two deputy heads of state, welcomed Goulart. Marshal Chen Yi, Foreign Minister, and Li Hsien-nien, Finance Minister, also greeted the visitors at the airport. Speaking at a dinner attended by Premier Chou En-lai, Mr. Tung said that the United States was obstructing China's admission into the United Nations. He further said that this attitude was entirely unreasonable and could not be tolerated. Apparently by this speech, the Chinese were directly seeking Brazilian support for their admission into the United Nations. Mr. Tung concluded by saying that the Brazilian Vice-President's visit would make a positive contribution to the strengthening of friendship between the Chinese and Brazilian peoples and to the development of good relations between the countries. The visit would also serve to enhance their mutual understanding and solidarity.⁴³

⁴² O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, August 13, 1961, p. 1; "Distinguished Guests from Brazil," Peking Review, IV, No. 33 (August 18, 1961), 6.

⁴³ New York Times, August 14, 1961, p. 3; "Distinguished Guests from Brazil," p. 6.

João Goulart pledged to Communist China that his nation would promote an intimate brotherly relationship as well as trade with the Communist regime.⁴⁴

Then on the 23rd of August, 1961, the Ministry of Foreign Relations divulged officially the news of Goulart's signing an accord with the Communist Chinese providing for the adjustment of payments and commerce between Brazilian banks and the banks of Mainland China. The exchange anticipated an agreement of ten million pounds sterling with technical credit of 1.5 million pounds sterling. Brazilian products to be exported to Communist China would be coffee, cacao, almonds and their derivatives, cotton, hides and skins, sisal, tobacco, meat, carnauba wax, oil, rice and other cereals, and machinery. Brazil would import from China machinery, tools, coal, copper, zinc, antimony and tin.⁴⁵

The information had been contained in a letter from Goulart addressed to the Brazilian chief of government Jânio Quadros. In the writing, Goulart said that he visited, and

⁴⁴ New York Times, August 18, 1961, p. 8; Peking Review, IV, No. 34 (August 25, 1961), 22-23.

⁴⁵ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 151 (August 23, 1961).

was visited by, President Mao Tse-tung, and furthermore that Goulart gave support to the foreign policy of the Brazilian government and especially to that of Quadros in defense of the principle of self-determination.⁴⁶

After the success in Peking, the mission left for various economic and industrial centers of China. João Goulart was sent a message of congratulations by President Quadros for the success of the mission. Upon the publication of the letter from Goulart with its contents, the forces opposing Quadros' expanding relations with the Communist Chinese had, more than ever, a motive to accentuate the campaign against the international policy of the government.

The Nationalist Chinese on Formosa were not exactly idle.⁴⁷ As early as January, 1961, they had sent a mission to Brazil to sign an immigration agreement. Fearing the possible consequences of the Brazilian mission to Communist China, the government of Chiang Kai-shek initiated action to offset the influence of Mainland China on Brazil. The

⁴⁶ Mario Victor, Cinco Anos Que Abalaram O Brasil. (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1965), p. 290.

⁴⁷ "Chineses no Brasil," Visão, XVIII (January 6, 1961), 21.

Formosan government invited Congressional deputies Raimundo Padilha and Mendes de Moraes to visit Taipei.⁴⁸ Jânio Quadros was quite willing for them to go, especially if it meant increased trade for Brazil, and he agreed that the parliamentarians would carry a message from the President of Brazil to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Furthermore, in August of 1961, the Nationalist Chinese planned to send a special mission to Brazil. It was to be received by Quadros in Pôrto Alegre. Upon learning of the mission, Quadros declared he definitely desired to expand the relationship of Brazil with the island of Formosa, and he recommended to his foreign minister and the Minister of Industry and Commerce that they begin studying subjects to be included on the agenda for discussion with the Chinese representation from Taiwan.⁴⁹

After the resignation of Quadros, however, all these plans went into a state of abeyance. The Brazilian mission to Taipei had not taken place on August 28, 1961, when Deputies Raimundo Padilha and Mendes de Moraes announced the

⁴⁸ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 151 (August 23, 1961).

⁴⁹ Ibid.

postponement of their trip to Taiwan.⁵⁰ The Taiwan Chinese were persistent, nonetheless, and on December 28, 1962, Brazil concluded a thoroughgoing trade agreement with the Republic of China.⁵¹

On November 29, 1962, a Red Chinese trade delegation had come to Brazil, returning the visit to Peking by President Joao Goulart in 1961, when he was still Vice-President.⁵² They represented the Bank of China, and the official talks were devoted to discussions of the nature of each country's system of foreign trade, customs regulations and rate of exchange, and of the disadvantages ascribed by the Chinese to the lack of a Brazilian consulate on the mainland of China.⁵³

The Chinese delegation was exceptionally eager to organize a commercial and industrial exhibition in Brazil, a project which had been the subject of an application to the Quadros government and which had been authorized in July,

⁵⁰ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 154 (August 28, 1961).

⁵¹ Rodrigues, "Brazil and China," p. 464.

⁵² "Latins Set Out To Win Amigos," Business Week, October 20, 1962, p. 68.

⁵³ Rodrigues, "Brazil and China," p. 462.

1961. The resignation of President Quadros and the political slant of the exhibition convinced the Brazilian authorities that they should postpone it. However, the insistence of the 1962 delegation made it necessary to review the whole question. The exhibition was finally authorized by President Goulart.⁵⁴

The Chinese were authorized to open a commercial office and visas were issued to the representatives of the Council for the Promotion of International Trade, who arrived to set up the office and organize the exhibition to be held in Niteroi, a state capital just across the Bay of Guanabara from Rio de Janeiro. In reality, this visit of the commercial mission from Communist China still brought no concrete results in the way of bills of sale or definitive understandings which would lead to an immediate increase in trade.⁵⁵

When the Brazilian military revolt occurred March 31-April 1, 1964, one of the first acts of Gustavo Borges, Chief of the Department of Political and Social Order of Guanabara state, was a raid on the Chinese commercial and

⁵⁴Rodrigues, "Brazil and China," p. 464.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 465.

journalist missions in Brazil.⁵⁶ After the raid, the Brazilian military accused as Communist spies the nine members of the Hsin Hua News Agency (New China News Agency) and the Commercial Mission of China.⁵⁷ This accusation was based upon the discovery of \$55,000 in the possession of the Chinese.⁵⁸

In addition, when the police arrived at the apartment of the Chinese at six o'clock in the morning, they found the remains of burned paper. The police were able to obtain another paper with the names of members of the Communist Party of Brazil on it before it was burned. But the most alarming document found was one with a list of names of people who were to be assassinated including generals Humberto Castelo Branco and Amaury Kruei, and Governor Carlos Lacerda.⁵⁹ Still more papers were found with lists of names on them and beside each name was a figure written as though the number represented a sum of money (e.g.,

⁵⁶ Peking Review, VII (April 24, 1964), 9.

⁵⁷ They were Ma Yao-tseng, Su Tzu-ping, Wang Wei-chen, Chu Ching-tung, Wang Yao-ting, Wang Chih, Sung-Pao Luc, Jayne Dak, and Sung Knei-pao.

⁵⁸ Correio da Manhã, April 4, 1964, p. 1.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

"Arrais 3,000"). An address book was found which contained names of journalists such as Samuel Waimer, Octavio Malta and Paulo da Silveira, names of politicians such as Roland Corbusier, Aurelio Viana, Artur Virgílio, Chagas Rodrigues and Aarão Stenbruch, as well as Domingos Velasco and Togo de Barra.⁶⁰ These documents were shown by the police to various journalists.

As a result of the unfavorable reaction of the Brazilian people to the incident, pressure was placed on the foreign ministry to explain its reasons for admitting the Chinese. Itamaraty responded by saying that it had twice before opposed the admission of the Chinese for cultural and commercial purposes.⁶¹ The implication was that Itamaraty had had to admit them under pressure from the now ousted João Goulart.

Communist China was not long in sending a message to the Brazilian government asking freedom for the nine Chinese detained by the Brazilian authorities. The request was made by the Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Commerce, the All-China Journalists Association, and the

⁶⁰ Correio da Manhã, April 4, 1964, p. 1.

⁶¹ Correio da Manhã, April 7, 1964, p. 9.

Hsin Hua News Agency. The three organizations asked Brazil to protect them and their rights personally and to free them immediately so they could resume their work.⁶²

When the first protest brought no results, the Chinese Communist government later protested to the Brazilian government about the extended imprisonment of the Chinese. The Chinese said that they had gone to Brazil at the invitation of Goulart to confirm the accord between the Bank of Brazil and the Central Bank of China.⁶³

As the second protest still brought no results, four Japanese organizations next resolved to send a delegation of six lawyers to Brazil to try to obtain freedom for the nine Chinese. The organizations were the Society for the Rights of People, the International Society of Lawyers, the Society for Sino-Japanese Commercial Promotion, and the Council of Japanese Journalists.⁶⁴ At the same time, the Communist Chinese initiated a campaign in their Communist publications to obtain sympathy and world opinion in favor of their

⁶² Correio da Manhã, April 8, 1964, p. 2.

⁶³ Correio da Manhã, April 17, 1964, p. 1.

⁶⁴ Correio da Manhã, April 30, 1964, p. 1.

release.⁶⁵ In their publications the Chinese attempted to place the entire blame on the United States.⁶⁶

The six Japanese lawyers announced that they planned to go to Brazil to investigate the imprisonment of the Chinese. However, in Tokyo, they further stated they did not know much about the case and would not leave for Brazil for three months. During that time they wanted to study the Brazilian judicial system.⁶⁷

The nine Chinese detained in Brazil were committed to trial by the Second Military Tribunal of Brazil's First Military District on September 4, 1964. They were charged with trying to start a mass revolution and attempting to change the Brazilian regime--both crimes punishable under the Brazilian State Security Act.⁶⁸

Finally the trial of the Chinese took place during December, 1964. They were further accused of having a document in their possession containing the names of Brazilians

⁶⁵ Peking Review, VII, No. 18 (May 1, 1964), 23.

⁶⁶ Peking Review, VII, No. 17 (April 24, 1964), 9.

⁶⁷ Correio da Manhã, May 5, 1964, p. 1.

⁶⁸ "Indictment against Arrested Chinese in Brazil Denounced," Peking Review, VII, No. 41 (October 9, 1964), 16.

who would be able to work with the Chinese.⁶⁹ Their defense was an interesting and rather unique one. They maintained that the papers were falsified since they were written in the characters used by Nationalist China and that the Communist Chinese, since coming to power on the mainland, had changed the Chinese written language and had modified the way of writing these particular characters.⁷⁰ They certainly would never have made such a mistake. In addition, the defendants contended that the document was supposed to have been written in October, 1963, but it contained the name of a Chinese who only came to Brazil in January, 1964.⁷¹ Immediately, the cause of the Chinese was taken up by left-wing writers and their indictment and prosecution touted as being a fraud.⁷²

In spite of this clever defense, the nine Chinese were found guilty and condemned to ten years in prison.⁷³

⁶⁹ Correio da Manhã, December 22, 1964, p. 3.

⁷⁰ Correio da Manhã, April 18, 1965, p. 2.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Edmar Morel, O Golpe Começou em Washington (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, S.A., 1965).

⁷³ Correio da Manhã, January 3, 1965, p. 2.

In addition to the Japanese attorneys, the Communist Chinese had attempted to assemble an international group of seven noted lawyers from around the world to go to Brazil to observe the trial. All of these lawyers except the one from France were refused visas for entry into Brazil.⁷⁴ Instead of having the Japanese lawyers as defense counsel and the international group of lawyers as observers, the defense of the nine Chinese had been conducted by the Brazilian attorney, Sobral Pinto.⁷⁵ After losing his case, their attorney immediately filed a protest.⁷⁶

At this point the situation was diplomatically rather embarrassing. In April, 1965, the Superior Military Tribunal decided that the Executive Power could legally deport the Chinese.⁷⁷ This resolved the embarrassing situation. The Chinese were to leave Brazil on a Swissair airplane from Galeão Airport. They were under strict supervision and accompanied by Pakistani Embassy personnel. They

⁷⁴Peking Review, VIII, No. 2 (January 8, 1965), 25-26.

⁷⁵Peking Review, VIII, No. 1 (January 1, 1965), 22.

⁷⁶Peking Review, VIII, No. 2 (January 8, 1965), 25.

⁷⁷Correio da Manhã, April 8, 1965, p. 8.

were to go to Geneva, then Karachi, and Peking.⁷⁸ To the relief of many Brazilians and Chinese, they left as planned without any incidents more alarming than some signs of "Chinese Go Home" at the airport.⁷⁹ When the Chinese arrived in Peking, they gave a long and detailed exposé of the Brazilian atrocities committed against them while they were in prison.⁸⁰

With the departure of the Chinese from Brazil went the remnants of the Chinese diplomatic offensive in South America. Specifically aimed at Brazil, the offensive had begun in the late 1950's, received its stimulus under Quadros, reached its apex during the administration of Goulart, and ended in failure after the Brazilian revolution of 1964. The Chinese effort in Brazil is especially revealing because the trial exposed the techniques attempted by the Chinese Communists in subverting Latin American countries. Overtly the Chinese were striving for ideological influence through cultural, commercial, and diplomatic

⁷⁸ Correio da Manhã, April 16, 1965, p. 1.

⁷⁹ Correio da Manhã, April 18, 1965, p. 2.

⁸⁰ "The Nine Chinese Expose Atrocities at Press Conference," Peking Review, VIII, No. 18 (April 30, 1965), 19.

exchange. Covertly they were giving support to the revolutionary movements within the country.

CHAPTER VII

BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY APPLIED TO LATIN AMERICA

With regard to Latin America, Brazilian foreign policy has consisted of three stages or components: territorial expansion, maintenance of a balance of power against the La Plata region which later became known as Argentina, and experimentation in Latin American international policies. Each stage or component inevitably overlaps another. Basically, the era of Brazilian territorial expansion was a nineteenth-century phenomenon and ended during the first decade of the twentieth century. The necessity for a maintenance of a balance of power also began in the nineteenth century when the La Plata region was under the control of Juan Manuel de Rosas, and he had ambitions for territorial expansion. It became less important when Brazil ceased to fear Argentina but reappeared whenever Brazilians became apprehensive about that country. President Jânio Quadros'

trial nonalignment policy marked the actual implementation of an experimentation in Latin American international politics.

The Brazilian territorial expansion stage began with Brazil's declaration of independence from Portugal in 1822, and since that time the newly independent nation has had boundary problems with every country in Latin America except Chile. However, during this early period of independence Brazil was preoccupied with preserving and expanding the vast territory inherited from the Portuguese colonial era. The wars embarked upon at this time were mostly attempts to expand Brazil's domain southward. To be more specific, Brazil was involved in an attempt to annex what is now Uruguay, and when this failed she tried to prevent the latter's being annexed by Argentina.¹

While Brazil was attempting to expand its boundaries, the country was also trying to establish a balance of power with Chile against the La Plata region. During the colonial period, Brazilians believed that the La Plata region had always represented the most serious threat to

¹José Honório Rodrigues, "The Foundations of Brazil's Foreign Policy," International Affairs, XXXVIII (July, 1962), 329.

Brazilian security. Only by expanding the frontiers would Brazil be secure. The origins of the War of the Triple Alliance lie in the establishment and growth of the two large countries of South America--Argentina and Brazil. The war may be regarded as an episode in the establishment of Argentine nationality or as a phase in the development of Brazil.² The usual explanation regarding the cause of the war is that Francisco Solano López, president of Paraguay, was responsible for starting the conflict. He plunged his nation into a war against the combined forces of Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil when Paraguay felt menaced after its offer to mediate in a dispute between a Uruguayan faction and Brazil had been rejected. The noted Brazilian historian José Honório Rodrigues states that the war was really the result of Brazil's expansive ambitions.³ Whichever version is correct, in trying to attack Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil, Paraguay invaded Argentinian territory. Argentina thus found itself fighting on the side of Brazil. The war grew into the largest in South American history, lasting from

² Pelham H. Box, The Origins of the Paraguayan War (New York: Russell and Russell, 1930), p. 9.

³ Rodrigues, "The Foundations of Brazil's Foreign Policy," p. 329.

1864 to 1870. It ended with the defeat of Paraguay, and the end at that time of practical Brazilian attempts to counter-balance Argentina.⁴ The war also ended Brazil's period of conquest by arms. The able Foreign Minister, the Baron of Rio Branco, settled further boundary questions peacefully and in Brazil's favor. Rio Branco's skillful diplomacy enriched Brazil with territories acquired from Argentina, French Guiana, and Bolivia.⁵

Brazilians believe that the leadership of Latin America by Brazil accrues as a natural result of territorial and demographic factors, as well as economic and cultural conditions.⁶ Brazil is unquestionably a key nation on the continent. Because of the circumstances of its historical formation, Brazil has not known the serious clashes with the United States experienced by some Hispanic American countries. This lack of armed conflict with the United States puts Brazil in a good position to act as a mediator in a

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ E. Bradford Burns, "Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy," Journal of Inter-American Studies, IX (April, 1967), 196.

⁶ Raymundo Pimental Gomes, Por Que Não Somos Uma Grande Potência? (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, S.A., 1965), p. 3.

policy of greater continental solidarity between the United States and the other Latin American countries.

The third stage or component of Brazilian experimentation in Latin American international affairs was actually initiated by President Juscelino Kubitschek, although real experimentation in foreign policy was to begin with President Quadros. President Kubitschek assumed the initiative in what came to be called Operation Pan America, in a letter sent to President Dwight Eisenhower in May, 1958, soon after Vice President Richard M. Nixon had encountered hostile demonstrations in some parts of his trip to South America (Nixon did not visit Brazil). Kubitschek visualized for Operation Pan America political, strategic, and economic objectives.⁷ The economic objectives, however, were predominant. The main theme was that the frightful situation of underdevelopment in Latin America should be improved, giving an economic base to Pan Americanism, without which the juridical-political framework of continental solidarity would always remain fragile. The proposal called for a kind of Marshall Plan for Latin America.⁸

⁷"The Atlantic Report: Brazil," Atlantic Monthly, September, 1959, p. 251.

⁸Nelson de Sousa Sampaio, "The Foreign Policy of Brazil," in Foreign Policies in a World of Change,

The first concrete result, although limited, was the creation of an Inter-American Development Bank. The bank, with headquarters in Washington, D.C., began its existence in December, 1959, with a capital of a billion dollars.⁹ These funds were to be used for developmental purposes in Latin America.

With the objective of fortifying the economic bonds between the countries of this hemisphere, Brazil, following the proposals of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, signed the Treaty of Montevideo in 1960, that created a zone of free commerce among Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru, and Mexico. Colombia and Ecuador joined later in 1961.¹⁰ The treaty, which went into effect in 1961, followed the example of the European Common Market, whose creation caused the countries on this side of the Atlantic to fear that their exports to Europe would be partly replaced by similar products of African origin. The zone of free commerce embraced a potential market of nearly

ed. by Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 634.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Sidney Dell, A Latin American Common Market? (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 36.

165,000,000 individuals at the time.¹¹ Although the commercial interchange between these nations was still a small percentage of their trade with the United States and Europe,¹² it signified the first phases toward making their economies complementary, expanding the consumer market and hastening the betterment of their standards of living. Following the model of the European Economic Community, the Treaty of Montevideo allowed a span of time for the achievement of its objectives. This was a period not longer than twelve years from its effective date--that is, by 1973. The Treaty also established the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) with headquarters in Montevideo, Uruguay.¹³

The lessons of the Cuban revolution persuaded the Kennedy administration to amplify the Brazilian suggestion of Operation Pan America into a much larger one, the "Alliance for Progress." The United States suggested a cabinet-level economic conference in Uruguay as a special

¹¹Dell, A Latin American Common Market?, p. 36.

¹²Donald W. Baerresen, Martin Carnoy, and Joseph Grunwald, Latin American Trade Patterns (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1965), pp. 47-49, 129-143.

¹³Dell, A Latin American Common Market?, p. 36.

meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, during the month of August, 1961.¹⁴

This meeting, in the Declaration and Charter of Punta del Este, offered a three-pronged approach to the economic problems of Latin America: aid, trade, and social reform.¹⁵ A minimum of twenty billion dollars in foreign aid was pledged for a ten-year period. More than half of this money was to come from the United States, much in low interest long-term loans, the rest from international financial agencies, Western Europe, and private capital.¹⁶

Although the United States delegation admitted that Congress was resistant to long-term commitments, it felt that in this instance Congress was behind the Alliance for Progress and would feel itself morally committed to continue what was promised at Uruguay.

Thus the psychological foundation for a more dynamic Latin American foreign policy was laid during Kubitschek's

¹⁴J. Warren Nystrom and Nathan A. Haverstock, The Alliance for Progress (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1966), p. 34.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶C. Neale Ronning, Law and Politics in Inter-American Diplomacy (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), p. 84.

presidency. His policy of rapid economic development mobilized the national consciousness and contributed to a wave of optimism and a desire for a greater role for Brazil in Latin American affairs. The mood of the Brazilian public caught up with the spirit of the Brazilian Foreign Office, whose high esprit de corps was partially the result of the professional foreign office members' long-standing confidence in the future global role of Brazil. While rapid economic development contributed to a spirit of optimism in the great future of Brazil, it also brought about grave economic stresses that increased the need to modify Brazil's foreign policy and to diversify its international economic ties.¹⁷

When Jânio Quadros assumed the presidency of Brazil in 1961, his foreign policy, with regard to Latin America, consisted of three different components. They were the sympathetic feelings that Quadros had for Fidel Castro and his accomplishments in Cuba, the attempts by Quadros to make Brazil a leader among the other Latin American countries especially in conjunction with Argentina, and the attitude

¹⁷ Hélio Jaguaribe, Economic and Political Development: A Theoretical Approach and a Brazilian Case Study (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), chap. xii.

of Quadros toward the Organization of American States (OAS) as manifested in the meetings in Punta del Este, Uruguay.

Jânio Quadros undertook, half a year before his election, a fact-finding tour which included India, Egypt, Yugoslavia, and Cuba, countries which a few years before would have been of only marginal interest to Brazil. Only two industrial countries were included in his itinerary: Japan and the Soviet Union. Evidently swayed by his experiences on his trip, Quadros declared that Latin America needed another neutralist leader like Tito or Nasser.¹⁸ The neutralist countries were eager to bring Brazil into their midst: they could point out that far from being isolated, they drew assistance from two sources, East and West.

Neutralism in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union had, however, no precedent in Latin America. Until 1962, many Brazilians had hopes that Castro's Cuba would be able to stabilize its revolution by assuming a neutralist position. Jânio Quadros was interested in the Cuban revolution primarily because Castro seemed to him a symbol of independence from foreign control.

¹⁸Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, "Trends in Brazil's Foreign Policy," in New Perspectives of Brazil, ed. by Eric N. Baklanoff (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1966), p. 87.

Once Cuba's total political, economic, and military dependence on the Soviet Union became evident and humiliating for Cuba, after the Soviets withdrew their rockets without consulting Castro's regime, the Brazilian government's hope for building neutralism in Latin America dimmed. The illusion that Cuba would be able to use the competition between East and West to benefit its development without actually becoming a victim of the Cold War had been artificially perpetuated. The fact that Cuba had moved into the Soviet orbit and become a base for further Communization of Latin America was an unpleasant awakening for those neutralists who wished Latin America to assume a unified collective bargaining position toward the United States.¹⁹

Quadros had always been fascinated by the activities of Castro on the island of Cuba. To make himself attractive to both the urban and the rural left, Quadros had visited Fidel Castro in Cuba,²⁰ where he went on record as saying that Brazil could benefit from Cuba's experience with land reform, and that if elected he would implant a Cuban style land reform in Brazil. When Quadros returned to Brazil from

¹⁹ Reisky de Dubnic, New Perspectives of Brazil, p. 87.

²⁰ John W. F. Dulles, Unrest in Brazil (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1970), p. 109.

Cuba, he described Castro as a paragon of patriotism whose image had been distorted by powerful international interests.²¹ These statements surprised many Brazilians, but his supporters contended that he would drop the pro-Castro line when inaugurated on January 31, 1961. They said that Jânio Quadros always sounded like a demagogue in the heat of a campaign. He would do almost anything to win an election. But once he was in office, as his record showed, there would be no sounder or more responsible man in the country.²²

To a certain extent his supporters were correct. In February, 1961, after Quadros had assumed the presidential office, he asked Fidel Castro to renounce his hostility to the Inter-American system and join together in an effort to achieve economic stability for these nations. The message was sent to Castro by the Brazilian Ambassador Vasco Leitão da Cunha who had just been named secretary-general of Itamaraty.²³ In addition, Foreign Minister Arinos de Melo Franco said that Brazil would negotiate between Cuba and the

²¹"In Brazil, a New Leader--and Uncertainty for U.S.," U.S. News and World Report, XLIX (October 17, 1960), 136.

²²John J. Johnson, "Brazil: New President, Old Problems," Current History, XL (April 7, 1961), 205.

²³Diário de Notícias, February 12, 1961, p. 1.

United States if desired.²⁴ Going even further, Arinos de Melo Franco prepared a letter to Castro about Brazilian apprehension regarding Castro's close ties with the Soviet Union. Quadros, however, began to fear the letter would appear as internal interference in Cuban affairs, and, therefore, had his ambassador Leitão da Cunha convey the message verbally.²⁵ Da Cunha returned to Brazil from Cuba and informed Quadros that Castro had not asked for any mediation. Instead, Castro had outmaneuvered da Cunha diplomatically, and all that da Cunha actually received was an invitation for Quadros to visit Cuba again.²⁶

Quadros opposed any collective action against Cuba.²⁷ One of the reasons for this opposition was the hope of Quadros to expand Brazilian trade with Cuba.²⁸ Then in a further attempt to show his warm feelings toward Cubans and their efforts in the Western Hemisphere, Quadros gave his

²⁴Diário de Notícias, February 16, 1961, p. 1.

²⁵Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, Evolução da Crise Brasileira (São Paulo: Companhia Editôra Nacional, 1965), p. 248.

²⁶Diário de Notícias, February 18, 1961, p. 1.

²⁷Diário de Notícias, February 23, 1961, p. 1.

²⁸Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 108 (June 22, 1961), No. 133 (June 29, 1961).

first personal interview for foreign journalists to Cuban reporters. In this interview, he said that he supported the Cuban attempts to attain self-determination.²⁹ This giving of his first foreign journalist interview to representatives of the Cuban press did not endear him to the other newsmen who were in Brazil at the time and were trying to obtain interviews. This act may have been the beginning of an unfavorable press which was to hound him throughout his short presidential career.

The reluctance of the Brazilian government to take part in an inter-American showdown over Cuba appeared to stem from the vexing problems this would have presented for President Jânio Quadros' independent foreign policy.³⁰ At that point in the development of Latin America's biggest country, President Quadros set for Brazil a policy dedicated to reducing world tensions, amplifying Brazil's trade to include greater commerce with the Communist bloc, coordinating international action with other underdeveloped countries and obtaining United States development

²⁹ Diário de Notícias, March 9, 1961, p. 1.

³⁰ New York Times, May 8, 1961, p. 23; "Política Exterior," Visão, XVIII (April 28, 1961), 12.

assistance while carrying forward international economic reforms.³¹

This was an ambitious program for this country of nearly 70,000,000 people, which was feeling its way toward a place of greater prominence on the world stage. At this point, the Cuban problem appeared to be a decided nuisance.³²

For more than ten days Brazil had been studying United States proposals on what the American republics should agree to do about the Castro regime in the wake of the abortive landing, April 17, 1961, by Cuban rebels at the Bay of Pigs and Premier Fidel Castro's increasing alignment with the Communist countries. As late as May, 1961, no one was absolutely certain what would be the international position of Quadros regarding the attitude to be taken with respect to Cuba.

There was little doubt in Brazil that the dynamic forty-four year old President made the final decisions on Brazil's foreign policy. Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco was a trusted advisor, but President Quadros was the man who determined the major policy lines.

³¹Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 92 (May 31, 1961).

³²New York Times, May 8, 1961, p. 23.

One weekend in May, 1961, Arinos de Melo Franco and Quadros had a long meeting with regard to Cuba. After the meeting, the Foreign Minister said the President had given him no instructions on the specific issues of the Cuban problem. He said that they had studied the Cuban problem but had not found sufficient information to characterize Cuba as a Communist country.³³

Arinos de Melo Franco did say that Brazil could not oppose a foreign ministers' conference if the other American countries wanted one. However, in May, 1961, the Ministry of Foreign Relations distributed a note in which the government declared itself openly on the side of Cuba. In this note, entitled "The Brazilian Position," were the following items:

1. World peace is founded on the self-determination of all peoples.
2. Self-determination is the beginning of liberty applied to international organization.
3. The guaranteeing element of self-determination is the beginning of nonintervention.
4. Nonintervention is opposed as much to economic domination as to ideological domination.

³³O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, May 7, 1961, p. 1.

The Brazilian Government:

1. Defends the self-determination of the people of Cuba.
2. Opposes any foreign intervention, direct or indirect, in order to impose on Cuba a determined form of government, considering economic interference in Cuba a form of intervention as undesirable as military or ideological.³⁴

The Foreign Minister was scheduled to go before the Chamber of Deputies in response to a request for a statement on the government's Cuban policy. The statement was to produce a clarification of the Brazilian view. At that time Brazil insisted that she was against both extracontinental intervention in American problems and the use of force from within the hemisphere against the Castro regime.³⁵ Behind Brazil's attempt to avoid the Cuban problem was a desire to obtain inter-American cooperation in attacking underdevelopment in the hemisphere as being the best antidote to the spread of Communism.

³⁴ Mário Victor, Cinco Anos Que Abalaram O Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1965), p. 24.

³⁵ Juan de Onis in New York Times, May 8, 1961, p. 23; "Presidência," Visão, XVIII (May 12, 1961), 13.

When the news of the attitude of Quadros reached the newspapers served by the international wire services, various reactions occurred. In Washington, D.C., some twenty Cuban citizens picketed in the proximity of the Brazilian Embassy to protest the attitude of Quadros in regard to Castro. They said Quadros was a friend of Communism.³⁶

In August, 1961, at Punta del Este, Uruguay, the nations of Latin America took a hard and generally disapproving look at themselves, their institutions, and their prospects for the future. Together with their colleagues from the United States, the Latin American delegates to the conference set down the results of extensive deliberations in two documents, a Declaration and a Charter, which together established the voluntary partnership of American nations known as the Alliance for Progress.³⁷ An interesting event was to occur at this meeting when the presidents of the delegations met in secret session to draft these documents. Ernesto Guevara attempted to gain admittance but they would not allow him to enter. Also the representatives of Ecuador and Bolivia were excluded from the secret session

³⁶ O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, June 11, 1961, p. 1.

³⁷ Nystrom and Haverstock, The Alliance for Progress, p. 2.

because the delegates wanted the Alliance for Progress benefits to apply only to those countries having representative constitutional regimes.³⁸ They later changed their position on this matter of the application of Alliance for Progress benefits. Brazil and Argentina opposed any declaration that would exclude Cuba.³⁹

When the Declaration and Charter were published, Guevara said that he did not know if Cuba would sign the final documents. Cuba, in fact, did not sign the documents, but the twenty other nations did.⁴⁰

On August 16, 1961, the Brazilian government had announced that the Cuban economic czar, Ernesto Guevara, would visit Brazil after attending the Inter-American Economic and Social Council meeting in Punta del Este.⁴¹ After the meeting, Cuba's homeward-bound Guevara did make a stop in Brazil.⁴² However, he did not arrive at the expected time, and row after row of officials waited in vain

³⁸ O Estado de São Paulo, August 15, 1961, p. 1.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ O Estado de São Paulo, August 18, 1961, p. 1.

⁴¹ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 146 (August 16, 1961).

⁴² O Estado de São Paulo, August 19, 1961, p. 38.

at the airport in Brasília. When Guevara finally arrived without warning the next day, Quadros gave him an ardent reception.⁴³ After conferring for about forty minutes, Quadros decorated Guevara with the Order of the Southern Cross, which is Brazil's highest award for foreigners.⁴⁴ This in effect provided a climax by indicating the way Quadros felt toward the Cubans and their revolution. Quadros addressed him as "Vossa Excelência" implying that the Cuban revolutionary government had earned a position in international affairs which merited the bonds of friendship and economic and cultural relations between Cuba and Brazil.⁴⁵ Guevara said that as a revolutionist he could not accept the decoration as a token of personal distinction but would accept it on behalf of the people of the Cuban revolution.⁴⁶

Quadros considered the Cuban revolution as one of the great pages of American history. It was a popularly led movement without the habitual military character of

⁴³ Dulles, Unrest in Brazil, pp. 124-126.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, August 20, 1961, p. 1.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

revolutions in other Latin countries, and at the same time national because it aimed at liberating the island from the political and economic domination of the United States.⁴⁷

Ultimately, even Brazil had her problems with Cuba. The Ministry of Foreign Relations sent an energetic letter to the Cuban government concerning the case of those people who had sought asylum in the Brazilian Embassy in Havana, asking for their safe conduct out. The Foreign Ministry said that the designation of a new Brazilian ambassador in Havana would be conditioned to the allowance of safe conduct for those in asylum.⁴⁸ There were 150 in asylum in the embassy.⁴⁹ Castro did not even bother to answer.

Whereas in the past Brazil had sought to prevent Latin American unity, during the Quadros administration that country actually encouraged it, perhaps sensing the opportunity for asserting political and economic leadership and also greater independence from the United States. In pursuit of his policy of attempting to make Brazil a leader of

⁴⁷ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 152 (August 24, 1961).

⁴⁸ Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 153 (August 25, 1961).

⁴⁹ O Estado de São Paulo, August 23, 1961, p. 40.

the Latin American countries, Quadros decided to try to form closer diplomatic and economic relations with Argentina.

Such activities were to comprise the second component of his Latin American policy.

In March, 1961, the Brazilian Government announced that Quadros would meet with the Argentine President Arturo Frondizi somewhere on the frontier of Brazil during the month of April. The agenda was to include economic matters between the two countries with especial regard to exports of coffee, cacao, tea, bananas, oranges, and iron ore.⁵⁰ In April it was further announced that Presidents Frondizi and Quadros would meet on April 20 in the cities of Paso de Los Libres in Argentina and Uruguaiana in Brazil.⁵¹ Two days later the Foreign Ministry modified this statement to say that the two presidents would meet only in Uruguaiana, situated opposite Paso de Los Libres on the Uruguay River. The reason for this modification was that Quadros would have difficulty in obtaining approval of Congress to absent himself from the country, and such difficulty signified that

⁵⁰Diário de Notícias, March 16, 1961, p. 1.

⁵¹O Estado de São Paulo, April 6, 1961, p. 60.

all the conversation was required to take place on the Brazilian side of the frontier.⁵²

On the days of the 20th, 21st, and 22nd of April, 1961, Jânio Quadros and Arturo Frondizi met in the appointed place for discussions.⁵³ The results of these discussions were published in various documents signed by the respective presidents.⁵⁴ In these official papers they condemned the interference of foreign ideologies in the Continent but at the same time defended the principle of self-determination. They also discussed the Cuban affair and agreed against any intervention.⁵⁵ Finally, these talks resulted in the signing of a "Treaty of Friendship and Consultation" between Brazil and Argentina.

After the meeting was over, Arturo Frondizi said that the meeting was a positive step toward better understanding between the two countries.⁵⁶ All Argentines,

⁵² O Estado de São Paulo, April 8, 1961, p. 5.

⁵³ Victor, Cinco Anos Que Abalaram O Brasil, p. 244; "Jânio e Frondizi na Frontera," O Cruzeiro, May 13, 1961, p. 19.

⁵⁴ O Estado de São Paulo, April 23, 1961, p. 5.

⁵⁵ Diário de Notícias, April 21, 1961, p. 1.

⁵⁶ O Estado de São Paulo, April 23, 1961, p. 5.

though, were not willing to agree. They believed that the Treaty served Brazil by dragging Argentina toward its policy of protecting Fidel Castro and toward its tendency to neutralism.⁵⁷ Such an attempt on the part of Brazil should have come as no surprise to the Argentines. In April, just shortly before the meeting with Frondizi, Quadros gave an interview to an Argentine journalist in which he said his foreign policy was going to be more affirmative and independent and would not recognize contracts which compromised Brazil's position in world affairs.⁵⁸

Months later it was revealed in the Argentine Congress that one of those who fought most enthusiastically to bring about the agreement with the Argentine Republic and who felt a great satisfaction when this agreement was signed was the brother-in-law of João Goulart, Leonel Brizola, then governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul.⁵⁹ Such an accusation may be very well-founded because as soon as the

⁵⁷ Alberto Conil Paz and Gustavo Ferrari, Argentina's Foreign Policy 1930-1962, trans. by John J. Kennedy (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p. 201.

⁵⁸ Diário de Notícias, April 2, 1961, p. 8.

⁵⁹ Paz and Ferrari, Argentina's Foreign Policy, p. 202.

meeting between Quadros and Frondizi was finished, Quadros met with Brizola and gave him a full report.⁶⁰

Brazil had thus succeeded in linking Argentine foreign policy to that of Brazil at the very moment the latter was moving in an obviously neutralist direction. The Cuban case again revealed the nature of the new relationship between Brazil and Argentina. In the inter-American meetings that were to come, Argentina apparently was willing to follow Brazil's lead and receive its instructions from Itamaraty.

President Jânio Quadros declared in July, 1961, that tightening Argentine-Brazilian relations had brought a new balance to the South American continent. President Quadros spoke at the opening of an exposition of contemporary Argentine art in the Museum of Modern Art in Rio de Janeiro. He recalled that he and the Argentine President, Arturo Frondizi, started tightening relations at a meeting in April, 1961. He stressed that they had agreed on a joint policy that reciprocally strengthened the international position of the two countries and would likewise serve to impose respect for the principle of self-determination of

⁶⁰ O Estado de São Paulo, April 23, 1961, p. 5.

peoples and to introduce a new element of equilibrium on the continent.⁶¹ Quadros apparently believed that he had accomplished his mission of persuading Argentina to follow Brazil in her foreign policy.

Apparently Quadros was right because Frondizi and his team attempted to comply exactly with this policy set by a foreign chancery. The new Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations, Adolfo Mugica, explained from Rio de Janeiro on the eve of the Economic Meeting of Punta del Este that Argentina and Brazil "shall act without discrepancies or divergencies of any kind. Argentina and Brazil will act as a single country. Argentina will make there the proposals of Brazil and vice versa."⁶²

The third component of Jânio Quadros' innovative foreign policy toward Latin America was manifested by the independent and contrary attitude of Brazil in the meetings of the inter-American states. This attitude was made known as early as February, 1961 when Foreign Minister Arinos de Melo Franco commented on a Guatemalan proposal for a

⁶¹New York Times, July 11, 1961, p. 11; Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 121 (July 12, 1961).

⁶²Paz and Ferrari, Argentina's Foreign Policy, p. 205.

ministers' meeting of consultation on Cuba by declaring that such a parley could become a meeting of disconsultation instead.⁶³ As has already been seen, under Quadros, Brazil opposed any condemnation or exclusion of Cuba during the August, 1961 Economic Meeting in Punta del Este.⁶⁴ Although Quadros was not President at the time, the foreign policy that he initiated was carried forward by the new Brazilian President João Goulart and again propounded in the foreign ministers' meeting at Punta del Este.

During January 22-29, 1962, the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers convened at Punta del Este in Uruguay as an Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty to seek ways of counteracting hemispheric subversive dangers emanating from Cuba as a consequence of the Castro government's alliance with the Communist bloc.⁶⁵

Before the meeting, four former ministers in the Foreign Relations Ministry under Jânio Quadros asked the Brazilian government to break diplomatic relations with Cuba and to eliminate it from the OAS on the grounds that Castro

⁶³ New York Times, February 26, 1961, p. 31.

⁶⁴ O Estado de São Paulo, August 5, 1961, p. 1.

⁶⁵ O Estado de São Paulo, January 14, 1962, p. 8.

had repudiated democracy and founded a Communist island. They were José Carlos de Macedo Soares, João Neves da Fontoura, Vicente Ráo, and Horácio Lafer.⁶⁶ The new Foreign Minister under Goulart was San Tiago Dantas, who responded by saying Brazil would defend democratic principles and the inter-American system. Exactly what this statement was to mean was soon revealed. San Tiago Dantas and the Mexican chancellor Manuel Tello signed in Itamaraty a Joint Declaration in which Mexico would defend at Punta del Este the same principles as Brazil of nonintervention and self-determination in relation to Cuba.⁶⁷ Brazil now had the support of Mexico as well as Argentina. Thus the three largest and wealthiest countries in Latin America were aligned against the United States.

After much discussion in the meeting in Punta del Este, Communism was declared incompatible with the inter-American system, and because the Castro government of Cuba had accepted the principles of Marxist-Leninism, it was excluded from participation in the OAS on the ground of

⁶⁶ O Estado de São Paulo, January 20, 1962, p. 1.

⁶⁷ O Estado de São Paulo, January 19, 1961, p. 36.

incompatibility.⁶⁸ The exclusionary vote barely mustered a two-thirds majority for passage. Six nations--Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico--abstained from the vote, while Cuba voted in the negative.⁶⁹

Cuba had almost won her battle not to be ostracized by the Organization of American States. A great deal of the credit must go to the able political maneuvers of the Cuban President, Osvaldo Dorticós. Just prior to the meeting in Punta del Este, he visited Brazil. There he met João Goulart at the air base in Florianópolis where he obtained from the Brazilian President the reaffirmation of Brazilian policy in the conference at Punta del Este favorable to the principle of nonintervention and self-determination of the Cuban people.⁷⁰

Why had Brazil taken this position in the Punta del Este meeting? The Quadros government had fallen and the new Brazilian President, João Goulart, was in office. Why could he not have initiated a new foreign policy? Perhaps

⁶⁸Pe. José Narino de Campos, Os Grandes Problemas de Brasil da Década de 60 (Petropolis: Editora Vozes, 1964), p. 106.

⁶⁹O Estado de São Paulo, January 31, 1961, p. 1.

⁷⁰O Estado de São Paulo, January 21, 1961, p. 24.

the behavior of the Brazilian delegation at Punta del Este is more easily understood if one takes into account the internal situation of the new regime. Parliamentary government had just been inaugurated in Brazil, in September, 1961, after the resignation of Jânio Quadros. Brazil could not deviate abruptly from Quadros' foreign policy without being accused by some vocal sections of various Brazilian anti-American groups of submission to the United States. Such an accusation could put the new government in an unfavorable position in comparison to the last presidential administration. After the Punta del Este meeting, President João Goulart and the new cabinet seemed to strive for a more moderate foreign policy, in fact even if not in name, and for the betterment of continental solidarity.

Brazilian foreign policy had thus not changed, in the sense that the United States' concern with the foreign policy of Quadros had actually begun with an attempt by Adolf A. Berle, Jr., to get Brazil to agree with the United States on the ostracism of Cuba from the Organization of American States. Quadros would never commit himself to such a policy for Brazil, and in the end he was not even to have the opportunity of making such a decision when the showdown arrived. His policy, however, was continued by his

successor in office and the result for the United States was the same. Brazil would not assist the United States in its difficulties with Fidel Castro. Quadros won that diplomatic battle, but he lost something much more significant for him--the presidency of Brazil.

CHAPTER VIII

THE RESIGNATION OF JÂNIO QUADROS

Jânio Quadros resigned the presidency of Brazil on August 25, 1961. To the world the news came as a surprise, but to those who were more closely observing the activities of Quadros, it was obvious that he was encountering much opposition pressure. During his presidential administration, he had received very unfavorable press reports, vehement criticism from the Governor of Guanabara State, Carlos Lacerda, and according to a subsequent statement of Quadros, opposition from unidentified pressure groups such as conservatives, labor, foreign countries, and others whom his administration had antagonized.¹

In the earliest days of his presidency, Quadros began to encounter opposition pressures in the form of adverse and hostile treatment by the international press.

¹O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, August 13, 1961, p. 1; "Presidência," Visão, XVIII (March 10, 1961), 13.

He had never been especially cooperative with foreign correspondents, and it seemed as though they purposely tried to publish information that was deleterious to his public image. The situation reached a climax in May, 1961, when, because of consistently unfavorable coverage in the press, President Jânio Quadros ordered an investigation into the possibility that sensationalist or alarming stories about Brazil were being distributed by foreign news agencies.²

The President ordered the Minister of Justice, Oscar Pedroso D'Horta, to form an investigating commission of three men to report in eight days on the activities of foreign news agencies in Brazil. A presidential memorandum said the commission should examine the distribution of unfounded news stories of a sensationalist or alarming nature that were prejudicial to the people or the nation. If the commission found that such stories were indeed being distributed, the President ordered the members of the commission to adopt energetic and definitive measures to inhibit such activities.³

² New York Times, May 24, 1961, p. 5; Embassy of Brazil, Boletim Informativo, No. 111 (June 27, 1961).

³ Ibid.

Representatives of some foreign news agencies were summoned to appear before a committee investigating their reports on Brazil's relations with Cuba and the Communist countries.⁴ President Quadros was prepared to end the operations of any agency found responsible for distributing alarming reports. It was hinted that the government was considering some form of control over outgoing news. All foreign news agencies were scheduled to be summoned, but at first only the United Press International and the Italian ANSA Agency received the call. Their representatives were ordered to appear with copies of all dispatches sent during a designated week.⁵

Then toward the end of May, 1961, President Quadros said that he was prepared to expel foreign correspondents who repeatedly filed false, tendentious or dishonest reports on Brazil.⁶ The President said at a news conference that the investigation of news agencies then underway was designed to determine if foreign newsmen covering Brazil were filing unbiased reports. Later, the bureau chiefs of

⁴New York Times, May 28, 1961, p. 2.

⁵Ibid.

⁶New York Times, May 31, 1961, p. 9.

the Associated Press and the French agency were questioned.⁷ The real purpose of this investigation may remain a mystery, for in seeming contradiction to the original intent, Quadros actually took action only against a local publication by closing for three days the Radio Jornal do Brasil. Then turning his attention back to the foreign news agencies, he threatened them with cancellation of their licenses. All foreign and domestic agencies were now, for all practical purposes, under the control of the government, because they were further required to send copies of their news stories to the National Security Council and to the Presidential Press Secretary.⁸ The road was certainly opening for total and direct control of the press, but Quadros stopped just short of this. Perhaps it was only his purpose to warn the press or even frighten them into being more agreeable. If this motive was the real one, it was a failure because the press continued to criticize him. The underlying significance of this conflict with the international press was the revelation of the great opposition that existed toward the policies of Quadros and the desperation with which he was

⁷New York Times, May 31, 1961, p. 9.

⁸Moniz Bandeira, O 24 de Agosto de Jânio Quadros (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Melso, 1961), p. 22.

reacting to this opposition. But the press was merely a part of the opposition that forced him to resign the presidency.

The second pressure brought to bear on Quadros came from Carlos Lacerda. The pressure from this volatile man was perhaps the more immediate in forcing Quadros' decision to resign. In August, 1961, when Quadros bestowed the Order of the Southern Cross on Cuba's Ernesto Guevara, influential Brazilians were alarmed. Even more significant, former Quadros backer Governor Carlos Lacerda took action to inform Quadros that his policy toward Castro was a disgusting sight to the world.

Less than twelve hours after Quadros had decorated Guevara, Governor Lacerda gave the key to the city of Rio de Janeiro to the anti-Castro leader Manuel Antonio de Varona who was coordinator-general of the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front. The key was presented in a public ceremony at which time Lacerda said:

It is a great honor for the State of Guanabara to receive a visit from one of the great leaders in the fight against tyranny. Your presence in our state comes to consolidate the friendship of the Brazilian people for the Cuban people, that fight for their

self-determination and for freeing themselves from Fidel Castro and foreign domination.⁹

In accepting the key, de Varona called Guevara a monster.¹⁰

Next, Lacerda threatened to resign his position as Governor of Guanabara State as a public protest against the foreign policy of Quadros. Fearing the repercussions from such a move, Quadros immediately went to Rio de Janeiro to meet Lacerda and persuade him to withdraw his resignation. They met in the Palácio de Laranjeiras in Rio de Janeiro, and after the meeting Lacerda continued as Governor.¹¹

Still, all was not complete amicability between Quadros and Lacerda. The two continued to have their differences over Quadros' foreign policy. Carlos Lacerda, on a television program in Rio de Janeiro on the 22nd of August, 1961, excoriated the federal administration for its attitude in relation to the regime of Fidel Castro in Cuba and for the decoration given to Ernesto Guevara, and furthermore for its general leftist tendencies as dangerous to the Brazilian

⁹ O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, August 20, 1961, p. 6.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 1.

way of life.¹² Lacerda insinuated that it was near the 24th of August, the date of the suicide of Getúlio Vargas in 1954, and that the suicide had been the result of a campaign that was unleashed against Vargas.¹³ Perhaps a similar fate awaited Quadros.

Lacerda had not yet finished his campaign against Quadros. He asked Dona Elóia Quadros to help him obtain an audience with her husband. His approach was distinctly unique in that he told her he had never had a father when he was growing up and he desired Jânio Quadros to be one. He thus made the matter a family problem and sought the counsel of Quadros. The President thought that Lacerda referred to some domestic problem with his wife Dona Letícia Lacerda, and responded through Dona Elóia that Lacerda would be able to cry on his shoulder, and if it were urgent he should come immediately to Brasília.¹⁴ Lacerda was also invited to dinner; so he packed an overnight bag and flew in an Air

¹² Fernando Bueno, L. M. de Souza, and Guimarães Padilha, Esse Incrível Lacerda (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Iniciativa, [n.d.]), pp. 38-39.

¹³ Castilho Cabral, Tempos de Jânio (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1961), p. 239.

¹⁴ Bandeira, O 24 de Agosto de Jânio Quadros, pp. 48-49.

Force jet to Brasília to carry his protest to the President in person. Quadros, who was watching a movie in his private projection room at the time of his arrival, offered him a sandwich and told him to start talking. Lacerda began his protest. "Do you doubt my democratic principles?" demanded the President. "I heard the same thing from Fidel Castro right after the revolution and look at him now," retorted Lacerda.¹⁵ At this point, Quadros excused himself and quietly telephoned Justice Minister Pedroso D'Horta. "Call Carlos over to your house and see what he wants," said Quadros to D'Horta. When Lacerda finished talking to the Justice Minister and returned, he found his overnight bag sitting forlornly outside the presidential palace door. An aide said that Jânio was asleep.¹⁶

From then on Lacerda increased his attacks on Quadros, and Lacerda was a formidable antagonist. He returned to Rio de Janeiro and announced that Justice Minister D'Horta had invited him to join a Quadros plot to grab more authority for himself by sending Brazil's Congress

¹⁵"Brazil: Abrupt Departure," Newsweek, LVIII (September 4, 1961), 39.

¹⁶John W. F. Dulles, Unrest in Brazil (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1970), p. 128.

into permanent recess.¹⁷ Lacerda further charged that Quadros was secretly plotting to make himself a dictator. The Governor then vowed to fight the President in the streets.¹⁸

Credence was given to Lacerda's utterances because of internal activities in northeast Brazil. When the students at the University of Recife went on strike because the director of the Faculty of Law prohibited a lecture by the mother of the revolutionary leader, Ernesto Guevara, there was a great movement of troops to the northeast. The rumors grew that the government was preparing a coup d'etat.¹⁹ As Lacerda's charges began to stir up a fuss, Quadros dramatically resigned.

Quadros himself drafted an emotional letter of resignation. It read as follows:

I wanted Brazil for the Brazilians, and I had to face and fight corruption, lies and cowardice by ambitious groups and individuals from inside and also from outside. However, I feel crushed. . . . Terrible forces rose up against me and intrigued

¹⁷ Dulles, Unrest in Brazil, p. 128.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 132.

¹⁹ Bandeira, O 24 de Agosto de Jânio Quadros, p. 22.

against me or maligned me. . . . I return now to my work as an attorney and professor. Let us work together. There are many ways to serve our country.²⁰

The letter of resignation was given to Oscar Pedroso D'Horta who took it to the vice-president of the Senate.²¹

Simultaneously the announcement was made to the press by the Presidential Press Secretary in the Palácio do Planalto.²²

The letter had thus made reference to the sources of opposition to Quadros, i.e., some pressure groups which were not identified. After this announcement that he had been defeated by terrible forces, and the consequent Brazilian interpretation of the message implying that his enemies had been supported by the United States, within hours a crowd of Brazilian students was shouting, "Viva Jânio" and hurling rocks at the glass walls of the gleaming United States Embassy in Rio de Janeiro.²³

After his resignation, Quadros flew to São Paulo. He then drove to the port of Santos and boarded a vessel

²⁰Cabral, Tempos de Jânio, pp. 235-236.

²¹Bandeira, O 24 de Agosto de Jânio Quadros, p. 34.

²²Cabral, Tempos de Jânio, pp. 235-236.

²³"Brazil: Abrupt Departure," p. 39.

named the Uruguay Star for a voyage to London and then around the world.²⁴

Constitutionally, Quadros' extraordinary maneuver put power in the hands of Vice President João Goulart, a Labor Party leader, who at that point was just completing a tour of Communist China where he had told the Chinese that no obstacles, discord, or conflict existed, or ever had existed between Brazil and China. Goulart had actually reached Singapore when he received the message of the resignation. By airplane, via Great Britain, Goulart headed for home proclaiming that he was obliged by law to assume the Presidency. Since Goulart was out of the country, the Presidency went to the President of the House of Deputies who at that time was Ranieri Mazzilli.²⁵ Mazzilli was never considered more than an interim President. The problem of succession became very serious because the army had always been opposed to the liberal Goulart and was expected to prevent his assuming the Presidency.

With the resignation, there was a traumatic effect felt throughout Brazil. Why had Jânio renounced the

²⁴ Bandeira, O 24 de Agosto de Jânio Quadros, p. 34.

²⁵ Mario Victor, Cinco Anos Que Abalaram O Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965), p. 315.

Presidency? The question was being asked by every Brazilian. He had been elected by a very large majority. Many thought he was the last hope for a democratic solution to Brazilian problems.²⁶ Brazil was suddenly adrift, without the leadership President Quadros had given for the past seven months. Despite his open flirtation with the Communist bloc, many Brazilians still thought he was the right man for the job. They liked the way he tackled the country's multitude of problems.²⁷

For all his bitterness and eccentric ways--Quadros had recommended that other civil servants adopt for wear in their offices his working costume of slacks and belted sport shirts because they were comfortable and easy to launder--Jânio Quadros had already gone a long way toward reforming the corruption-ridden and inflationary economy he had inherited. He had fired scores of bureaucrats and cut subsidies on imports, thereby winning the support of both local businessmen and United States economic strategists.²⁸

²⁶ Cabral, Tempos de Jânio, p. 231.

²⁷ "A Big Country Adrift--Story of Brazil's Turmoil," U.S. News and World Report, LI (September 11, 1961), 61.

²⁸ Brazil, Government Trade Bureau, Brazilian Bulletin, XVII (March 1, 1961), 1.

On August 29, 1961, at the height of the crisis in Brazil, Fidel Castro urged the masses to take matters into their own hands to prevent reactionary militarists from installing an illegal fascist regime. Despite Castro's advice, the majority of Brazilians showed no signs of quickly falling for the Castro-Communist line. As in other crises, the people of Brazil showed their traditional historical distaste for violence that is almost unparalleled in Latin America.

Like a crash of thunder, the news from Brazil rolled up across the southern horizon to the United States. The large Latin American country, a nation of some sixty-six million people at the time, had been the crux of President Kennedy's hopes for the twenty billion dollar Alliance for Progress. It seemed then that Brazil might suddenly be plunged back into the old South American cycle of revolution and military dictatorship.²⁹ In Washington, United States officials viewed Quadros' departure with mixed feelings. They hoped that any succeeding government would halt the trend toward a neutralist position in world affairs that had begun to lean much too far to the left. A Goulart

²⁹Dulles, Unrest in Brazil, pp. 143-150.

presidency, they realized, would probably push Brazil even farther in that direction. On the other hand, the United States could not welcome the overthrow of the constitution by a military coup. Even more important, the United States had held high hopes for Quadros' domestic policies. A junta of generals, the State Department feared, would be less likely to care about social progress or economic reform.³⁰

In troubled Brazil, the question will always remain whether the President meant to step down permanently or whether he expected to be coaxed back to the Presidency. There was certainly a precedent for his action. He had resigned the nomination of the political parties for the Presidency of Brazil in 1960 while campaigning for the Presidency. Then, the parties discovered that they definitely needed him, in fact desperately so, and he was received back as the parties' nominee with everything that he asked for in terms of independence. Quadros may have been expecting to be asked back again as President of Brazil with the additional authority he desired. Theoretically, his timing was perfect. Vice-President Goulart was touring the Far East. The Brazilian military had continuously been

³⁰Dulles, Unrest in Brazil, pp. 143-150.

opposed to the leftist policies of Goulart and supposedly would prefer the resumption of the Presidency by Quadros rather than Goulart. Certainly he could have expected the people of Brazil to rise up in support of him because of the large vote he had received from them. If he were expecting such reaction, he was personally disappointed because the request or demands for his reinstatement never came.

The government of Jânio Quadros, inaugurated on January 31, 1961, came to an abrupt end on August 25 of that same year with the President's resignation. The resignation was marked by the same sudden unpredictability he had exercised so many times in directing the foreign policy of Brazil. This should not, however, be attributed to the usual reason advanced: the mercurial character of President Quadros, so spectacularly evidenced by his sudden resignation. Quite apart from any quirks in the President's personality, that which gave his regime its admittedly unexpected quality was the lightning speed at which events moved following the Kubitschek government, and the corresponding speed--not always tempered by wisdom--with which President Quadros reacted, often by changing a former position.³¹

³¹ Hélio Jaguaribe, Economic and Political Development: A Theoretical Approach and a Brazilian Case Study (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 183.

Once in power, President Quadros, whatever his previous intentions may have been, soon showed that he realized the ineffectuality of the conservative pharmacopoeia's time-honored prescriptions for solving the urgent problems in the fields of economic and foreign policy.³² Confronted with these problems, he perceived, as part of his economic policy, the need to achieve monetary stability and fend off a runaway inflation, and to accomplish this he adopted conventional remedies. But he also grasped the structural character of the Brazilian inflation, believing that if the country was to be preserved and strengthened as a national society, effective correction of inflation could not be disassociated from the problems of economic and political development as a whole. He accordingly oriented his government toward national economic development and sociopolitical change in accordance with a simple national economic model albeit in an unelaborated form.³³ The model provided for reduced domestic governmental expenditures and

³² Nilo Odalia, "As Relações Externas do Brasil: 1945-1964," Estudos Históricos, No. 5 (December, 1966), p. 247.

³³ Jaguaribe, Economic and Political Development, p. 184.

was also expanded to include an economic foreign policy designed to seek new markets for Brazilian goods.

The problem of Jânio Quadros' administration, however, was not so much the lack of full theoretical understanding of the model adopted, but the fact that his keen insight into the country's real problems was not matched by a corresponding grasp of the conditions and instruments necessary to put the required policies into effect. The surprising impact of his personality with its extraordinary impression of power, heightened by the momentousness of the decisions he was taking, made him fall victim to delusions of grandeur. He played a Bonapartist role--as circumstances appeared to demand--but without Bonaparte's armies backing him up. In this way he committed two blunders, both of them fatal. First he ignored the fact that his presidential authority alone, undermined as it was by an increasingly restive Congress, was not enough to bring about a change in the country's domestic and international economic structure, particularly in any satisfactory direction that would be agreeable to all the powerful domestic and international interests. Accustomed as he was to practicing politics above party level, through a direct charismatic appeal to the masses, he never saw the need to rally organized party

support for his policies to cancel out the well-ordered resistance of domestic and international conservative interests.³⁴

His second mistake was in ignoring the fact that he had to win the loyalty of the predominantly conservative military to whom he entrusted command of the armed forces at a time when he was playing the very opposite role of being a liberal in domestic and international politics. For a time the bonds of tradition and personal relationship, as well as the magic of presidential authority, kept his military chiefs and the armed forces in line. He especially made use of the magnetism of his own personality. But when the very expert Carlos Lacerda, then in command of the Guanabara state machine, decided that the time was ripe to lead the ostensible opposition to President Quadros, the latter suddenly found himself with literally no support at all in any of the relevant sectors of the establishment. Lacerda was backed by domestic and external elements with a vested interest in preserving the status quo. Since Quadros had prepared no other basis for the support of his policies, he lost his nerve and resigned. Anticipating the crisis he

³⁴Jaguaribe, Economic and Political Development, p. 184.

knew was inevitable, he chose to resign rather than be ousted from power. Quadros possibly hoped that the national commotion that would follow the news of his resignation would carry him back into power on the crest of a wave of national protest. Even in playing this last card he did not count on the support of any organized groups, and because he did not call specifically on these groups, the impact of the feeble, spontaneous manifestation for a Quadros comeback, which did in fact take place in the cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, was weakened. Marshal Odílio Denys's army, too pleased with its bloodless coup to let the fruits slip through its fingers, lost no time in taking over control of the country. Quadros' military ministers did not resign as had the civilian ministers, and by retaining their posts were in a position to bar any chance of President Quadros' return, and any attempt by Vice-President Goulart to assume power as his lawful successor.³⁵

Jânio Quadros left Brazil in August, 1961 with his wife, mother, daughter, son-in-law and new granddaughter and remained incommunicado for some time.³⁶ Finally, in

³⁵ Dulles, Unrest in Brazil, p. 138.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 139-140.

December, 1961, Jânio sent from Australia his first message to the Brazilian people since he had resigned. It was, in essence, a note to the Brazilians saying that he would return to the political arena and that all Brazilians understood the motives for his leaving the Presidency. Then in February, 1962, he sent from Durban, South Africa, a letter to Castilho Cabral stating that he was returning, and saying that the nation would know the reasons for his resignation.³⁷

Thus, in early 1962, Brazil's mercurial ex-President Jânio Quadros was returning home by the slowest possible means. He had boarded a freighter in Hong Kong that was not scheduled to reach Rio de Janeiro until March 9 of that year. Immediately, however, Brazilians waxed enthusiastic with that familiar political slogan on their lips, "Here comes Jânio." In northeastern Maranhão state, a federal deputy announced the formation of a national front to return Jânio Quadros to control of the nation he had abandoned five months before. After his departure, many Brazilians felt he had let them down; Quadros' political career seemed ended at the age of forty-four. Many Brazilians wondered at the

³⁷ Cabral, Tempos de Jânio, pp. 250-251.

time whether Quadros, indeed, was attempting a political comeback.³⁸

All the signs pointed to his return to the political arena. Brazilians, disillusioned by what had happened to them since, were ready to take him back even if they still thought he had left them in their hour of need. The drive to bring back Quadros centered in the Popular Movement for Jânio Quadros, a Citizens-for-Eisenhower type of organization, developed for the October, 1962 elections. The movement was working to get Quadros nominated for Parliament in every one of Brazil's twenty-one states and to push a full slate of pro-Quadros candidates. The hope was to win a parliamentary majority and thus sweep their hero into the prime ministership.³⁹

On Ash Wednesday, the day after Carnival ended, Brazilians welcomed home Jânio Quadros from his sailing trip around the world. Jânio's "widows," as Brazilians called his still-faithful associates, organized a mass welcome at the coffee port of Santos in São Paulo state. All the way

³⁸ Dulles, Unrest in Brazil, pp. 181-182.

³⁹ Ibid.

around the world he had refused to talk to anyone.⁴⁰ Upon his arrival, he visited his very good friend Governor Carlos Alberto Carvalho Pinto in Campos Elísios and promised to tell all.⁴¹ Quadros then made radio and television appearances explaining his resignation, blaming the economic-financial state of affairs and pressures during his administration.⁴² He spoke an hour and a half, during which time he was properly dressed in a coat and tie. There was a map of Brazil in the background. During this speech he made reference to the suicide of Getúlio Vargas, but that was really all that was said about that subject. Quadros reiterated his entire foreign policy, e.g., his desire for more exchange with Africa and Eastern Europe, and again he accused Adolph Berle, Jr., John Moors Cabot and the German Ambassador of interfering in Brazilian affairs. He said that certain unnamed Brazilians had asked him to name names and make accusations but he refused to do so.⁴³ The other

⁴⁰ "Brazil's Jânio's Return," Newsweek, LXIX (March 12, 1962), 57.

⁴¹ O Estado de São Paulo, March 9, 1962, p. 4.

⁴² Victor, Cinco Anos Que Abalaram O Brasil, p. 414.

⁴³ O Estado de São Paulo, March 16, 1962, p. 6.

pressures which forced him to resign thus remained as ambiguous as ever.

An example of these pressures is illustrated by the following story. Jânio Quadros, on the morning of August 25, 1961, sent a telegram to João Goulart, who was in the Orient, asking him to return to Brazil. A colonel who was the Director of the Department of Mail and Telegraphs, intercepted the telegram and advised Marshal Odílio Denys of the text of the message.⁴⁴ The assumption may be made that for some time the Department had been censoring the letters and other communications of Jânio Quadros.

These were, then, the pressures that bore on Quadros, forcing him to resign the Presidency. They included pressure from the international press, from Carlos Lacerda, conservative groups, labor groups, and from foreign countries, and all the others who were becoming displeased with various measures he was taking to remedy the problems of the cost of living, international trade balances, and monopolies.⁴⁵ The speech that Quadros had made on radio and

⁴⁴ Bandeira, O 24 de Agosto de Jânio Quadros, p. 56.

⁴⁵ Ivo A. Cauduro Piccoli, As Pressões na Renúncia de Jânio (Rio de Janeiro: [n.n.], 1962), chaps. ii, iv, viii, and x.

television gave no additional explanation regarding the reasons for his resignation. He said absolutely nothing that was not already known. Instead, he continued the mystery regarding the identification of the pressure groups by not specifically naming them.

In the election of October, 1962, Jânio Quadros challenged Ademar de Barros and José Bonifácio for the governorship of São Paulo. Economic interests denied him television, radio and newspaper space, so he resorted to a door-to-door campaign. On October 25, 1962, the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral de São Paulo divulged the results: Ademar de Barros received 1,244,612 votes; Jânio Quadros 1,121,920; and José Bonifacio 720,645.⁴⁶ In this way the charismatic political career of Jânio Quadros in the 1960's came to an end.

⁴⁶Victor, Cinco Anos Que Abalaram O Brasil, p. 414.

CHAPTER IX

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF JOÃO GOULART

João Goulart, the Vice President of Brazil, was travelling in the Far East when the crisis regarding Jânio Quadros' resignation arose. According to the Brazilian Constitution of 1946, there was little doubt about the procedure to be followed if the Presidency should become vacant. Article 79 stated simply that "the Vice President succeeds."¹ Despite this unambiguous provision, the question of Goulart's succession immediately aroused a bitter debate. Only after a ten-day crisis, which included the threat of civil war and a constitutional amendment (an Additional Act) establishing a parliamentary government, was the Vice President installed as President of Brazil in the presidential palace. That ten-day crisis illustrated important features

¹Brazil, Constitution (1946), Art. 79, in Constituições do Brasil, ed. by Fernando H. Mendes de Almeida (São Paulo: Edição Saraiva, 1954).

of the relationship between the political forces of the country and ultimately was to have a profound effect on the independent foreign policy initiated by Jânio Quadros.

Although the Constitution provided that if the President should be impeded from exercising his office, the Vice President would succeed, it also provided that in the absence of the Vice President, the President of the Chamber of Deputies was the next in line of succession.² João Goulart was indeed absent--heading a special economic mission to the Far East. Therefore the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Ranieri Mazzilli, was sworn in as the Provisional President of Brazil.³ On the night of August 25, 1961, the following situation obtained: Jânio Quadros had left Brasília, the Vice President was in the Orient, and a temporary President, exercising real power, had been sworn in.

Despite Goulart's obvious constitutional right to the office of President, the Brazilian military forces were basically opposed to his accession because they believed he was far too liberal. After Quadros' resignation, effective

²Brazil, Constitution (1946), Art. 79, Sec. 1.

³Levi Carneiro, Uma Experiência de Parlamentarismo (São Paulo: Livraria Martins Editôra, 1965), p. 159.

power was held by the three military ministers--General Odílio Denys, the Minister of War; Brigadier Grun Moss, the Air Minister; and Admiral Sílvio Heck, the Minister of the Navy. They quickly declared de facto martial law in an attempt to prevent public demonstrations. A few people, however, cast their lot with Goulart, including some of the military in Rio Grande do Sul, Goulart's home state. Goulart's brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, was also busy arming a local militia in that state to ensure the inauguration.⁴ Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott, who was then in retirement in Rio de Janeiro, advocated the maintenance of the Constitution.⁵

In the subsequent nine days, from August 26 to September 4, there ensued a struggle between the military ministers, who were opposed to Goulart's succession, and the supporters of "legality"--composed of those military, political, and public figures who felt that the legal successor, whoever he might be, must be allowed to take office immediately. Constitutionally, if João Goulart could be prevented from acceding to the Presidency, elections would be

⁴Diário de Notícias, September 26, 1961, pp. 1, 8.

⁵Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 209.

necessary within sixty days to elect a new President.⁶ In the interim, Mazzilli would remain the temporary President. This was the objective of the military ministers, who were backed by a small but vocal group of civilians.

Promptly on the opposite side, certain Communists, demagogues, and opportunists, who could count on the already extensive and deep infiltration of mass media, unions, students, and other organizations, launched a vigorous legality campaign which succeeded in leading the Armed Forces to mistake headlines for public opinion.⁷ The military finally conceded, and the Congress had to find a political formula that would conciliate the fear that Goulart might lead the country to Communism and the need to abide by the Constitution.⁸

On August 28, 1961, acting President Mazzilli sent a short message informing the Congress that the military ministers regarded the return of Goulart to Brazil as

⁶ Brazil, Constitution (1946), Art. 79, Sec. 2.

⁷ John W. F. Dulles, Unrest in Brazil (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1970), pp. 143-156.

⁸ Paulo Ayres Filho, "The Brazilian Revolution," in Latin American Politics, Economics and Hemispheric Security, ed. by Norman A. Bailey (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 241-242.

inadmissible "for reasons of national security." The ministers of the three military posts, on August 30, 1961, then promulgated their "Manifesto to the Nation" in which they recorded their belief that João Goulart favored the Communist regimes of Russia and China.⁹ The statement went further and said that Goulart's background as Minister of Labor and Vice President made him unfit for the Presidency. They did not say, however, that they would not suffer Goulart to take office.¹⁰ Thus, the issue was transferred to the political arena. The Congress, however, declined to rubber-stamp the veto of Goulart's succession. It seems likely that had Congress still been meeting in Rio de Janeiro under the watchful eyes of the generals, it would have yielded to the military pressures. Secure in Brasília, however, it took an independent step and worked out a compromise which the military accepted. Goulart would remain as a figurehead President, and the country would be governed by a Council of Ministers responsible to the Congress in a parliamentary form of government. The Armed Forces were amenable to this proposal and the military ministers

⁹Carneiro, Uma Experiência de Parlamentarismo, p. 156.

¹⁰Filho, "The Brazilian Revolution," p. 242.

resigned to make way for the new appointees. On September 2, 1961, the Congress adopted the Additional Act establishing a modified parliamentary system for Brazil.¹¹ According to this constitutional amendment, the President lost the following powers: to make foreign policy, to issue decrees and regulations, to choose and depose ministers, to decree intervention in the states or impose martial law, and to prepare the budget. These functions were passed on to the President of the Council of Ministers.¹² The amendment supposedly eliminated the danger that Goulart, who asserted his right of succession, would assume the Presidency with too broad powers. In reality, under the parliamentary system, the President retained many powers through his personal ability to control the Prime Minister.¹³ Such was the parliamentary form of government that was to be offered to Goulart.

Meanwhile, it was a circuitous route that was bringing João Goulart back to Brasília. From Communist China, he

¹¹Carneiro, Uma Experiência de Parlamentarismo, p. 160.

¹²Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, Political Trends in Brazil (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968), p. 2.

¹³Filho, "The Brazilian Revolution," p. 243.

had gone to Singapore when the crisis erupted. Hesitating to return directly to Brazil until some compromise solution had been worked out, he flew from Singapore to Europe. Then from Europe, he went to New York, and from there down the west coast of South America, across Argentina, and stopped in Montevideo. In Uruguay, he conferred over the telephone with former Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos. During this telephone conference he agreed to accept the parliamentary solution offered to him.¹⁴ In Montevideo, on being interviewed by a group of journalists, João Goulart said that he would obey the Brazilian Constitution and his government would be for all the people of Brazil. He reiterated with pride his point of view on foreign policy declaring that he would follow the policy of continuing diplomatic relations with all the people of the world.¹⁵ From Montevideo, he went to his own state of Rio Grande do Sul and thence made his way to the Presidency in Brasília. On September 5, 1961 his airplane landed in Brasília.¹⁶ On September 8,

¹⁴Carneiro, Uma Experiência de Parlamentarismo, p. 161.

¹⁵Mário Victor, Cinco Anos Que Abalaram O Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1965), p. 408.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 409.

1961, João Goulart was sworn in as President of Brazil.¹⁷

Who was this man who had become the President of Brazil? A rapid career, owed to the favor of Getúlio Vargas, had promoted him without resort to armed force to the Presidency at the age of forty-two. In his private life, he was a man of the world. He was simple, generous, and loyal to his friends. Personally he did not display arrogant attitudes. In fact, he could give the appearance of being affable and humble. Goulart was well-known for having a luxurious apartment in Avenida Atlântica in Rio de Janeiro and for owning vast properties.¹⁸

Certain Brazilian authors have not been so kind in their treatment of him. They considered Goulart a demagogue and an ambitious man who wanted personal absolute power like that wielded by Vargas, whose political heir he considered himself to be.¹⁹ As with most politicians, the truth probably lay somewhere in between these opinions. In 1954, he had been relieved of his position as Labor Minister because

¹⁷ Carneiro, Uma Experiência de Parlamentarismo, p. 161.

¹⁸ J. J. Faust, A Revolução Devora Seus Presidentes (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Saga, 1965), p. 54.

¹⁹ Filho, "The Brazilian Revolution," pp. 241-242.

of pressures on Vargas by the military who objected at that time to Goulart's cooperating with Communist elements in the unions.²⁰ After Vargas' suicide, however, his prestige was more than reestablished among certain sectors of public opinion; he came to be recognized as the executor of Vargas' political will (Vargas left a letter of doubtful authenticity) which was, however, intensively and skillfully exploited by Communists because it was a document which condemned foreign economic cooperation.²¹

The years that Goulart was President of Brazil can be divided into two segments. The first segment consisted of the time that he was a parliamentary President, and the second segment consisted of the time spent as a Brazilian President with full powers. In the first he was maneuvering to regain full presidential power. In the second he was struggling against a multiplicity of domestic problems.

In the first fourteen months of his administration, from September, 1961 to January, 1963, Goulart maneuvered carefully to regain full presidential powers. He desired to have a plebiscite which would reject the Additional Act that

²⁰John W. F. Dulles, Vargas of Brazil (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967), pp. 315-317.

²¹Ibid., p. 334.

had established the parliamentary system. Parliamentarism in Brazil was a failure because President Goulart and his party, the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, did their best to make the new system unworkable. As a result, the country reverted to the old presidential system in January, 1963, after a national plebiscite. The election regarding continuation of the parliamentary form of government was held January 6, 1963.²² The votes in favor of a presidency were 9,457,448 against 2,073,582 for a parliamentary government.²³ On January 23, 1963, the Brazilian government promulgated the Constitutional correction revoking the Additional Act which had instituted the system of parliamentary government.²⁴ After his full powers were restored in 1963, President Goulart pursued a domestic policy that leaned more and more toward the forces of the left.

Upon such a domestic base as has been described, Goulart had to predicate his foreign policy. As might be expected he was not able to implement a foreign policy as forcefully as Jânio Quadros. In reality, he had very little

²²Diário de Notícias, January 8, 1963, p. 1.

²³Victor, Cinco Anos Que Abalaram O Brasil, p. 446.

²⁴Diário de Notícias, January 23, 1963, p. 1.

time for working with one because he had to concentrate so much on Brazilian domestic problems. What foreign policy that Goulart did conduct was in accord with what he thought that the people of Brazil wanted as manifested to him through the Council of Ministers.²⁵

In matters of foreign policy, the new President took a cue from his predecessor. He made an effort to maintain an independent foreign policy.²⁶

Upon taking office as President, Goulart appointed Francisco Clementino de San Tiago Dantas to be his Foreign Minister. San Tiago Dantas took office in a formal ceremony on September 12, 1961, in the Palace of Itamaraty. In a little speech made at the event, the new Foreign Minister revealed the direction of Brazilian foreign policy under the new administration. San Tiago Dantas affirmed that the international commercial policy of the Goulart administration would be the same as the one pursued by Jânio Quadros. This meant that Brazil would be willing to trade

²⁵ O Jornal de Rio de Janeiro, September 10, 1961, p. 1.

²⁶ Edmund Dell, Brazil: The Dilemma of Reform (London: The Fabian Society, 1964), p. 33.

with all nations of the world whether they were Communist or capitalist.²⁷

This foreign policy was supported at the first Council of Ministers' meeting attended by João Goulart three days later. At the meeting the President reaffirmed Brazil's policy of nonintervention and self-determination in regard to Cuba.²⁸ Goulart and his Foreign Minister thus established the fact that the Goulart administration would attempt to pursue an independent foreign policy following the same general lines and directions that had been initiated by Jânio Quadros.

Like Quadros, Goulart courted Cuba. He dispatched a trusted military aide to Havana in an attempt to bring about an understanding between the Castro government and Washington. This man was the chief of his military, General Albino Silva.²⁹ Brazil had generally approved the United States blockade of Cuba, but, in a counter-effort, had offered her good offices to mediate between the United States and Cuba,

²⁷ Diário de Notícias, September 12, 1961, p. 1.

²⁸ Diário de Notícias, September 15, 1961, p. 1.

²⁹ E. Bradford Burns, Nationalism in Brazil (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 97.

which no one asked for, as far as is known.³⁰ It was President Goulart personally who assumed command in the negotiations with Cuba. The purpose of this mission was to propose to Castro that he return to the American community under the surety of Brazil. This initiative was abundantly ridiculed by the enemies of Goulart, notably by the severest critic of past Brazilian Presidents, Carlos Lacerda, who as always was a strong voice of opposition from the right.³¹ The idea was not totally absurd. The Cuban affair could have been settled by Latin Americans since Cuba was a Latin American country, and it was not an imbecilic pretense on the part of Brazil to try to mediate the conflict. But Washington and Moscow had other arrangements and apparently ignored the Brazilian gesture. Brazil felt that she was wrongly treated by the super powers in this matter.³²

The next foreign policy move of significance during the Goulart administration took place at the meeting at Punta del Este of the Organization of American States. Prior to his departure to lead the Brazilian delegation, San Tiago Dantas said repeatedly that Brazil would defend

³⁰ Faust, A Revolução Devora Seus Presidentes, p. 44.

³¹ Ibid., p. 13.

³² Ibid.

the principle of self-determination in the meeting.³³ In an interview, he went further and said that the Brazilian position would be an attempt to bring Cuba back into the Organization of American States.³⁴ The principles of non-intervention and self-determination were the official positions of the Brazilian government.³⁵ Brazil thus refused to ostracize Cuba at the Punta del Este meeting and found herself in the minority of those who abstained from voting to censure Cuba. When San Tiago Dantas returned to Brazil, there was passed by the Chamber of Deputies a vote of censure against him for his actions in Punta del Este.³⁶

Prior to the resignation of Quadros, the United States had just appointed a new ambassador to Brazil. He was Lincoln Gordon, who was a graduate of Harvard, a Rhodes scholar, and a professor of international economic relations at Harvard. The appointment came on August 24, 1961, one day before Quadros resigned. Ambassador Gordon succeeded the career diplomat John M. Cabot. He had traveled

³³Diário de Notícias, January 6, 1962, p. 1.

³⁴Diário de Notícias, January 10, 1962, p. 1.

³⁵Diário de Notícias, January 13, 1962, p. 1.

³⁶Diário de Notícias, February 1, 1962, p. 1.

extensively in Brazil and read and spoke Portuguese.³⁷ On October 20, 1961, Gordon presented his credentials to the Brazilian government in the Palácio do Planalto.³⁸ It fell to the lot of Lincoln Gordon to discuss with Goulart a problem developing between the United States and Brazil. Under the Goulart administration, there were nationalizations of selected foreign enterprises. A subsidiary of the American Foreign Power Company named "Bond and Share" had been nationalized. Through the efforts of Gordon, the governments of the United States and Brazil resolved that American Foreign Power Company would be indemnified. Certain Brazilian intellectuals reacted unfavorably to such an agreement.³⁹

The United States made serious efforts to promote better relations with the administration of João Goulart. President Kennedy sent a special envoy named Merwin Bohan to study various ways the two countries could cooperate. The mission, headed by Bohan, was formed especially to examine

³⁷ "Harvard Man for Brazil: Kennedy Picks an Envoy," U.S. News and World Report, L (September 4, 1961), 20.

³⁸ Diário de Notícias, October 20, 1961, p. 1.

³⁹ Edmar Morel, O Golpe Começou em Washington (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965), p. 98.

possibilities of work projects financed by the United States in the northeastern part of Brazil.⁴⁰ With Lincoln Gordon, Bohan called on San Tiago Dantas and discussed various area development programs that could be implemented.

In the early months of his parliamentary Presidency, Goulart labored to consolidate his domestic and international political positions. He stressed his anti-Communist principles and his devotion to the democratic process. Given the continued financial crisis, which Quadros had only begun to attack, Goulart knew that he would have to convince the United States and the international monetary authorities of his serious intent. He partially succeeded in doing this by a trip to Washington, D.C., in April of 1962. His visit included a speech to a joint session of the American Congress and a lengthy conversation with President Kennedy and other officials.⁴¹ In his speech to the United States Congress, he said:

We feel . . . that our destiny is in our own hands, and we keep our eyes open to find the adequate solutions for the development of Brazil. The political awareness of the leaders in government and of the people themselves is keenly awake to the fact that the fight for development is the fight of the

⁴⁰Diário de Notícias, October 28, 1961, p. 1.

⁴¹Washington Post, April 4, 1962, p. 1.

people. In pursuance of this purpose, we are engaged in the realization and implementation of basic reforms, among which the agrarian reform is paramount. We recognize the importance of the foreign contribution to the process of our development.

I have repeatedly said that we nourish no prejudice against foreign capital and the technical collaboration of the more advanced countries. We desire this cooperation and will assure its full freedom within the legal limits established and the inspiration of Brazilian ideals. . . .

As a country now in a phase of full expansion, Brazil offers broad possibilities to foreign private enterprise desirous to cooperate loyally for its development. In the matter of public utilities services there are certain areas of friction which should be eliminated, all the more so because through a natural phenomenon, besides creating disagreements between the granting authority and the concessionary, they are not rarely a source of misunderstanding between friendly countries.

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I wish to reaffirm the identification of my country with the democratic principles which unite the peoples of the West. Brazil forms no part of any politico-military bloc, but it abides by its freely assumed international commitments. Brazil's international action responds to no other objective than that of favoring, by all the means in our power, the preservation and strengthening of peace. It is our belief that the ideological conflict between East and West cannot and must not be decided by military action, for in the event of a nuclear war, even if we managed to save our own lives, whether in victory or in defeat, our very reason for living would be obliterated.

Brazil believes that a noninimical contact between the democratic world and the socialist world can be beneficial to the knowledge and coordination of experience of all. It is our hope that these contacts will make it evident that representative democracy is the most perfect of all forms of

government and the only one compatible with the protection of mankind and the preservation of human freedom.⁴²

Although Goulart's trip was essentially a good will mission, both sides made concrete gestures. Goulart assured the United States Congress that Brazil was an independent but not a neutral nation and declared his opposition to the totalitarian regime of Fidel Castro. The United States government in turn completed negotiations for \$131 million in aid funds for the Brazilian northeast, which had been held up because of American insistence on controlling its expenditure. The two Presidents also issued a joint communiqué reaffirming the principles of the inter-American system and pledging support for the Latin American Free Trade Association.⁴³ During the informal conversation in Washington, Goulart gave indications of reasonable treatment of foreign-owned public utilities, whose expropriation had become a burning political issue in Brazil.⁴⁴ Perhaps of greater significance though were those statements which he did not

⁴² João Goulart, speech before the U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., April 4, 1962, in Vital Speeches, May 1, 1962, pp. 426-427.

⁴³ Washington Post, April 5, 1962, p. 1.

⁴⁴ Washington Post, April 6, 1962, p. A16.

make. He made no response which indicated a more cooperative attitude toward the Alliance for Progress and gave no impression of concern about Communist infiltration in the labor union movement. Although the visit produced limited results, it appeared to mark the beginning of what might have proved to be more fruitful cooperation between the Goulart government and the United States.

Goulart tried to be active in other diplomatic matters. He welcomed a Mainland Chinese trade mission to Rio de Janeiro. The reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. and other European Communist countries actually was realized during his administration. Nikita Khrushchev invited Goulart to visit Russia and made an offer of economic and technical aid to Brazil. The aid was for a hydroelectric plant.⁴⁵ Diplomatic missions were also dispatched by Goulart to such diverse countries as Algeria, Syria, and Ceylon.⁴⁶ San Tiago Dantas further stated that Brazil wanted the four great powers to reach an understanding on Berlin and that Berlin should have self-determination.⁴⁷ San Tiago Dantas also said that Brazil should look

⁴⁵Correio da Manhã, January 1, 1964, p. 6.

⁴⁶Diário de Notícias, October 11, 1961, p. 1.

⁴⁷Ibid.

to new markets everywhere in the world.⁴⁸ The search for new markets seemed to become the dominant theme in the foreign policy of João Goulart. This desire for trade and prestige gave two reasons for the recognition of Communist governments and the establishment of diplomatic posts in neutralist nations; the compelling psychological motive was the desire to exert independence of action.⁴⁹

San Tiago Dantas often wrote about Brazilian foreign policy. In his books and articles, he attempted to justify the position Brazilian presidents took regarding international matters. In 1962, he wrote that "the Brazilian people realized, and all countries understood, that Brazil had taken an international position, and that position was neither arbitrary nor provisional but corresponded to the permanent interests and aspirations of our nationality."⁵⁰

Goulart had many enemies but probably none were so formidable against him as the military. They were the ones who originally opposed his being President, and they were the ones who finally overthrew him in a revolution. Goulart

⁴⁸ Diário de Notícias, January 5, 1962, p. 1.

⁴⁹ Burns, Nationalism in Brazil, p. 98.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

never seemed to try to placate the military, and toward the end of his administration he, in fact, seemed to do everything possible to exacerbate the bad feeling existing between them.

Under the pretense of protesting the disciplinary imprisonment of some sailors and marines by the Minister of the Navy, about 600 enlisted men assembled at the headquarters of the metal workers union in Rio de Janeiro and proclaimed themselves a "permanent assembly" until the Minister would agree to their demands. There they remained.⁵¹

Their demands were:

1. No punishment for the demonstrators.
2. Recognition of their association.
3. Liberation of all the seamen and fusilier prisoners, including those gathered on the Ilha das Cobras.
4. Humanization of the Navy (right of marriage of all the sailors and marines, better pay, elimination of inhuman prisons, etc.).
5. Better food in the ships and quarters.⁵²

⁵¹O Estado de São Paulo, March 29, 1964, p. 6.

⁵²Morel, O Golpe Começou em Washington, pp. 88-89.

President Goulart, rather than punish the mutineers and reestablish authority, encroached upon the jurisdiction of the Navy Minister by giving amnesty to all of them and sending them back to their units and vessels. This act of the President made a mockery of military discipline.⁵³ And as if to crown the chaotic situation which he had engineered he named as Minister of the Navy an admiral of notorious leftist leanings, Paulo Mário da Cunha Rodrigues. The new Navy Minister then supported the action of Goulart in granting amnesty.⁵⁴

The matter really reached a climax at a rally held by a group of sergeants in honor of Goulart on Monday, March 30, 1964.⁵⁵ The speeches were seditious and subversive; the President responded mentioning the brave sailors who had mutinied.⁵⁶ All of this was too much for the military and on March 31-April 1, 1964, they deposed Goulart. When the armies of the revolution faced the armies loyal to Goulart which were sent to destroy them, nobody wanted to

⁵³ O Estado de São Paulo, March 31, 1964, p. 5.

⁵⁴ O Estado de São Paulo, March 29, 1964, p. 8.

⁵⁵ O Estado de São Paulo, March 31, 1964, p. 7.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

fire the first shot. There were negotiations among the officers, and after several hours of suspense the government leaders decided that Goulart's administration was not inspiring enough to defend.⁵⁷ The government troops disintegrated. Some joined the revolution; a part went home to Rio de Janeiro; and the rest declared themselves prisoners of the revolutionary army. Ranieri Mazzilli again became interim President of Brazil. The Supreme Command of the revolution, composed of the military leaders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, proposed General Humberto Castelo Branco as presidential candidate to Congress. He was elected in April 5, 1964, by military leaders to finish Goulart's term and he took office on April 15, 1964.⁵⁸

There was much that was old in the Quadros-Goulart foreign policy. It supported the traditional policies of peaceful solution of international disputes, nonintervention, self-determination, and international order. What was new was the determination to exercise independent leadership and to gain recognition on a much broader scale than ever before. The Baron of Rio Branco as Foreign Minister had

⁵⁷ O Estado de São Paulo, April 2, 1964, p. 10.

⁵⁸ O Estado de São Paulo, April 15, 1964, p. 1.

weakened Brazil's ties with Europe in favor of a closer friendship with the United States; the nationalists of the mid-twentieth century were prepared to deemphasize those connections in favor of a new alliance between the underdeveloped nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia. With the revolution of 1964, all that was new in the Brazilian foreign policy came to an abrupt end, and the military government turned Brazil once again into the path of a more conventional and traditional foreign policy.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

Nationalism has been defined as a deep love for one's own country coupled with a dislike for other countries.¹ During the presidential administrations of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart, the nationalist movement gained supporters and strength. Led by these two Presidents, nationalists played a more active role in government. The nationalist ferment in Brazil, as in other developing areas, reflected the passionate efforts of millions of people to create something better economically for themselves and to attain a more influential status in the determination of world affairs. The pursuance of an independent foreign policy could be attributed to this nationalism. But with Quadros, much more than just nationalism was involved. Quadros was aware that there was a growing self-confidence

¹E. Bradford Burns, Nationalism in Brazil (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 3.

in Brazil and his independent manner appealed to Brazilians. His personal actions in diplomatic activities conveyed to the observer that Quadros knew exactly what he wanted to do but actually did not know how to obtain his goals. His personal mannerisms and treatment of diplomats gave the impression of an egotistic and inept political leader.

In 1961, the Quadros administration used the alleged advantages of a third position to justify reorienting Brazil's foreign policy in the direction of neutralism. To support this position Quadros argued that the United States had abandoned its traditional policy of acting as a neutral nation or "honest broker" between quarreling factions in the world. As a consequence, Brazil no longer had an uncommitted United States in which it could have confidence and to which it might look for guidance. In these circumstances Brazil, according to Quadros, was compelled to develop an independent foreign policy. Neutralism was also a useful vehicle for rationalizing a closer relationship with the Soviet and Communist Chinese blocs. The Communists of either bloc, dedicated as they had been to fostering suspicions of and hostility toward the United States, obviously regarded neutralism in Latin America as a victory in

their campaign to control men's minds and loyalties.²

Quadros was determined to add other dimensions to Brazilian nationalism. One of these was Brazil's ambition to play a leading part in world affairs, especially among the underdeveloped countries; another was the tendency to align Brazil with the underdeveloped nations as one of the more industrially developed members and at the same time to show its independence of the Western powers. Both aspirations had a basis in precedent as well as fact. In the 1920's Brazil had sought to gain a permanent seat in the League of Nations Council, alongside the recognized great powers. In the 1940's at the close of World War II, it tried to be the spokesman for Latin America from its position as the only Latin American country to have sent an expeditionary force to fight in Europe. Both bids for leadership failed, but Brazil's exploding population made it one of the largest countries in the world with respect to both population and area, and a large part of the country, especially São Paulo in the south center, had made rapid progress in industrialization and modernization. Moreover, Brazil had long-standing ethnic ties with Africa, because of

²John J. Johnson, "The New Latin American Nationalism," Yale Review, LIV (December, 1964), 187.

the large Negro element in its population, and commercial and cultural ties with Asia dating from the time when both Brazil and that continent were a part of Portugal's globe-girdling empire.³

In spite of Quadros' and Goulart's efforts at autonomy, under their administrations the United States continued to be the most important country as far as Brazilian foreign policy was concerned. The United States loomed large in every decision that these two presidents made. The United States was the overwhelming influence upon Brazilian foreign policy from 1961 through 1964. In her relations with Brazil during this time, the United States had several alternatives. She could have had a foreign policy which concentrated exclusively on the Middle American region, and as always, there were plenty of Americans and foreign nationals who wished her to do so. If Brazilian presidents and politicians wanted to follow an independent foreign policy, the United States could have done the same, and far more easily than most Latin American countries.

When an International Monetary Fund Commission visited Brazil in the spring of 1961, there were street

³Arthur P. Whitaker and David C. Jordon, Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 86.

demonstrations organized against it,⁴ probably of covert Communist origin. President Quadros, seeking assistance from the Monetary Fund in April and May of 1961, took great care to make it appear that nothing he did was constrained by his Monetary Fund agreements. He attempted to follow International Monetary Fund recommendations honorably, but he insisted that the measures he took were solely self-initiated and sovereign decisions of Brazil.

The real base of the diplomacy of the Western Hemisphere in 1961 and 1962 remained much as it was during World War II. In the early 1960's Communist and nationalist movements in Latin America opposed Western Hemisphere diplomacy, adopted slogans, and endeavored to excite corresponding diplomatic attitudes on the part of their governments and foreign offices. Brazilian activities in international affairs proceeded with the slogan of independence. Yet, no country in the world is completely independent and can conduct diplomacy with entire disregard of other countries. Since all Latin American nations are sovereign and are as independent as it is possible for a nation to be in a rapidly shrinking world which depends on foreign trade to

⁴Adolf A. Berle, Latin America--Diplomacy and Reality (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 50.

survive, words and slogans imply more than they say. Independence, in the sense intended by the politicians using the word, implied the capacity to act contrary to the interests of the United States, though naturally such meaning was rarely expressed openly. It could also be interpreted as a quite legitimate desire that the government involved should not be merely a "yes-man" to the United States. The word "independent" in relation to foreign relations was used most forcibly by President Jânio Quadros, but in addition it was used by the Foreign Ministers of both Quadros and Goulart. The exact meaning of the word as used by Quadros may never be completely understood by the world even though he attempted to interpret in a written essay what he meant in advocating that Brazil pursue an independent foreign policy.

This attempt at explanation was made in an article which appeared in a United States journal treating of international matters.⁵ The article had been written before Quadros resigned his office but appeared in the journal two months after he had left Brazil. In the article, he succinctly reviewed all the major programs that he had tried to develop for Brazil in foreign affairs and gave what he

⁵Jânio Quadros, "Brazil's New Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, XL (October, 1961), 19.

considered plausible reasons for them. He failed, however, to give a reasonable explanation for the change in Brazilian foreign policy toward the United States during his administration. The most significant assertion in the article was his statement quoting a likely motto for Brazil, namely, "Produce everything, for everything produced is marketable."⁶ The word "marketable" as used by Quadros referred to the international market. Looking at the independent foreign policy of Quadros in retrospect, one may say this motto seemed to be the dominant theme of his international relations with all the world except the United States. The Theme was not as clearly pronounced during the Quadros administration as it was in the subsequent presidential administration.⁷ Quadros was determined to seek new markets for Brazilian products in an attempt to improve Brazil's economy. What Quadros did not realize was the fact that Brazilian products were not always competitively priced in the world market.

In spite of the new, independent foreign policy, the primary goals of Brazilian diplomacy, as a whole,

⁶Quadros, "Brazil's New Foreign Policy," p. 27.

⁷Diário de Notícias, January 5, 1962, p. 1.

remained constant. Under Quadros and Goulart, the basic principles remained: (1) continental solidarity, translated in practice into the consistent and irreversible backing Brazil continued to give Pan Americanism, albeit with Brazil as the leader; (2) nonintervention, i.e., respect for the sovereignty of other states; and (3) peaceful solution of controversies, repudiating force as a means of settling conflicts.⁸ These were deep-rooted principles upon which the whole structure of Brazilian foreign policy had rested for a long time and they continued to be emphasized under Quadros and Goulart. In fact, Quadros stressed these principles in the article he wrote for Foreign Affairs.⁹ Quadros did indeed continue to support these principles but he began to add new dimensions by attempting to increase the role played by Brazil in international affairs, and by pursuing a foreign policy more self-interest-oriented. Because of increased domestic problems during his administration, Goulart was unable to give as much attention to foreign affairs as his predecessor. His foreign policy, for the

⁸ Fernando Ramos de Alencar, "Some Postulates of Brazilian Foreign Policy," Brazilian American Survey, VIII (1960), 6.

⁹ Quadros, "Brazil's New Foreign Policy," p. 19.

most part, was a continuation of the one espoused by Quadros. It was easier to follow what had been implemented by Quadros.

Independence in foreign policy was entirely within both the right and the power of any sovereign state such as Brazil. If the United States maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, it was difficult to object to Brazil's establishing similar relations. If Great Britain could expand her trade relations with the Communist world, there was no valid reason why Brazil should not market her products behind the Iron Curtain goods in return, if she could.

Acting as an independent agent, however, has a powerful corollary. In taking such action, governments have to take into account two facts. First, they, and they alone, must take full responsibility for their actions. Secondly, they create a situation whereby other governments may act independently of them and their interests. Tacit assumption was usually made by most Brazilian politicians advocating independence that the United States, in hemispheric affairs, would under all circumstances maintain a policy of cooperation with and consideration for its Brazilian neighbor quite irrespective of the line taken by Brazil.

There is, in international law, no reason to prevent any Latin American government's seeking trade relations and accepting economic assistance from the Soviet Union under the program followed by the Soviet government since 1954. But, equally, there would be no legal or moral reason why in such case the United States should not be free to consult her own independent national interest in giving or withholding any aid she might be providing by grants or loan, or in reviewing any measures she may have taken to stabilize or assist markets for her neighbor's products. There should not be a double standard of independence in the conduct of international relations.

Since the enunciation of the Good Neighbor policy in 1933, the economic policy of the United States with respect to the Western Hemisphere has not been one of independence. The United States has sought to follow a policy of mutual cooperation within a regional family of nations. That policy found expression in the 1948 Charter of the Organization of American States, Article 63 of which sets up the Inter-American Economic and Social Council for the promotion of the economic and social welfare of the American nations and through effective cooperation, for "the better utilization of their natural resources, the development of their

agriculture and industry and the raising of the standards of living of their peoples."¹⁰ But cooperation can never be a permanent one-way street for international law. Neither by treaty, nor by morality, nor by ordinary common sense is it any state's obligation to cooperate with another state which finds it in its interest to be hostile in essential matters, as Brazil was toward the United States.

Some Brazilian politicians and intellectuals, like many politicians in neutralist and underdeveloped countries elsewhere in the world, had deluded themselves into thinking that the United States could not withdraw from a policy of economic support. The theory held that the United States could not survive economically without stimulating the market by means of periodic financial assistance to their country. Some of the spokesmen for Brazil believed that they, on behalf of their country, had a right to draw on the resources of the United States.¹¹ When it was pointed out that at any time the Congress of the United States might

¹⁰ Charter of the Organization of American States, Art. 63, in Ann V. Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., The Organization of American States (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963), p. 421.

¹¹ For example, Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco and Edmar Morel.

simply decide to end such programs, the response was a sort of incredulous horror. "But you cannot because the United States needs the Brazilian market," was a common rejoinder, and the more naive parroted the classic threat: "But then we would go Communist."¹² The United States' obtaining of Brazilian cooperation based on fear of that kind is worth little or nothing, and there was always plenty of political pressure in the United States to terminate cooperation at once whenever that argument was used.

If independence for Brazil meant breaking away from the inter-American system it automatically implied a willingness to take the consequences of withdrawing from that system, possibly on the theory that the blackmail value of the resulting position would be more useful than the advantages of mutual friendship. Outside the inter-American system no Latin American country would have an automatic right to participate in the program of the Alliance for Progress or, perhaps more important, any particular claim to sell her goods in the markets of the United States. A number of Latin American countries, and Brazil in particular, insisted after the Cuban sugar quota had been cut off that they had a

¹² Berle, Latin America, p. 81.

right to a portion of the Cuban quota, thus enabling them to sell sugar in the United States at the higher price paid by American consumers. This insistence was a remarkable exhibition of faith in the inter-American system and in the cooperative attitude of the United States, and at the same time a misunderstanding of a basic premise in international law.¹³ For if any one thing is plain it is that preferential access to the American market lies solely and peculiarly within the sovereign power of the United States.

Every country in the world should be wholly independent in dealing with its internal problems and should be free to choose the political and social structure it prefers. The basis of this right is essentially juridical. In matters of international policy every country should have the right to act according to its choice, but no government in existence can act without considering policies and countermeasures which other countries may take with equally unquestioned juridical right as their interest may dictate. In matters involving international economic relations the word "independence" is almost meaningless. Economic exchange between advanced countries is a necessity; no country is or can be independent of that fact. There is, to be

¹³Berle, Latin America, p. 81.

sure, the juridical capacity to withdraw from the complex of trade and commerce. The exercise of this alternative is practically impossible for any country save primitive communities. Part of the political emotion finding its way into Brazilian diplomacy results from awareness of this reality. This is understandable; each country would like to have the privileges of economic life in a complex world without the attendant burdens, and each resents the fact (for which no one is responsible) that the burdens are inevitable. In a way, these economic privileges without the burdens were what Quadros' new foreign policy was striving to achieve for Brazil.

It was Quadros' daring innovations in foreign policy that caused the greatest antagonism toward him and proved that no man or country can act completely independently and without regard for the consequences of his acts with respect to others. Conservative elements in the armed services and the more intransigent anti-Communists, under the leadership of men like Carlos Lacerda, were alarmed and angered at Quadros' declared intention of renewing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Communist bloc nations and incensed by the honoring of Cuba's Ernesto Guevara with one of Brazil's top decorations. Nevertheless,

after Quadros' departure, diplomatic relations were quietly reestablished with Russia and attempts were made to expand trade with the Soviet Union as well as with Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Communist China. The compromise parliamentary government that succeeded Quadros under João Goulart continued to stand firmly for nonintervention and the untrammelled right of self-determination for all nations despite powerful United States pressures for a decisive stand against Cuba.¹⁴

Brazil's new policy was fundamentally a drive for new power. It thus involved not only Brazilian self-affirmation as an independent leader within the hemisphere but also the seeking out of markets for the country's expanding industrial production and the enhancement of its position as a world power through participation in the development of the newly freed African nations. One of Quadros' early moves while in the presidency was the creation of a Brazilian Institute of Afro-Asian Studies and the naming of a Negro journalist as Ambassador to Ghana, the first of his race to receive a major diplomatic appointment

¹⁴ Frank Bonilla, Operational Neutralism--Brazil Challenges United States Leadership, American Universities Field Staff Reports, East Coast South America Series, X, No. 1 (January, 1962), 1.

in Brazil's foreign service. The ambassadorial nomination was confirmed after Quadros had left the government.¹⁵

Looking back upon the foreign policy of Quadros and Goulart, one can say that Quadros did what he thought was best for Brazil in the field of international relations. Through his policy of seeking new markets, he was making Brazil a force in the world and at the same time developing the country economically. Indeed, many Brazilians believed there was nothing wrong with his foreign policy, but there was one very serious flaw in the manner in which he implemented his new diplomacy, and that concerned the treatment of Brazil's traditional friends, toward whom he was unnecessarily rude. He seemed to be particularly obnoxious in his attitude toward the United States, and only a little less so toward Great Britain and Portugal. If Quadros had pursued his new foreign policy without the corollary of insulting Brazil's firm, traditional allies, he might well have succeeded in accomplishing his goals for Brazil. He was potentially one of the great presidents of Brazil. But all of this success was not to be. Because of the eccentric ways and his ability to antagonize a number of friendly

¹⁵ Bonilla, Operational Neutralism, p. 5.

countries, and because of pressures brought to bear by many Brazilians fearful of his actions, Quadros was forced to resign.

Goulart inherited the chaos left after the sudden departure of Quadros. This young President continued Quadros' policies and attempted to finalize all those diplomatic maneuvers that Quadros had initiated. Goulart had no original foreign policy. His one feeble attempt to mediate in the Cuban problem was a failure. His administration was one of complicated domestic problems. Goulart's administration had to contend with a multiplicity of pressures. Soon they were sufficiently strong to bring about his ouster.

On April 1, 1964, in as abrupt a manner as the departure of Quadros, Brazil's independent foreign policy was terminated with the revolution that overthrew Goulart. The April, 1964 revolution against the economic and political anarchy of Goulart's administration gave Brazil a government which brought to a sudden end the neutralist foreign policy of the Quadros-Goulart era. The new government, under the Presidency of Humberto Castelo Branco, abandoned the main provisions of the foreign policy begun by Quadros and continued by Goulart: the pro-Castro bias, the objective of organizing the underdeveloped countries against the

developed nations for the purpose of creating a world-wide third force, and the effort to strengthen ties with Communist China and the Soviet bloc.

The foreign policy of any Brazilian government, some critics have pointed out, will be conditioned by (1) the nature of the national consciousness, (2) past and present United States policies, (3) the Brazilian president's assessment of what policy best serves the country's national interest and the military concept of national security.¹⁶ These conditions raise the interesting question of whether Quadros' brief tenure in Brasília had any lasting influence on Brazil's foreign relations. The desire for an independent foreign policy became dormant after the 1964 revolution. Whether a future administration will try to revive it is questionable. Quadros' sharp departures from Brazil's traditional international policy, which previously had almost always closely followed United States leadership, were attributed during his months as President to his flamboyant personal style or to the exigencies of Brazil's precarious economic and political situation. This study has

¹⁶Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, Political Trends in Brazil (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968), p. 125.

attempted to show that these activities by Quadros in international relations were sufficiently unique and distinct from previous Brazilian foreign policy so that they could justifiably be termed an independent foreign policy.

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